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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SEMITIC AND GREEK THOUGHT
CONCERNING THE WRATH OF GOD.

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INTRODUCTION.

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Although the wrath of God is not a topic of debate and discussion today, it is an important question. Its importance arises from three facts. First, it bulks large in the writings of the Old Testament. Second, it bulked large in the thinking of the early Christians. The conflict between the Hebrew Old Testament idea of an angry God and the Greek philosophic doctrine of an impassible God furnished them with one of their major intellectual problems. This conflict played an important part in the theological controversies of the first four centuries. It was at the root of battles between pagan and Christian as well as conflicts between orthodox and heretic. The importance of this factor in these disputes has not received adequate recognition. It is hoped that this dissertation will make a contribution to the understanding of the theological disputes of these centuries by calling attention to the part the conflicting views of the wrath of God played.

The third reason for its importance is that there are still philosophical problems connected with the concept which are unsolved. One of these is the problem of reconciling the concept of impassibility with that of personality. The ancients were also conscious of this problem. How could an impassible deity be the living God? There are also problems in the relation of this doctrine to that of the atonement. In a recent book, The Suffering of the Impassible God, E. H. Brasnett deals with the problem of maintaining the doctrine of impassibility with a moral doctrine of the atonement, the latter requiring that the Father suffer with the Son in the atonement.

There are also problems in the field of religious education involved in the idea of the wrath of God. How are the primitive anthropo-

pathic stories in the Old Testament attributing anger and even unethical conduct to God to be treated? How are we to prevent children from receiving erroneous and harmful ideas of God through their use? This problem cannot be solved merely by a process of selection of material. Omission of such passages may be necessary for children, but it does not offer a permanent solution of the problem. It merely postpones it until the child has reached a stage of development in which a more adequate solution can be offered, such as the teaching of a rational view of inspiration and the doctrine of progressive revelation. The purpose of this study, however, is not to discuss or offer solutions for these philosophic or practical problems.

The purpose of this study is primarily historical. The aim has been to study the teaching concerning the wrath of God in the patristic writings, showing the important part the conflicting views concerning this doctrine played in the philosophic thought and controversy of this period. The chief interest has been historical, but the nature of the theme makes consideration of the philosophic questions inevitable.

Before discussing the patristic writings themselves it is necessary to discuss not only the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, but also that of Greek philosophy concerning the wrath of God. Without this background it would be impossible to understand the intellectual problems of the early Church Fathers connected with the concept. This study, while not exhaustive, adequately represents the Greek point of view with which the Old Testament came into conflict with the spread of Christianity into the Graeco-Roman world.

It was also necessary to devote a chapter to Hellenistic Judaism, since the Hellenistic Jews were the first to be faced with the problem of reconciling Greek and Hebrew ideas concerning the wrath

of God. This chapter forms one of the most important parts of the contribution of this dissertation. Evidence is presented which points to a toning down in the text of the Septuagint due to the influence of the Greek doctrine of impassibility. This evidence has not been presented before. The chapter also includes a study of the teaching concerning God's anger in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament. Practically nothing has been written upon that subject. Pohlenz' Vom Zorne Gottes, the only work which is concerned with the theme of this dissertation, deals very casually with the subject of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. The aim of the study of these works was to find how far they reflect the influence of Greek philosophic thought upon the question. The results of the study show that for the most part this literature represents the view of late Judaism. It does not differ markedly from the later canonical writings of the Old Testament. In two writings, The Letter of Aristaeus and IV Maccabees, there is clear and definite evidence of the influence of the Greek view.

The chapter on the New Testament does not devote more space to the study of Paul for several reasons. First, there is nothing in his concept of the wrath of God to mark it as distinctly individual. His concept is similar to that of late Judaism. It is eschatological and not primitively psychological. It is also characterized by a tendency towards the hypostatization of anger. In this Paul represents the development of a factor already at work in the later canonical writings of the Old Testament. Second, it was the cruder, more anthropopathic, unethical representations of the Old Testament which caused the intellectual difficulties of the early Christians. It is the Old Testament references to the wrath of God which are cited more often. Third, the influence of Paul for a large part of the period under discussion was

not as great as at other times. From shortly after his death until the time of Augustine interest in Paul's theology was at a low ebb.

The study of the patristic writings has been limited to those of the first four centuries, because it was in that period that the controversies involving the doctrine of the wrath of God were important. Theological interest shifted later, and the issue was no longer debated. This limitation to the fourth century has not been held very strictly in order to give a more complete picture of men whose work began in the fourth but extended into the fifth century, e.g. Cyril of Alexandria.

This study has been limited to the writings of the Hebrews, Greek and Roman philosophers, and Christians. No attempt has been made to investigate the teaching on the wrath of God or gods in other religions and races. The study has been that of the conflict of Greek and Hebrew thought concerning the wrath of God in the Christian writings of the first four centuries.

THE WRATH OF GOD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

One of the attributes most frequently ascribed to Yahweh in the Old Testament is anger. There are two hundred and ninety-six references to anger on the part of God. This number would be higher if one counted twice those verses which contain more than one reference to the anger of God, as in the parallelism of the psalms. This does not include other anthropopathic expressions such as repentance and jealousy. It does not include references to destruction and calamities or future punishments and judgment unless the anger of God is explicitly referred to in connection with the incident. Thus it does not include any reference to the flood story in which God is said to have repented that he made man (Gen. 6:6). It does not include such a reference as Exodus 4:24, in which Yahweh is pictured as attempting to kill Moses. It does not include any reference from Deut. 28, which consists largely of curses.

The concept of an angry God is found throughout the Old Testament. Of the thirty-nine books only six contain no reference predicated anger of Yahweh. These books are Ruth, Esther, Song of Solomon, Amos, Obadiah, and Haggai. This list is a surprising one; the books grouped together have little in common. Even the lovely idyl of Ruth is not quite free from the idea of God's anger, for Naomi complains that God has dealt very bitterly with her (Ruth 1:20, 21). Esther contains no mention of God at all, which precludes any mention of God's wrath. The Song of Solomon is generally regarded as a series of secular love poems or wedding songs. Both Esther and the Song of Solomon were among the books accepted in the canon with some reluctance and doubts. It is rather surprising to find Amos with no direct reference to God's anger, but that eloquent and stern preacher of God's

justice does not explicitly attribute anger to God, although he speaks much of the punishment of sin. This does not seem to be a conscious avoidance of anthropopathic language. In Amos 7:3, 6 God is said to have repented because of the pleadings of Amos and not to have sent threatened punishments of a plague of locusts and a conflagration. It is perhaps less surprising that the brief prophecy of Obadiah in its twenty-one verses contains no direct reference to the wrath of God, but even here we find the idea implied in the threatened doom of Edom. The theme and brevity of Haggai are probably the reasons for the omission of the idea in that book.

The idea of the wrath of God is common to all parts of the Old Testament. It is found in every type of literature: history, law, poetry, narrative, prophecy, and wisdom literature. It is found in the late literature as well as early literature. This can be made clear by briefly summarizing its occurrences. In Genesis we have only two references, Gen. 18: 30, 32. Here we find Abraham pleading with Yahweh not to be angry with him for entreating him to spare Sodom and Gomorrah. Here we find the typical ethical problem involved in references to the wrath of Yahweh, for Abraham is represented as more merciful than Yahweh and more conscious of the injustice of slaying the innocent with the wicked. Abraham is pictured as reminding God of his obligation of justice (Gen. 18: 25). In Exodus we have seven direct references to God's anger, in Leviticus only one, in Numbers fifteen, and in Deuteronomy twenty-five. If these references are grouped by documents, it will be found that the idea of God's wrath is as frequent in the latest as the earliest document. J has ten references, E only two, and P eleven; one comes from the Book of the Covenant, and one from the poem or song celebrating the crossing of the Red Sea. The remaining books may be tabulated as follows:

Joshua	5	Neh.	3	Dan.	1
Judges	6	Job	15	Hos.	5
I Sam.	1	Ps.	52	Joel	1
II Sam.	4	Prov.	3	Jonah	2
I Ki.	10	Eccl.	1	Micah	2
II Ki.	10	Isa.	23	Nahum	3
I Chron.	1	Jer.	43	Hab.	3
II "	17	Lam.	12	Zeph.	3
Ezra	5	Ezek.	20	Zech.	3

The Hebrew language has many different words to express the idea of anger. They are picturesque and vividly descriptive of the physiological aspect of anger. One common expression חָרָה אָף means literally "one's nose became hot". The word אָף, which is literally "nose" or "breathing", is the commonest noun for anger. Sometimes the verb חָרַח is used without this noun to express the idea of anger. The related noun חֵרָה meaning "heat" is also used for anger. It is frequently used with אָף and translated fierce anger. Another common word for anger חֶסֶם is also used for the heat and excitement caused by wine. Another noun which is often used is יִצְרָה literally "an overflowing". The related verb יָצַר is also sometimes used. The most common word for wrath is קָצַף which is literally "splinters" or "chips". The related verb form is also often used to express the idea of wrath; it literally means "to break in pieces". Another much used word is the verb כָּעַס, usually translated to provoke to anger, and its related noun. The use of these terms gives evidence that originally at least the expression the wrath of God was not a figurative expression denoting future punishment. It was conceived as a genuine physiological and psychological emotion. These facts are well summarized in the following quotation,

"Die hebräische Sprache ist sehr reich an Ausdrücken für 'zürnen', und in allen malt sie entweder den Zornsaffekt selbst als inner Glut, so חָרָה, חֶסֶם, חֵרָה, oder die Ausserung desselben in leidenschaftlichen Erregungen des seelischen und körperlichen Lebens, besonders schnauben, אָף, wahrscheinlich auch קָצַף, sodann schäumen, überwallen u. dgl. יָצַר, זָעַם, עָבַר. Alle diese Ausdrücke werden auch von Gottes

"Zorn gebraucht, und der zornige Gott is oft gemalt wie er schnaubt, Feuer von sich ausgehen lässt u. dgl. z.B. Dt. 32: 19 ff." (1)

Not only are the representations of an angry deity in the Old Testament couched in primitive anthropopathic terms, but some of them represent equally primitive ethical standards. They are sub-Christian and pre-Christian in their ethics. They are inferior to the New Testament level and to the best of the Old Testament. This non-moral or even immoral character of the wrath of Yahweh is expressed by Lods in the following quotation,

"The ancient Israelite did not shrink from regarding Jahweh as the instigator of acts that were morally bad." (2)

Ezek. 20:24, 25 might be cited as an example of this type of reference.

Otto also points out the non-ethical character of Yahweh's wrath when he states,

"In the first place it is patent from many passages of the Old Testament that this 'Wrath' has no concern whatever with moral qualities." (3)

Badè explains the capricious, irrational, unethical character of this wrath in a reference to II Sam. 6:8. He states,

"But to the ancient Hebrew, who sometimes was forced to harmonize the oracular directions of one day with the calamities of the next, events seemed to prove that Jahveh was liable at times to 'break forth' into unaccountable acts and sudden exhibitions of ill temper." (4)

In reference to Exodus 32 and 33 this same author points out that Moses intervenes for the people by calling to Yahweh's memory his oath, causing a change of heart by recalling him to his better self. He continues,

(1) Ruegg: "Zorne Gottes" in Realenc., v. 21, pp. 719-720

(2) Lods: Israel, p. 469

(3) Otto: The Idea of the Holy, p. 18

(4) Badè: The Old Testament in the Light of Today, p. 68

"By comparison Moses appears more just and humane than God, who like a quick tempered monarch, is protected by his vizier from the consequences of his own ill-considered actions.

"The Jahvist apparently did not feel Jahveh's liability to sudden fits of anger as a moral defect." (1)

He continues by pointing out that Ex. 33:5 implies that Yahweh even expresses distrust of his own angry moods.

Not all of the references to the wrath of Yahweh picture it as a human emotion. In a few references it seems to be more of an external malevolent force than an inner emotion. In the Old Testament it does not appear to develop as far as hypostatization. Wrath seems to be a blind impersonal force rather than a personalized demon. Otto describes it as follows,

"It is, as has been well said, 'like a hidden force of nature', like stored up electricity, discharging itself upon any one who comes too near." (2)

This quotation suggests that the idea of wrath is closely connected with the idea of holiness. The primitive idea of holiness was not associated with the concept of righteousness. Holiness was thought of as a mysterious, formidable force. Lods states that this was still the concept at the time of the settlement in Palestine, but that the discharge of divine energy was conceived somewhat less after the fashion of a blind physical force, and rather more after the pattern of human anger.(3) The few references in which it appears to be a blind impersonal force rather than a human emotion are late. They are found in the P document, Zechariah, and the work of the Chronicler. This type of reference uses the Hebrew word אַפַּיִם. A typical reference of this sort is Numbers 16: 46, "there is wrath gone out from Jehovah; the plague is begun." Another is I Chr. 27: 24, "there came wrath for this upon Israel."

A third type of reference, more numerous than the above, is the es-

(1) Ibid., pp. 69-70

(2) Op. cit., p. 18

(3) Op. cit., p. 466

chatological. Here also the idea of a human emotion does not seem to be connoted. The predominant thought is that of judgment. A future, definitely scheduled day of judgment does not carry with it the picture of an outburst of human emotion. These eschatological references to a day of wrath are characteristic of some of the prophets: e.g. Isa. 13:9, Ezek. 7:19, Zeph. 2:2. The idea of a cup of wrath in Jer. 25:15 is used as an eschatological concept in the New Testament. It would be a mistake to think of the eschatological idea of a day of wrath as a late development away from the primitive psychological idea of divine wrath. The eschatological concept is found in one of the oldest writings, Amos, although he uses the expression day of Yahweh rather than day of wrath. Amos' use of it implies that it was a common concept in his time, and it is believed that it roots back in very ancient mythological beliefs.

Although the eschatological view of the wrath of God is not a development undertaken with a conscious and deliberate purpose of avoiding anthropopathisms, later Hebrew literature does grow sensitive on this point and avoids crude anthropomorphisms. (1) The idea of the wrath of God was further refined on the ethical side. It became not a mysterious, capricious outburst whose cause was unknown, but the righteous indignation and well-merited punishment of sin. Lods says of this development,

"According to the great prophets and especially according to their disciples of post-exilic times, the sole cause of the anger of God was the injustice of man: the people, the generation, or the individual who committed the crime fell inevitably under the divine wrath." (2)

According to Pohlenz this was the only essential change in the idea of the wrath of God. He describes this development in the following sentence,

"Während nämlich für die ältere Zeit es oft ein Rätsel bleibt, wie der Zorn Gottes so plötzlich hereinbricht, wissen die Späteren, dass die Sünde des Volkes es ist, die Jahve in Erregung versetzt." (3)

- (1) Op. cit., p. 68
- (2) Op. cit., pp. 466-7
- (3) Op. cit., p. 2

This development refined the cruder and more primitive concept of divine wrath on the ethical side. From the metaphysical side there seems to have been no questioning of the propriety of attributing emotions to God. The closest approach to this is found in I Sam. 15:29, which asserts that God is not a man that he should repent. Even this verse does not seem to be a metaphysical statement of the difference between human and divine, but an assertion of the steadfastness and unchangeableness of God's purpose. It is also embedded in a story attributing to Yahweh a very low moral standard, the story of blood-thirsty vengeance wreaked upon the Amalekites. There is nowhere in the Old Testament a categorical denial of anger to Yahweh upon philosophical grounds. The only instances where it is denied that Yahweh is angry are ethically motivated. These are not denials of all anger on the part of Yahweh, but denials that Yahweh is an irascible, quick-tempered deity. They emphasize that he is "slow to anger", patient, and merciful, e.g. Neh. 9:17, Jonah 4:2, Joel 2:13. They emphasize that he is forgiving and that his anger does not last long, e.g. Mic. 7:18, Isaiah 54:8. Concerning the ethical aspect of the question it should also be noted that there is some recognition of the dangers and evils of anger on the part of man. There are admonitions against anger, but they are not numerous; they are more prominent in the Wisdom literature than in the other books. They are mild injunctions in comparison with the vehement and extravagant language of Greek philosophy or the writings of early Christians influenced by it.

Concerning the origin of the Hebrew concept of Yahweh as an irascible deity there have been various suggestions. The question really breaks into two. One of these is in the domain of the philosophy of religion; it is the problem of explaining the origin of the concept of anger on the

part of deity in religion generally. The other is the explanation of the emphasis upon the concept which is found in the Hebrew religion. It has already been noted that one writer suggests that the need of harmonizing oracular directions with calamities which followed had some influence upon the origin of the idea.

Otto calls attention to a different factor. He explains it as awe or dread in the presence of the supernatural, man's fear of the "Wholly Other". This is expressed in the following,

"This ὄργη is nothing but the 'tremendum' itself, apprehended and expressed by the aid of a naive analogy from the domain of natural experience, in this case from the ordinary passional life of man. But naive as it may be, the analogy is most disconcertingly apt and striking; so much so that it will always retain its value, and for us no less than for the men of old be an inevitable way of expressing one element of religious emotion. It cannot be doubted that despite the protest of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, Christianity also has something to teach of the 'Wrath of God'." (1)

Otto's point of view is further explained in connection with his discussion of the work of Boehme. He defines the idea of the wrath of God in his writings as follows,

"It is rather a 'ferocity', a 'fiery wrath' about something unknown; or better still, not about anything at all, but Wrath on its own account and without reference to any object; an aspect of character which would be quite meaningless if taken literally in the sense of a real and conceivable and apprehensible anger." (2)

He continues that "Wrath", "Fire", and "Fury" are excellent ideograms for the "Tremendum". Otto's insistence upon the reality of a divine anger which cannot be identified with judicial punishment is saved from the charge of anthropopathism only by his denial that it is to be taken literally and his statement that it is an ideogram or symbol. He returns to the idea of the mystical aspect of the wrath of God more than once. He states that in the writings of Paul the wrath of God is more than mere righteous retribution, that it is permeated by "awefulness". (3) He calls

(1) Op. cit., p. 19

(2) Ibid., p. 111

(3) Ibid., p. 89

attention to the numinous quality of the concept in Luther; it is not just righteous indignation. (1) Without accepting Otto's evaluation of the worth of the idea for modern use, or his emphasis upon the numinous to the exclusion of other factors, one may admit that man's awe of the supernatural played its part in the development and reinforcement of the concept. Probably no one factor is the sole source of the concept. The ethical factor, the demand for justice and punishment for sin, is another important factor.

An interesting fact concerning the origin of the concept is that it does not seem to be characteristic of very primitive religion. G. M. Stratton has pointed out that in the more primitive types of religion the deity is usually thought of as indifferent rather than irascible. The concept of God as irate is also not typical of highly developed religions; it is characteristic of a mid-point of development and not common at either extreme. (2)

Turning to the question of the Hebrew emphasis upon the anger of Yahweh, one finds various factors suggested as possible influences. Lods offers the following explanation for it,

"The Israelites were the more inclined to ascribe to Jahweh this early irascibility in that it seemed to harmonize with the character of a storm-god and perhaps with the volcanic nature which he had brought from Sinai." (3)

Stratton states that there are obscure racial and geographical differences in regard to anger and pugnacity which have left their deep mark upon religion. (4) One of these geographic factors which may have played a part is the capricious climate of Palestine. Scanty rainfall which caused failure of crops could readily be explained as a manifestation of divine anger. (5) The geographic position of Palestine as a buffer state may

(1) Ibid., p. 102

(2) Stratton: Anger: Its Moral and Religious Significance, p. 159

(3) Op. cit., p. 466

(4) Op. cit., p. 208

(5) McCown: The Genesis of the Social Gospel, p. 55

also have played a part. The Hebrews had to struggle to keep any independence. This constant fighting would tend to develop the fighting spirit, and this characteristic would affect their view of Yahweh. National defeats would also be interpreted as evidence that Yahweh was angry. For example, at the destruction of Samaria, or the capture of Jerusalem, there were two possible explanations: either Yahweh was angry and punishing his people for their sins, or he was too weak to protect them. The latter alternative would not receive serious consideration. (1) The strong emphasis upon the anger of Yahweh among the Hebrews was probably not due to any one of the above factors alone. It is more probable that there were racial factors as well as the geographic reinforcing and enlarging the concept, which was not peculiar to the Hebrews alone.

Turning from the problem of the origin of the idea to the effects which it had, one important development resulted according to the hypothesis of Stratton. He gives a strong argument that the development of monotheism was powerfully influenced by the Hebrew idea of Yahweh as a jealous and angry deity. He begins by pointing out that jealousy and anger over infidelity were strongly developed as a characteristic of the Hebrews, citing Prov. 6: 34ff., and Song of Solomon 8:6 as evidence for this. The next step was the transference to the relation between God and his people all this passionate love-anger. The ground is prepared by the use of the marital imagery as a figure for the relation of Yahweh to Israel. This is no uncommon figure. Anyone familiar with the Old Testament can readily recall passages from Hosea and Ezekiel which would illustrate it. Next it is pointed out that the expression that Yahweh is a jealous God is exceedingly common, Stratton states,

"But Jehovah's jealousy, often rising to this pitch of love-fury, is not of exceptional occurrence in discord with his true charac-

(1) Ibid., p. 175

"ter; it is regarded as part of the proper description of his character, the term reappearing almost like a Homeric epithet: on Sinai the Lord reveals himself to Moses as a jealous God who will not tolerate the worship of anything in heaven or earth or in the waters under the earth." (1)

The next step is the connection of the idea of the jealousy of Yahweh particularly with the worship of gods of other nations; this infidelity is thought to arouse in Yahweh a rage which threatened to consume Israel. The argument is continued with the following statement,

"Nor can it be doubted that the love between man and woman in thus becoming a fiery mold of the Jew's thought of God's relation to Israel pressed his thought straight toward the form of monotheism." (2)

Stratton recognizes that at first jealousy would seem consistent with the thought that other gods are real, seducing lovers of Israel, rivals of Yahweh. He points out that logically the jealous god cannot be sole-existent, his very rage affirming the reality and importance of the rival. On the other hand, love-passion drives against logic. Stratton's reasons for holding this to be true are explained in the following,

"For there is also in the worshipper here the emotional exclusion of the rival that is insidious; the withdrawal of human interest and affection is more deeply annihilating than would be a purely intellectual denial where the object still had its fascination." (3)

Whether the above hypothesis be true or not, there can be no doubt that the concept had an important influence upon the development of Hebrew religion. It bulked too large in their religious thought not to have been of significance. It is also beyond question that it played an important part in the development of religious thought after the Old Testament period. It became the subject of heated controversy. The discussions concerning it form a significant chapter in the history of the religious thought of early Christianity.

- (1) Op. cit., p. 215
- (2) Ibid., p. 217
- (3) Ibid., p. 218

CHAPTER II.

THE ANGER OF THE GODS AMONG THE GREEKS

At first the Greeks held a concept of the anger of the gods equally as primitive and realistic as that of the Hebrews. In the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, and in Greek mythology in general, the gods were endued with all the passions of men. The gods were merely men on a large scale with super-human powers. They were subject to anger together with all the other human emotions. The only difference between the emotion of the god and that of man was that the former was more violent and terrifying. The emotions of the gods were intensified and heightened just as other qualities were raised to a super-human level or pitch. Violent rages were by no means the gravest crime of the gods. Also attributed to them were the grossest sex immoralities. Much more of the ethically objectionable is found in Greek mythology than in the Old Testament.

Perhaps it was the very crudeness and grossness of these representations which aroused in the Greeks a consciousness of their incongruity with the divine. Whatever the cause, the fact is certain that the realization of the inappropriateness of these representations resulted in numerous protests against them among Greek philosophers. It led to the doctrine of the impassibility of the deity and also to the exaltation of impassibility as a goal for men. The Greeks became conscious of the crudeness and erroneousness of anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms in a measure beyond that of the Hebrews.

One reason for this is that the Hebrew literature for the most part comes from an earlier date and from a much more primitive civilization than the Greek protests against crude representations of the deity. It represents an earlier stage of development. The Hebrew literature which contains the more primitive and unethical references to God's wrath received

written form before the Greeks had developed into the doctrine of divine impassibility. Moreover, it represents an even more ancient oral tradition. Because of this the Greek literature cannot be directly compared with the Hebrew. If the Hebrews had had a free and untrammelled opportunity to develop, it is possible that they too would have come to as complete a rejection of crude anthropopathism as did the Greeks. This is a speculation which one can neither prove nor disprove; it is impossible to say what development would have taken place. There is evidence, however, in the later Hebrew literature of a growing sensitiveness and avoidance of the cruder anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms.

Another fact which should be born in mind is that it is impossible to avoid entirely anthropomorphic language in speaking of God. The Hebrew, the Greek, and the modern are all under the necessity of using human terms as symbols in discussing the divine.

A second factor in the difference between the Greek and Hebrew attitude may have been a temperamental one. In addition to the Greek literature representing a later period, the Greeks were far more interested in philosophy than the Hebrews. The former also seemed to develop a strong aversion to anger not found in the Semitic temperament. By the beginning of the Christian era they had developed an attitude toward anger and philosophic theories concerning the relation of emotion and God which were diametrically opposed to the Hebrew attitude and doctrine embodied in the Old Testament.

The Greek protest against the crude anthropomorphic and anthropopathic representations of the gods of Olympus can be traced back at least as far as the sixth century B.C. In the fragments of the philosopher Xenophanes, c. 530 B.C., we find it expressed. The following fragments illustrate this:

"1. There is one god supreme among gods and men; resembling mortals neither in form nor in mind.

5. But mortals fancy gods are born, and wear clothes, and have voice and form like themselves.

7. Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all deeds that are a disgrace among men: thieving, adultery, fraud." (1)

Heraclitus, who flourished some thirty years later made a similar protest.

The following fragment expresses it:

"Homer ought to be thrown out of the lists and whipped, and Archilochus too." (2)

PLATO AND THE PLATONISTS.

About a century later than the date assigned to Xenophanes was born one of the greatest of Greek philosophers, Plato. In his work we find a strong protest against unethical representations of the gods. The following passage, in which Plato discusses what a poet may say and what he should not say, is a typical exposition of the Greek view,

"... he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery,- that the poet is not permitted to say, though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good, is the author of evil to anyone is to be strenuously denied, and not allowed to be sung or said in any well-ordered commonwealth by old or young. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious." (3)

Plato further shows the Greek doctrine of the impassibility of God in his statements that the gods should never be depicted as weeping nor as laughing. (4) The Greek attitude towards emotion is also evident in the following quotation,

"...but he who has injured another through his own folly, when overcome by pleasure or pain, in cowardice and fear, or lust, or envy, or implacable anger shall endure a heavier punishment." (5)

(1) Bakewell: Sourcebook in Ancient Philosophy, pp. 8, 9

(2) Ibid., p. 30

(3) Republic, II, 380

(4) Republic, III, 388

(5) Laws, XI, 934

This provision is the direct opposite of the modern legal view, in which a murder committed in the heat of passion is not given as severe a sentence as the "cold-blooded" premeditated murder. Plato's law shows the Greek repugnance to uncontrolled emotion. On the other hand, Kroll points out that Plato was opposed to apathy as a human ideal in contrast to the Stoics. (1) He cites three passages from *Philebus* (21 D, 60 E, 63 E) as evidence of this. In the first of these references Socrates asks if any one would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by such feelings. The reply is that it is unlikely that such a life would be chosen by anyone.

The philosophic view of the impassibility of God held by Plato and others which was so radically in conflict with their more primitive traditions created an intellectual problem for the Greeks. The usual method of solving the problem was to interpret the myths allegorically, a recourse often resorted to in dealing with traditions handed down from the past which have become outgrown and are judged offensive to a keener and more awakened ethical sense. Another favorite method of dealing with the problem was the postulation of demons upon whom the crimes of the gods could be laid. It was not Venus, Zeus, nor Hermes who committed the shameful deeds recorded of them, but demons by the same name. One of the factors behind the wide-spread belief in demons at the beginning of the Christian era was just this effort to find an adjustment to the problem of the scandals of the gods and the higher philosophic views. An interesting parallel to this is found in the nineteenth-century opponents of Ritschl, who used Satan as the ancients used the demons. Satan is declared to be the agent of God's wrath and executes His punishments.

(1) Kroll: "Apathy" in Enc. Rel. & Ethics, v.1, p. 604

This demonology of the ancients seems in some respects to be a step backward to a more primitive view, but it served as a solution of the difficulty raised by the consciousness of the incongruities of the primitive representations of the gods. Plato himself laid the foundation for this solution. He did not develop it in full, but his pupils built upon his foundation. Plato said that love is a demon and like all spirits intermediary between the divine and mortal. (1) He also represented Apollo as a type of intermediary in calling him the interpreter of religion to all men. (2) He said that God in love of mankind placed demons over us for our protection. (3) These demons are superior to men; they represent a half-way station between the human and the divine. Plato stated that the gods of Olympus deserve our reverence and worship first and foremost, next he ranked the gods of state, and third in honor he placed the demons. (4) It should be understood that demon is used by Plato and others with its Greek connotation of a spirit, whether good or evil. The word had not yet been given the connotation of an evil spirit exclusively, the meaning which was carried over into our English word.

These are the things, implicit in Plato, which were developed by his pupils into the full-fledged system of the demons as the intermediaries between God and man. Perhaps his pupils went farther than Plato himself would have gone; perhaps they made a literal dogmatic system out of what was for Plato poetic and figurative only. Pohlenz is probably correct in his suggestion that this was the case. (5) He also states,

"Es lässt sich nicht direkt zeigen, dass Plato selbst diesen Gedanken nachgegangen ist, aber seine Schüler haben es sicher getan. Schon in der Epinomis, die Philippus von Opus wohl mit

- (1) Symposium, 202
- (2) Republic, IV, 427
- (3) Laws, IV, 714
- (4) Ibid., 717
- (5) Op. cit., p. 132

"Benutzung von nachgelassen Zetteln des Meisters aber unter eigenem Namen kurz nach Platos Tod veröffentlicht hat, werden die Dämonen durchaus als reale Mittelwesen Zwischen Gott und Mensch geschildert." (1)

In Xenocrates, a pupil of Plato, we find a completely developed demonology. The demons are God's servants. God is too transcendent to be immediately concerned with men. The demons are the interpreting race, the mediators between God and men. They have divine power, but at the same time are subject to human pain and desire; in a word, they are passible. It is to the demons that prayers and sacrifices should be made. It is also to the demons and not to the gods that all the scandalous doings of the gods, of which the poets speak, should be attributed. (2) The gods themselves are impassible and sinless.

These ideas, neglected for a time, were revived by Posidonius and the Neoplatonist school. Posidonius' view of the demons was not identical with that of Xenocrates. The former identified the demons as inborn spirits, the god which man carries within him; thus his view makes the demon almost equivalent to the idea of the soul, or the spiritual part of man. He held that man had a passible body, but an impassible soul. (3)

In the writings of Plutarch is found a very clear exposition of the use of demons as a method of explaining the offensive stories of immoralities on the part of the gods. Plutarch objects to the fact that the gods are represented as "full of malice and hatred and wrath and other passions which ill become even men of good sense." (4) In another essay he deals with the question more fully. He states that God is not concerned with sacrifices, but turns these over to the demons,

"...who are the spies and scouts of the Gods, wandering and circuiting about at their commands, -some beholding and ordering the

(1) Ibid., pp. 132-3

(2) Ibid., p. 134

(3) Kroll: "Apathy" in Enc. Rel. & Eth., v. I, p. 604

(4) Life of Pericles xxxix

"sacred ceremonies and oblations offered to the Gods, others being employed to revenge and punish the high misdemeanors and enormous injustices of men." (1)

He asserts that he can never believe sacrifices need to be made on God's account, but they are to avert, mollify, and appease the wrath and fury of some bad demons. (2) He states that passions are fitting to be attributed not to God but to demons. (3) The demons as beings half-way between immortal and impassible man had come to be considered as immortal but subject to passions. This was the view of Apuleius, Maximus, and Chalcidius. (4) Plutarch does not agree with this. He says

"... for granting as you do that there be Daemons, but not allowing them to be vicious and mortal, you cannot prove there are any at all. For wherein do they differ from Gods, supposing they be incorruptible and impassible and not liable to error." (5)

Pohlenz makes the interesting comment upon the above quotation,

"Um so uberraschender ist es, dass Plutarch de defectu oraculorum 16 extr. den Dämonen mit der ἀπάθεια zugleich die ἀφθαρσία absprechen zu müssen glaubt. Diese Differenz ist besonders interessant, wenn wir daran denken, dass nach dem Schluss des Karneades, den Panaitos und Poseidonius and im allgemein die Späteren anerkannten, ein ἀθάνατον καὶ ἐμπαθές ein Unding ist." (6)

In another essay Plutarch supports this view by pointing out that Plato, Pythagoras, and Xenocrates picture the demons,

"not to have a divine part pure and unmixed, but such as participates of both the soul's nature and body's sensation, and all the passions that attend these mutations, which disorder some of them more and others of them less." (7)

Plutarch does not wholly agree with the Stoic ideal of impassibility as the goal for human conduct. He argues that the emotions are innate and natural to man; hence they ought not be utterly rooted out, but only pruned and cultivated. He continues the argument by stating,

(1) De def. or. 13

(2) Ibid., 14

(3) Ibid., 15

(4) Pohlenz: op. cit., p.137

(5) De def. or. 16

(6) Op. cit., pp. 137-8

(7) Of Isis and Osiris 25

"... Reason makes very good use of the passions, after they are well subdued and made gentle without either tearing in pieces nor over-much weakening that part of the soul which was made obedient to her.... Thus moderate anger is of admirable use to courage or fortitude; hatred and aversion for illmen promotes the execution of justice; and a just indignation against those who are prosperous beyond what they deserve is then both convenient and even necessary." (1)

The argument continues with the thought that those who are inspired by great rage are invincible in fighting. He even justifies this by quoting from Homer passages which attribute more than human rage in men to the gods. On the other hand, Plutarch shows the normal Greek attitude in devoting an entire essay to the subject of the cure or control of anger.

Plutarch's views concerning human anger have something in common with the views of Aristotle. He also does not completely condemn anger, as that would be inconsistent with his doctrine of the Golden Mean. He describes the following excesses: irascibility, ὀργιλότης, quick temper, ἀκροχολία sullenness, πικρότης, sternness, χαλεπότης, and deficiency, ἀοργησία. He lists mildness or gentleness πραότης as the Golden Mean. His attitude is further made clear in the following quotation,

"A person is to be praised if he grows angry on the right occasion and with the right people, and also in the right manner, at the right times and for the right length of time; such a person will be good-tempered, therefore as good temper is a term of praise. For a good-tempered person is in effect one who will be cool and not carried away by his emotion but will wax wroth in such a manner, on such occasions and for so long a time, as reason may prescribe." (2)

Although Aristotle does not hold that impassibility is the goal of perfect humanity, he does clearly believe in the impassibility of the Deity. He calls God the immovable First Mover. Concerning the impassibility of God he states,

"But unquestionably also it has been demonstrated that such (the Mover) is impassive and unalterable (ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος)." (3)

(1) Of Moral Virtue 12

(2) Ethics, Bk. IV., ch. V. 3

(3) Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. VIII

THE STOICS.

Turning from the Platonists and from Aristotle to the school of Greek philosophy which especially exalted self-control and impassibility on the part of man, and which also stressed the view that ignoble emotions must not be associated with God, we come to the Stoics. This school was founded by Zeno of Citium who flourished in the third century B.C. The doctrine of apathy is older than the Stoics according to Kroll. (1) He states that there was a marked tendency in that direction in the Cynics. It also influenced Stilpo the Megarian. Zeno was influenced by Megarian and Cynic philosophy. Kroll also states that Pyrrho, founder of scepticism taught the doctrine of apathy, probably even under that name.

Zeno's work is known only through fragments. It is clear that he taught that God is impassible. This is implied in the following quotation which Plutarch gives,

"Zeno, son of Mnaseas, the native of Citium, avers these principles to be God and matter, the first of which is the efficient cause, the other the passible and receptive." (2)

In this statement of Zeno's dualism, passible matter is clearly and directly contrasted with impassible Deity. We have another fragment which gives clear evidence of Zeno's attitude concerning emotion. He states,

Z 136 (Diog. L. vii. 110)" ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζηνῶνα ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις, ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα ". (3)

In commenting upon this passage Pearson states,

"In maintaining that every πάθος is essentially ἄλογον and παρὰ φύσιν, Zeno goes far beyond Plato and Aristotle, although he has much in common with the Platonic point of view." (4)

The Stoic philosophers are generally divided into three periods.

The middle Stoa departed somewhat from the original teaching, but the later

(1) Kroll: "Apathy" in Enc. Rel. & Eth., v.1, p. 603
 (2) On those Sentiments concerning Nature with which Philosophers were delighted, Bk. I, ch. 4

(3) Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 177

(4) Ibid., p. 178

Stoa returned to it. Of the early Stoics Cleanthes, 331-232 B.C., and Chrysippus, 280-207 B.C., were the most prominent. A fragment from the latter writer shows that he agreed with Zeno concerning the impropriety of attributing unethical emotions or conduct to God. He says,

"...it is not reasonable that the deity should be the cause of base deeds. For just as a law cannot be the cause of contravention, so neither can the gods be the cause of impiety." (1)

His attitude towards anger is revealed by the following fragment preserved in Plutarch,

"And indeed, Chrysippus, in those books which he wrote of Anomology, after he has told that anger is blind, not discerning oftentimes those things which are plain and conspicuous and as frequently casting a mist upon such things as were before clear and evident; proceeds a little farther in this manner: for, says he, the passions being once raised not only reject and drive away reason but violently push men forward to actions that are contrary to reason." (2)

Stoic philosophers often did not go all the way in ascribing impassibility to God. They usually admitted that kindness and noble emotions were consistent with Deity, and they denied only the base and unethical emotions to God. The Epicurean school went further than the Stoics. They held that God was absolutely impassible, untouched even by noble emotions. The Stoics seem to have approached the problem from the ethical point of view; the Epicureans approached it more from the metaphysical. The latter particularly objected to the Stoic doctrine of providence and to their fatalism. This was an important factor in the Epicurean adoption of the doctrine of the complete impassibility of the Deity. Plutarch devotes an essay to a criticism of the teachings of Epicurus, 342-270 B.C. He gives Epicurus' doctrine of the impassibility in the following words,

"The deity is not therefore constrained by either anger or kindness; but that is because it is natural to it to be kind and aiding, and unnatural to be angry and hurtful." (3)

Plutarch criticises this view on the ground that it offers small comfort

(1) Bakewell: Sourcebook in Ancient Philosophy, p. 280

(2) Of Moral Virtue, 10

(3) That it is not possible to live happily according to the doctrines of Epicurus, 22

to those in distress. He states,

"Dost thou hope for any good from the Gods for thy piety?
It is thy vanity; for the blessed and incorruptible Being is
not constrained by either angers or kindnesses." (1)

We find evidence in Epicurus' own writings that he held this doctrine.

The following quotation shows this,

"Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turn-
ings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena
to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls
and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys per-
fect bliss together with immortality (for trouble and care and
anger and kindness are not consistent with a life of blessed-
ness, but these things come to pass where there is weakness and
fear and dependence on neighbors). "(2)

Epicurus has often been accused of being an atheist, but the following quo-
tation shows that this accusation is false, and also reiterates his doc-
trine that the gods are indifferent to men, that they are impassible:

"For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear
vision... And the impious man is not he who denies the gods of
the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the
many. For the statements of the many about the gods are not
conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, ac-
cording to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and
the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods." (3)

R. D. Hicks states that Epicurus' denial of Divine providence and Divine
interference with the world is unqualified. He holds that Epicurus'
belief in any kind of gods may be due to the influence of Democritus.
He contrasts the gigantic long-lived demons of Democritus with the gods
of Epicurus. They differ at three points: 1) the latter do not dwell in
this or any world but in the intermundia or interspaces between worlds
where multitudes of gods and goddesses converse in human form, 2) they
are not divided into malevolent or beneficent beings, but are all ut-
terly indifferent to human concerns, 3) they are not merely long-lived
but eternal and indestructible. (4)

(1) Ibid., 23

(2) To Herodotus, 77

(3) To Menoeceus, 123

(4) Hicks: "Epicurus" in Enc. Rel. & Eth., v. 5, pp. 328-9

The Epicureans were also not in harmony with Stoics concerning impassibility as a human ideal, since the doctrine of hedonism might be interpreted as placing pleasure as one of the chief passions (Stobaeus ii 90:16). (1)

One of the chief opponents of the Stoic doctrine of impassibility as a human goal was Carneades. His argument against it was that men had bodies and certain bodily impulses were inevitable, among which pleasure was chief; hence impassibility was impossible. (2)

ROMAN PHILOSOPHERS INFLUENCED BY GREEK THOUGHT.

The Roman philosophers may be included in this chapter on Greek philosophy, since they show the influence of Greek thought upon them. They do not exhibit traits which characterize them as a separate or distinct school. They build upon the foundation of Greek thought, the influence of Stoicism being especially prominent in their writings. They demonstrate the fact that the Greek attitude towards anger and doctrines concerning it were wide-spread in the Graeco-Roman world just prior to and just after the advent of Christianity. Although Roman Christian theologians of the ante-Nicene period frequently do not show this influence, the pagan philosophers do show it.

The first important Roman philosopher to be considered is Cicero, 106-43 B.C. His work "On the Nature of the Gods" is important not only for his own philosophic views, but also as a source for the views of other ancient philosophers. The theme of this book is the controversial question of divine providence; Cicero attempts to prove that the gods are interested in human affairs, believing that the Epicurean denial of the doctrine of providence was tantamount to atheism. The treatise is written in the form

(1) Kroll: "Apathy" in Enc. Rel. & Eth., v. 1, p. 604

(2) Ibid., p. 604

of a dialogue between representatives of the Stoic, Academic, and Epicurean schools of philosophy. Velleius, the Epicurean representative, summarizes the views of the various Greek philosophers critically, and adds,

"Not much more absurd than these are the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to the sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as enraged with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our eyes their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions, discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their indulgence in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals." (1)

He repeats Epicurus' argument for the existence of gods from the universal belief in them and his doctrine that they must be both happy and immortal, quoting from Epicurus. Velleius adds,

"For the superior and excellent nature of the gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration; and all fear of the power of the anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being." (2)

The remainder of the first book of this treatise is taken up with Cotta's refutation of Epicurean doctrines, Cotta representing the Academics. He criticizes Epicurus' argument for the existence of gods from universal belief in them, his atomic theory of the universe, his anthropomorphism, and his idea that the gods live in a state of idle blessedness utterly indifferent to men. He especially attacks the idea of divesting the gods of the power to do good, holding that this extirpates all religion from the hearts of men. (3)

The second book of this treatise contains the arguments of Lucilius Balbus, the Stoic representative. He first gives various arguments for the existence of the gods, then discusses their nature. He posits that the

(1) Of the Nature of the Gods, Bk. I, xvi

(2) Ibid., Bk. I, xvii

(3) Ibid., Bk. I, xliii

Deity must be an animated being and that nothing in nature must be superior to him, attributing to the universe divinity. (1) He concludes this section,

"Do you not see, therefore, how from the productions of nature, and the useful inventions of men, have arisen fictitious and imaginary Deities; which have been the foundations of false opinions, pernicious errors, and wretched superstitions? For we know how the different forms of the Gods, their ages, apparel, ornaments, their pedigrees, marriages, relations, and everything belonging to them, are adapted to human weakness, and represented with our passions; with lust, sorrow, and anger, according to fabulous history..." (2)

The latter part of this book is devoted to the proof of the doctrine of providence, the doctrine that the gods govern the universe and are interested in human affairs. The Epicurean doctrine that the universe was formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms is attacked, the law and order of the motions of the heavenly bodies being used in refuting it. The argument is advanced that if the universe were not governed by the wisdom of the gods, one would have to postulate a cause superior to the gods.

Book three of the treatise is devoted to Cotta's objections to Balbus' arguments. One of the chief points of attack is that the Stoic has compromised, accommodating his teaching to popular beliefs. He accepted the myths by allegorizing and spiritualizing them. After pointing out the inconsistencies and absurdities of these myths, the Stoics are accused of giving them authority instead of refuting them. (3) At the close of the treatise is another direct disavowal of belief in angry deities. It is put into the mouth of Cotta, who says,

"I believe ... that those eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked out, the one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess, that a Deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation." (4)

Cicero, who was an Academic, concludes the book by saying that Velleius

(1) Ibid., Bk. II, xvii

(2) Ibid., Bk. II, xxviii

(3) Ibid., Bk. III, xxiii

(4) Ibid., Bk. III, xxxviii

judged the arguments of Cotta were the truest, but that he considered those of Balbus to have the greater probability.

In another writing Cicero states,

"... it is the universally accepted view of all philosophers that God is never angry, never hurtful." (1)

In this same treatise he exhibits a Greek attitude towards anger in a passage which urges self-control. (2) An objection to passion which he mentions is that it alters the countenance. This point is mentioned by other philosophers, and it is apparently not an unimportant factor in the Greek aversion to anger.

A contemporary of Cicero, Lucretius (96-55 B.C.) represents the Epicurean point of view. This is exhibited by the following extract,

"For the nature of the gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger." (3)

Lucretius insists that nature can do all things spontaneously without the meddling of the gods, whom he describes as in tranquil peace passing a calm time and an unruffled existence. He continues,

"Who can at once make all the different heavens to roll and warm with ethereal fires all the fruitful earths, or be present in all at all times, to bring darkness with clouds and shake with noise the heaven's serene expanse, to hurl lightnings and often throw down his own temples, and withdrawing into the deserts there to spend his rage in practising his bolt which often passes the guilty by and strikes dead the innocent and unoffending?" (4)

Seneca, 4 B.C.-65 A.D., may be taken as a representative of Stoic philosophy among the Romans. He devoted several dialogues to the consideration of anger. In one he states that some of the wisest of men have called anger a short madness. (5) His estimate of it is revealed in the following exclamation,

(1) De Officiis, III, 102

(3) Bakewell: Sourcebook of Ancient Philosophy, p.309

(2) Ibid., I, 102

(4) Ibid., p. 309

(5) Of Anger, Bk. I, 1

"How great a blessing is it to escape from anger, that chief of all evils, and therewith from frenzy, ferocity, cruelty, and madness, its attendants." (1)

He clearly classifies it as a vice in the following quotation,

"You must remove anger from your mind before you can take virtue into the same, because vices and virtues cannot combine, and none can be both an angry man and a good man, anymore than he can be both sick and well." (2)

One of the most important points in Seneca's discussion is his recognition of the fact that judicial punishment is possible apart from anger. This point is important because one can refute by its use the defense of divine anger with the argument of moral necessity used by Lactantius and others. Seneca clearly recognized that the psychological disturbance of anger not only was not an inseparable and necessary accompaniment of punishment, but that it was not even a desirable accompaniment. In response to the question whether correction was not sometimes necessary, he replied that it is, but with discretion not with anger. (3) He states,

"Nothing becomes one who inflicts punishment less than anger, because the punishment has all the more power to work reformation if the sentence be pronounced with deliberate judgment." (4)

He gives another argument a little further on which refutes the idea that anger is an essential part of chastisement.

"We do not, therefore, need an angry chastiser to punish the erring and wicked: for since anger is a crime of the mind, it is not right that sins should be punished by sin." (5)

Concerning the impassibility of the gods Seneca has little to say.

One passage which bears indirectly upon the question implies that he held the gods to be free from anger,

"You waste your time by being angry with him (a god) as much as if you prayed him to be angry with someone else." (6)

Although Seneca does not discuss the question at length, there is no doubt that he would have refused to ascribe anger to the gods in view of the es-

(1) Ibid., Bk. 4, 12
(3) Ibid., Bk. 3, 6
(5) Ibid., Bk. 3, xvi

(2) Ibid., Bk. 4, 12
(4) Ibid., Bk. 3, 15
(6) Ibid., Bk. 4, xxx

timate which he held of it. He considered it a vice of the worst sort, and he would not have attributed such an ethically obnoxious trait to a god.

Marcus Aurelius, 121-180 A.D., is another representative of the Stoic school. The Stoic ideal of impassibility is expressed in the following,

"For the nearer such a mind attains to passive calm, the nearer is the man to strength. As grief is a weakness, so also is anger." (1)

Another illustration of the Stoic attitude towards anger is contained in the following,

"For such should be the inner springs of a man's heart that the Gods see him not wrathfully disposed at anything or counting it a hardship." (2)

Like Seneca, Marcus Aurelius classifies anger as a vice. This is evidenced by the following quotation,

"Bethink thee how much more grievous are the consequences of our anger and vexation at such actions than are the acts themselves which arouse that anger and vexation." (3)

Marcus Aurelius does not say much that bears directly upon the question of the impassibility of the gods. He does, however, make some statements which imply very clearly that he held the gods to be free from anger. He insists, for example, that the gods are kindly and forgiving to the wrong-doer. He says,

"If thou art able, convert the wrong-doer. If not, bear in mind that kindness was given to meet just such a case. The gods too are kindly to such persons..." (4)

The same idea is reiterated in Bk. 7, 70. He also contests the idea that the gods are the cause of natural evils. He says,

"Find no fault with the Gods for what is the course of Nature, for they do no wrong voluntarily or involuntarily; nor with men, for they do none save involuntarily." (5)

(1) Communings within Himself, Bk. 11, 18, #10

(3) Ibid., Bk. 11, 18 #8

(2) Ibid., Bk. 11, 13

(4) Ibid., Bk. 9, 11

(5) Ibid., Bk. 12, 12

Other passages which illustrate the Stoic estimate of anger are Bk. I, 9; Bk. II, 1, 10, 16; Bk. VII, 38; Bk. VIII, 17; Bk. XI, 18, #3. These are admonitions against anger and condemnations of it. They do not add anything of importance to the quotations already cited above.

From this discussion of representative ancient philosophers it may be seen how general was the belief that it was impious, even blasphemous, to ascribe anger to the Deity. It was not the peculiar dogma of a single sect. Academics, Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans were united in this opinion. This thought dominated philosophic thought for many centuries. Beginning in Greece in the sixth century B.C. in a protest against the crude representations of the gods in the primitive traditional religion, it persisted as an important doctrine in the early centuries of the Christian era. Roman philosophers show its influence. It also influenced Christian theologians of the first few centuries and was a source of conflict. The doctrine of the desirability of human impassibility was less generally accepted, but it also had some influence.

CHAPTER III.

THE WRATH OF GOD IN WRITINGS OF THE HELLENISTIC JEWS

The first point at which the Old Testament concept of a wrathful god came into conflict with the Greek ideal of an impassible deity was among the Hellenistic Jews. Brought up with reverence for their own Scripture and at the same time having contact with Greek culture, the divergence between the two was bound to make itself felt. There are three places where evidence of this may be investigated: the Septuagint, the Pseudepigrapha, and the writings of Philo.

THE SEPTUAGINT.

Pohlenz suggests the possibility of the influence of the Greek ideal upon the Septuagint in the translation of the Hebrew word נָחַם . (1) He points out that in Gen. 6:6 it is translated by $\epsilon\nu\sigma\upsilon\mu\epsilon\iota\sigma\alpha\theta\alpha\iota$ which means to consider seriously or take to heart; in I Sam. 15:11 and Jud. 2:18, by $\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\kappa\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\eta\mu\alpha\iota$, which means to be comforted or have called in for aid; in I sam. 15:35 by $\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\eta$ and I Sam. 15:29 by $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\nu\omicron\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota$, both meaning to repent. He states that no conclusion can be drawn, since there is no consistency in the translation.

Following the suggestion of Pohlenz an investigation of all the passages associating the idea of repentance with God yielded more positive results. Of thirty-four references in seventeen cases, or exactly half, the idea of repentance does not appear in the Greek translation. This seems to remove all doubt from the conclusion that the translators of the Septuagint were so influenced by the Greek philosophic ideal that they actually modified the text in order to bring it more into harmony with those ideals. An intentional and deliberate toning down of the text is the only possible explanation of the fact that such a large proportion of the

(1) Op. cit., p. 7

references have lost the idea of repentance. The following table shows the facts upon which this conclusion is based.

REFERENCES	GREEK
-Gen. 6:6	ἐνεθυμήθη
-Gen. 6:7	ἐνεθυμήθη
-Ex. 32:12	ἴλεως
-Ex. 32:14	entire clause changed
-Num. 23:19	ἀπελειληθῆναι
-Deut. 32:36	παρακληθήσεται
-Jud. 2:18	παρακλήθη
-I Sam. 15:11	παρακέκλημαι
I Sam. 15:29	μετανοήσει
I Sam. 15:35	μετεμελήθη
-II Sam. 24:16	παρακλήθη
I Chron. 21:15	μετεμελήθη
-Ps. 90:13	παρακλήθητι
Ps. 110:14	μεταμεληθήσεται
-Ps. 135:14	παρακληθήσεται
Jer. 4:28	μετανοήσω
Jer. 18:8	μετανοήσω
Jer. 18:10	μετανοήσω
Jer. 20:16	μετεμελήθη
-Jer. 26:3	παύσομαι
-Jer. 26:13	παύσεται
-Jer. 26:19	ἐπαύσαυτο
-Jer. 42:10	ἀναπέπνυμαι
-Ezek. 24:14	phrase omitted
Hos. 13:14	μετεμελεία
Joel 2:13	μετανοῶν
Joel 2:14	μετανοήσει
Amos 7:3	μετανόησον
Amos 7:6	μετανόησον
Jonah 3:9	μετανοήσει
Jonah 3:10	μετανόησεν
Jonah 4:2	μετανοῶν
Zech. 8:14	μετανόησα
-Jer. 15:6	ἀνήσω

(References marked with a minus sign are those in which the idea of repentance is not found in the Greek).

It is significant that of those references in which the idea of repentance is retained in the Greek translation there are five which assert either that God does not or did not repent: I Sam. 15:29, Ps. 110:4, Jer. 4:28; 20:16, and Zech. 8:14. These negative references do not conflict with the Greek view as the positive references did, hence they were unchanged. The use of forms of the verb παρακαλέω as a translation for פָּנָה can be explained by the fact that the Hebrew word has the meaning of to comfort or to console as well as that of to repent. It is probable that the translators intentionally chose the milder meaning of the word, even when the context indicated it was wrong, in order to avoid connecting the idea of repentance with God.

A similar examination of the references attributing jealousy to God yielded negative results. Of twenty-five references only one shows a significant change, Ezek. 8:3. Here the phrase pillar of purchaser is substituted for image of jealousy of the Hebrew. Two references, Dt. 32:16 and Ezek. 36:5 in the Greek convey the idea of anger rather than jealousy. These negative results seem to indicate that the translators of the Septuagint were influenced by metaphysical considerations rather than ethical, i.e. they were sensitive to the inappropriateness of attributing repentance to God because it conflicted with the concept of His omniscience, but they were not sensitive to the inappropriateness of attributing jealousy to Him, which is objectionable from the ethical point of view.

Turning to the much larger list of references to the concept of the wrath or anger on the part of God, we find again evidence of a deliberate softening or toning down of the text to eliminate concepts out of harmony with Greek thought. This is not so decisive as in the case of repentance, but it is significant. There are thirty-five verses in which a reference

to anger on the part of God is either omitted or differs, more than one omission or difference for every nine references. Some of these omissions and differences can be explained in other ways than by attributing them to a conscious desire to avoid ascribing anger to God, but others definitely point to such deliberate alteration. The following table lists the references where there is any change or omission.

REFERENCE	GREEK
Gen.18:30	μή τι κύριε ἐὰν λαλήσω
Gen.18:32	μή τι κύριε ἐὰν λαλήσω
Num.1:53	ἁμαρτήμα
Deut.3:26	ὑπερεῖδε
Josh.23:16	half of verse missing
I Ki.14:9	about twenty verses missing
I Ki.14:15	about twenty verses missing
Neh.4:5	one verse and a half missing
Job.21:20	ἀπὸ δὲ κυρίου μὴ διασωθείη
Job.42:7	ἡμαρτες σὺ
Ps.76:10	ἐνθύμιον
Ps.78:59	ὑπερεῖδε
Ps.78:62	ὑπερεῖδε
Prov.11:4	verse 4 missing, verse 3 altered
Prov.11:23	ἀπολεῖται
Jer.10:10	four verses missing
Jer.12:13	ὀνειδισμοῦ
Jer.17:4	four verses missing
Jer.25:7	οἴνου τοῦ ἀκρατοῦ
Jer.25:15	phrase missing
Jer.25:38	παραπικράναι
Jer.32:29	phrase missing
Jer.32:30	πικράναι
Jer.44:3	παραπικράναι
Jer.44:8	παραπικράναι
Jer.51:45	four verses missing
Jer.52:3	three verses missing
Lam.4:16	πρόσωπον
Ezek.7:3	part of verse omitted
Ezek.7:12	last clause omitted

Ezek. 7:14	last clause omitted
Ezek. 7:19	phrase omitted
Ezek. 8:17	phrase omitted
Hosea 12:14	ἐθουώσεν ἑρπαλι

A few comments upon the above table are needed in order to point out some of the factors which seem to indicate a softening of the text and others which work against that idea. First, in cases like Josh. 23:16, where there is just a small portion of the verse missing there are two possible explanations: either a scribe with a Jonathan Edwards' temperament and theology inserted the clause in the Hebrew, or the translator omitted it as objectionable. The latter seems more probable and is to be preferred to the third possible alternative, accidental loss or omission. Such a long omission as in I Ki. 14, however, is probably not due to the same cause.

Another factor which should be mentioned is that it is known that the Septuagint is not the work of the same translator throughout, not all of it being done at the same time. This being the case, it is not surprising to find that much clearer evidence of toning down is found in some books than in others, the translators differing in their willingness to alter the text and their sensitiveness to the Greek point of view. The translator of Jeremiah gives the clearest indication of an effort to tone down the text. It is also possible that the translator worked with a different Hebrew text than the Massoretic. There is a difference in position of chapters and other variations. It does, however, seem significant that of thirty-three references to anger on the part of God in Jeremiah thirteen are omitted or altered. In chapter 25 only one of four references are retained.



Another section which seems to give unmistakable signs of toning down the text is found in Ezekial. Although only five of the twenty references differ in the Greek from the Hebrew, the fact that four of these are in chapter 7 and the other in the next chapter indicate at this point deliberate change either by the translator or possibly a redactor. In Ezek. 7:8 the idea of the anger of God is retained, but in 7:12, 14, 19 and 8:17 only the phrase or clause containing the idea of God's anger is omitted, and the remainder of these verses is retained. Ezek. 7:3, also has a portion of a verse missing which contains the idea of God's anger, but there is also a difference in the order of the Greek here, indicating the possibility of disarrangement of the text.

In Lam. 4:16 is an interesting variation. Here the difference seems to be between English and Greek rather than Hebrew and Greek due to ambiguity of the Hebrew. The American Standard Version translates 'לֵב as anger. The Septuagint gave it a more literal rendering of face or presence *πρόσωπον*. If 'לֵב carries the connotation of anger it is a rare use of the word.

Hosea 12:14 is also interesting. The Greek expresses the idea that Ephraim was angry and excited. In Moffatt's translation, the American Standard Version, and the American translation of J.M.P. Smith the idea expressed is that Ephraim provoked God to anger, not that he became angry and excited, as the Greek puts it. The Hebrew verb is *הִתְעַבְּרָה*, a hiphil form.

On the other hand, there are at least three references to God's wrath in the Septuagint where the Hebrew does not have it: Isaiah 1:4; 57:6 and II Ki. 17:20. In spite of these the evidence of the references to God's wrath in the Septuagint show that Greek thought made the Alexandrian

Jews sensitive to anthropopathisms in the Old Testament. They avoided in some instances ascribing anger to him and were even more reluctant to ascribe repentance. These give conclusive proof of the influence of Greek philosophy on Hellenistic Jews.

THE APOCRYPHA.

Further light upon the question of Greek influence upon the Septuagint may be gained by an examination of the Apocrypha. By the number and the character of the references to the wrath of God in these books we may gain additional information concerning the possibility of the influence of Greek philosophy or the lack of it. The evidence upon the whole indicates that in the Apocrypha there is simply a continuation of the concept of the wrath of God as it appeared in late Judaism. There is little evidence of Greek influence. For the most part there is no difference in the concept of the wrath of God in the Apocrypha and the later canonical books of the Old Testament. Perhaps the idea receives a little more emphasis in the canonical books, but that is the only difference that is evident. Of the Apocrypha the wrath of God receives no mention in Tobit, the additions to Esther, the additions to Daniel (Song of the Three Children, Susannah, Bel and the Dragon), and the Epistle of Jeremy.

I Esdras contains four references to the wrath of God: I 52, VIII 21, 88, and IX 13. Of these the first reference interprets the invasions of the Chaldeans in the past as a manifestation of divine wrath. The second reference implies that diligent keeping of the law averts God's wrath.

Judith contains three references: VIII 14, IX 9, and XI 11. The first is an exhortation not to provoke God to anger, the second is an imprecation, the third implies that it is sin that provokes God to anger. One other verse in this book is of interest, VIII 16. It states,

"God is not as man, that he may be threatened; neither is he as the son of man, that he should be wavering."

This verse is reminiscent of Num. 23:19. Both approach a metaphysical distinction between humanity and deity without clearly and definitely making it. The writers seem to have had in mind not a philosophic distinction so much as the superior might and power of God.

Wisdom contains seven references to the wrath of God: V 17, X 9, XVIII 20, 21, 23, 25, and XIX 1. Here there is more of the eschatological coloring to the references. Wrath in these references has nothing to do with a primitive psychological emotion; it is a malevolent force. It may be sharpened for a sword (V 17), it is something tasted (XVIII 25). These symbolic uses of wrath are characteristic of the eschatological use of the concept, the latter being like the references to a cup or vial of wrath in Jeremiah, Revelation, etc.

There are eleven references to wrath in Ecclesiasticus: 4: 6, 7; 7:16; 16:6, 11; 23: 16; 39: 23, 28; 44:17, 20; and 48: 10. Some of these references may be given an eschatological interpretation. It comes forth suddenly (4:7); it does not tarry long (7:16). In common with other Wisdom literature there are admonitions against anger in Ecclesiasticus. Whether these show any Stoic influence or not depends upon how far they exceed in vehemence similar admonitions in the canonical writings. Three of the strongest of these expressions against anger in men are 1:21; 2:16; and 10:18.

The first states,

"A furious man cannot be justified, for the sway of his fury shall be his destruction."

The second states that one who angers his mother is cursed of God. The third states,

"Pride was not made for man, nor furious anger for them that are born of a woman."

These may be interpreted as a development of purely Hebrew ethics; there is no definite proof that Greek influence has been at work, although there is the possibility of it suggested in the unqualified denunciation of human anger. A reference which suggests contact with Greek thought more strongly is 39:28. It states that there are spirits created for vengeance and that as they pour out their fury, their creator's wrath is appeased. Has this verse any connection with the doctrine of demons in Greek philosophy? Are these spirits the same as the demons the Greeks invented to avoid the onus of having the Deity pictured as personally wrathful and avenging? If this could be proved, one would still have to admit that the Greek doctrine had only imperfectly been assimilated. The Hebrew writer does not hesitate to say that the strokes of the avenging spirits appease the wrath of their creator. One should note also that the same writer in other passages does not cavil at using the expression the wrath of the Lord. This writer has, however, gotten beyond the cruder ideas of God's wrath. It is pictured as a punitive force rather than an emotion. Only the noun form is used; the expression The Lord is angry does not occur.

Baruch contains six references to God's wrath; 1:3; 2:13; 2:20; 4:6, 9, 25. These are largely penitential expressions. They do not imply an outburst of passion so much as a judicial punishment. The Prayer of Manasseh also has within its fifteen verses three references to God's anger, which are like those of a penitential psalm.

In I Maccabees there are three references to divine anger. The first, 1:64, interprets the persecutions of Antiochus Epiphanes as a manifestation of God's anger; the second, 2:49, states that the time of wrath is at hand; the third, 3:8, that Judas Maccabaeus turned aside God's

wrath by destroying the ungodly in Israel.

There are four references in II Maccabees to God's anger. The first, 5:20, states that the treasury was forsaken in the wrath of the Almighty; the second, 7:33, that the purpose of God's wrath is chastening and correction. The third, 7:38, is the most interesting of all. It implies a doctrine of substitutionary atonement. A Jewish martyr states that he and his brothers are ready to give up body and soul for the Law and prays that God's wrath may end in them. The last reference, 8:5, states that God's wrath was turned into mercy.

From this survey of the Apocrypha the evidence of Greek influence is very slight. The passages on the whole do not materially differ from the later canonical writings in their doctrine of the wrath of God. Ecclesiastical 39:28 possibly indicates contact with Greek thought, but if it does, the Greek doctrine was very imperfectly absorbed.

THE PSEUDEPIGRAPHA.

Turning from the Apocrypha to the writings which did not find a place in the Septuagint one finds definite evidence of the influence of Greek philosophic thought. Pohlenz calls attention to one of these, the Letter of Aristeas. (1) In the passage pertinent to the question of the wrath of God, the king is pictured as asking how he could be free from wrath, a Stoic longing. The reply is that he should recognize that wrath is unnecessary because all men are subject to the king and none hostile. The passage concludes with these words,

"It is necessary to recognize that God rules the whole world in the spirit of kindness and without wrath at all, and you," said he, "O King, must of necessity copy his example." (253-4)

This letter is generally dated about 130-170 B.C.

Another document which clearly shows the influence of Stoic thought

(1) Op. cit., p. 7

is IV Maccabees, which is thought to be the work of a Jew in Egypt, probably at Alexandria, who lived within a few years of the Christian era. This document begins by praising the study of philosophy. One of the arguments for philosophy is that it includes the greatest of virtues, self-control. The passage continues,

"... if reason is proved to control the passions adverse to temperance, gluttony, and lust, it is also clearly shown to be lord over the passions like malevolence, opposed to justice, and over those opposed to manliness, namely rage and pain and fear." (1:2-4)

A later passage states,

"For the temperate understanding repels all these passions, as it does wrath: for it masters even these." (2:16)

It continues by citing Moses and Jacob as examples of men in whom understanding, σωφροσύνη, conquered passions.

In other works the Stoic influence is not so evident. There is one passage against anger in the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs which, like those quoted from Ecclesiasticus, may be merely a heightening of Hebrew piety rather than the result of Stoic influence. The passage is,

"And now, my children, behold I am dying, and I tell you of a truth, that unless ye keep yourselves from the spirit of lying, and of anger, and love truth, and longsuffering ye shall perish.

"There is blindness in anger, my children, and no angry man seeth the face with truth." (Test. Dan 1:1, 2)

Further on in the Testament of Dan there is a longer section devoted to the evils of anger, 3:1-5:4. The section begins by stating that wrath is an evil thing because it troubles the soul itself. One of the most striking statements in the passage states that when the soul is continually disturbed the Lord departs from it and Beliar rules over it (4:7). This seems difficult to reconcile with the typical Hebrew concept of the wrath of God. Two other passages comment upon the evil of anger. It is stated that hatred is evil, because it kindles wrath (T. Gad 5:1). One of the dying pa-

triarchs also confesses that his anger against Joseph had caused him much physical suffering (T. Gad 5:11). Throughout all twelve books, moreover, there is an emphasis upon the compassion and mercy of God. There is, on the other hand, one reference which expressly attributes wrath to God. T. Levi 6:11 states,

"But the wrath of the Lord came upon them to the uttermost."

Many of the Pseudepigrapha show typically late Jewish teaching concerning the wrath of God with no apparent softening of the doctrine due to contact with Greek thinking. This does not necessarily indicate a lack of that influence among Hellenistic Jews. It is a heterogeneous collection that spreads over several centuries in date. The exact place of origin, the author, the date of writing are in most cases unknown. Internal and external evidence furnishes clues for approximate dates, and the content of the books usually makes it possible to ascertain whether the writer is Jewish or Christian. Among the writers thought to be Jewish definite traces of Greek influence sometimes indicate that the author is not a Palestinian Jew. A conservative and orthodox Jew of the Dispersion would be impossible to distinguish from his Palestinian brother in most cases. The fact that many of these writings are composite further complicates these questions; the work of redactors also making their solution difficult. The following brief treatment of the remaining books of the Pseudepigrapha is merely for the sake of completeness, not for evidence of Greek influence upon Hellenistic Jews.

Since a part of this literature consists of apocalypses, it is to be expected that the eschatological picture of the wrath of God will be prominent. This is true, for example, of various sections of I Enoch. A typical reference from the Similitudes illustrate this. It states,

"When I have desired to take hold of them by the hand of angels on the day of tribulation and pain because of this, I will cause My chastisement and My wrath to abide upon them, saith God, the Lord of Spirits" (I Enoch 55:3)

Another reference from this same section shows a low level of ethics in picturing the elect as gloating over the punishment and suffering of their enemies in the final judgment. The concluding part of this passage is,

"And they shall be a spectacle for the righteous and for His elect They shall rejoice over them,
Because the wrath of the Lord of Spirits resteth upon them
And His sword is drunk with their blood." (62:12)

There are other eschatological references to the day of wrath in other sections of the book. I Enoch 84:4,6, and 90:18 come from a section which may date as early as 200 B.C. (1) In a section which comes from the period 95-79 B.C., or else 70-64 B.C., there are four references to the wrath of God: 91:7,9; 99:16, and 101:3. Two others are found in the first chapters of the book, one in 5:9 of somewhat uncertain date, and one in 18:16 which is thought to be prior to 170 B.C.

Another apocalyptic book which refers to the coming wrath of God is the Book of Jubilees. The first reference, 3:24, states that God cursed the serpent and was wroth with it forever. This is not eschatological, but the second, 24:28, is. It consists of a curse upon the Philistines by Isaac. The third paints the coming judgment in vivid and bitter terms.

"But on the day of turbulence and execration and indignation and anger, with flaming devouring fire as He burnt Sodom, so likewise will He burn His land and his city and all that is his, and he shall be blotted out of the book of the discipline of the children of men, and not be recorded in the book of life but in that which is appointed to destruction, and he shall depart into eternal execration; so that their condemnation may be always renewed in hate and in execration and in wrath and in torment and in indignation and in plagues and in disease forever." (36:10)

(1) Here as in the other books of the Pseudepigrapha I have followed the conclusions of Charles concerning dates as given in The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament. According to Charles the Similitudes are dated 94-64 B.C.

There is much more of the idea of the wrath of God in this book than is indicated by these three direct references to it. There are many references to plagues, curses, vengeance, and destruction which contain the idea without actually employing the term. This book is believed to be the work of a Pharisee in 135-105 B.C.

Another document which is thought to come from the hand of a Pharisee, 7-30 A.D., is the Assumption of Moses. In 8:1 it speaks of a second visitation and wrath in a passage referring to Antiochus Epiphanes.

The Book of the Secrets of Enoch comes from about the same period, but it is believed to be the work of an Alexandran Jew. It contains two references to divine wrath. The first, 44:2, states that one who vents anger on any man without cause will be cut down by the Lord's great anger. The second, 50:5, is an admonition not to injure widows, orphans, or strangers for fear of God's wrath.

A somewhat later document, after 70 A.D., contains a reference which is similar to some noted in the later canonical Old Testament books which tend to make wrath a malevolent force or demon distinct from Yahweh. II Baruch 64:14 states,

"And then wrath went forth from the presence of the Mighty One that Zion should be rooted out...."

Another reference in this same book, 48:14, is a prayer that Yahweh will not be angry with man for he is nothing.

III Baruch is a document from a little later period, the beginning of the second century. The author seems to have been a Jewish Gnostic. A reference in 4:8 states that God was angry and cursed Sammael and his vine, the plant causing the fall in Eden. In 4:13 Noah prays that he will not meet the anger of God because of this plant.

In the Books of Adam and Eve there are three references in Vitae Adae

et Evae. The first two, 15:3 and 16:1 refer to the anger of God against Satan. The third, 29:5, perhaps a Christian interpolation, states that the Jewish sanctuary will be burned and the Jews dispersed because they have kindled God's wrath. In the Apocalypsis Mosis there are two additional references: 16:3 and 26:1. Both refer to God's anger against the serpent. The latter reference in some manuscripts omits the phrase in great wrath. This omission may have been accidental, or possibly the work of a scribe.

With the exception of I Enoch there are more frequent references to the wrath of God in the Zadokite Work and the Sibylline books than any others of the Pseudepigrapha. There are nine of these in the Zadokite Work: 1:17; 3:7; 4:7; 7:17; 9:13, 22, 26, 40 and 11:4. In each case the expression used is the wrath of God was kindled. These references are for the most part not eschatological; more often they refer to past punishments. 9:3 is a quotation of Hos. 5:10. Lactantius gives nine quotations from the Sibyls as evidence of the reality of God's anger, using them as proof-texts from Scripture. (1)

The Psalms of Solomon contain two references to God's wrath. The first is found in 2:25. If this psalm refers to Pompey, it must have been written about 48 B.C., the year of Pompey's death. The reference is,

"For they have made sport unsparingly in wrath and fierce anger;
And they will make an utter end, unless Thou, O Lord, rebuke
them in Thy wrath."

The second reference is thought to be a little earlier. It is a statement in a prayer that God is merciful and will not be angry to the point of consuming them (7:4). Throughout these psalms there is an emphasis upon God's chastising and correcting His sons.

There is one reference to God's anger in the Story of Ahikar, a document of proved antiquity. A Syrian manuscript in 2:33 has the following

(1) Lactantius: De Ira Dei (A.F., vol. 7, p. 278)

admonition,

"My son, in the day of thy calamity revile not God; lest when He hear thee, He should be angered against thee."

There are three books in the Pseudepigrapha which do not mention the wrath of God: The Martyrdom of Isaiah, III Maccabees, and IV Esdras.

Summarizing the results of this investigation it is seen that the Pseudepigrapha, like the Apocrypha, generally contain a concept of the wrath of God similar to that of late Judaism. It does not materially differ from the later canonical books of the Old Testament. Two books, however, the Letter of Aristeas and IV Maccabees, clearly show the influence of Greek philosophy upon this doctrine. The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs shows a possible influence, but the evidence for it is very uncertain.

PHILO.

The most definite proof of the influence of Greek philosophy upon Hellenistic Jews is found in the writings of Philo. It is well known that Philo tried to harmonize the teaching of the Old Testament with Greek philosophy, and that he made large use of allegory in this endeavor. That Philo was conscious of a lack of harmony between Greek and Hebrew thought concerning emotion in God is evident from his writings. He felt the problem and he found a solution for it. This comes out clearly in connection with discussion of the passages in which God is said to repent. Philo felt the need of explaining these so that they would not conflict with the metaphysical attributes of omniscience and unchangeableness.

In commenting upon Gen.6:6, which in the Septuagint quoted by Philo uses a Greek verb meaning to consider anxiously, he states,

"Some persons imagine that it is intimated by these words that the Deity repented; but they are very wrong to entertain such an idea, since the Deity is unchangeable. Nor are the facts

"of his caring and thinking about the matter any proofs that he is repenting, but only indications of a kind and determinate counsel, according to which he displays care, revolving in his mind the cause why he had made man upon the earth."
(Questions and Solutions #93)

That Philo felt called upon to give such a strained interpretation of the verse, completely out of harmony with its context, is an indication of the importance of the problem to him.

Philo's point of view upon the question is amplified in his comment upon Gen. 8:21. He points out a change of purpose is "an affection not usual nor akin to the divine virtue". He asks how God, who knew from the beginning that man was sinful, could intend to destroy the race and not do so later when the same evils exist. His solution of the problem is that these expressions are not to be taken literally, but have a pedagogic value. He states this in the following words,

"But we must think that every kind of expression of this sort is, by law, connected with learning and utility of instruction rather than the nature of truth...." (Questions and Solutions #54)

In amplifying this thought he is led a little further on to speak of God as capable of anger, a thought which is inconsistent with his philosophy. He probably intended this to be taken as figuratively as similar expressions in the Old Testament are interpreted by him. The passage is,

"...he is willing to impress us beings, born of the earth, lest perchance we should unceasingly incur his anger and his chastisement by our implacable hostility to him, without any peace; for it is sufficient for him to be roused and embittered against us once, and once to exact vengeance against sinners; but to inflict punishment over and over again for the same thing is the conduct of a savage and ferocious disposition."
(Questions and Solutions #54)

This problem was of such great importance in Philo's eyes that he devoted an entire essay On the Unchangeable Nature of God to its consideration. He asks what greater wickedness there can be than to think the unchangeable God can be changed. (1) In this essay he expressly denies

(1) The Unchangeable Nature of God, V

that God is capable of anger. He says of Gen. 6:7,

"Now some persons, when they hear the expressions which I have just cited, imagine that the living God is here giving way to anger and passion; but God is utterly inaccessible to any passion whatever. For it is the peculiar property of human weakness to be disquieted by any such feelings, but God has neither the irrational passions of the soul nor are the parts and limits of the body in the least belonging to him. But nevertheless, such things are spoken with reference to God by the great lawgiver in an introductory sort of way, for the sake of admonishing those persons who could not be corrected otherwise." (1)

In a later passage Philo is careful to make clear that the Scripture references attributing ignoble emotions to God are figurative. The following statement illustrates this:

"And the poets say that the whirlwind and the thunderbolt, mentioning them under other names, are the weapons of the Cause of all things. Moreover, speaking of him as they would of men, they add jealousy, anger, passion, and other feelings like these." (2)

Philo in this essay again expresses his solution of the problem by pointing out that the purpose of these passages was pedagogic. He argues that Moses hoped to eradicate all the diseases of the soul, if he represented

"the Cause of all things as indulging in threats and indignation and implacable anger, and moreover as employing defensive arms to ward off attacks, and to chastise the wicked...." (3)

Philo shows the influence of Stoicism not only in the treatment of the problem of emotion in God, but also in his estimate of anger on the part of man. Pohlenz states the dominant place of this influence in the following quotation,

"Er ist von der griechischen Affektenlehre, besonders der stoischen aufs stärkste beeinflusst, und der Gedanke, dass die Vernunft die Herrschaft über die Triebe haben muss, bildet geradezu den Mittelpunkt seiner Ethik." (4)

This conclusion of Pohlenz can readily be substantiated from the writings of Philo. The following quotation serves as evidence; referring to Gen 6:7

- (1) Ibid., #XI
- (2) Ibid., #XIII
- (3) Ibid., #XIV
- (4) Op. cit., p. 7

Philo says

"Perhaps Moses here means to show that bad men are made so by the anger of God, but good men by his grace... But anger, which is a passion peculiar to man, is here spoken of with especial felicity, but still more metaphorically than the real truth, in order to the explanation of a matter which is extremely necessary, namely to show that everything we do through anger, or fear, or pain, or grief, or any other passion, is confessedly faulty and open to reproach; but all that we do in accordance with right reason and knowledge is praiseworthy." (1)

Another quotation which illustrates the point equally well combines with the Stoic estimate of anger their metaphysical objection to attributing emotion to the Deity. The quibbling, sophistic nature of his argument and the extreme caution with which he guards against misunderstanding of his point of view emphasize the vital character of the problem for Philo. He attaches great importance to the order of words in Gen. 6:6. He calls attention to the fact that Genesis says God was indignant that He had made man, rather than because He made man, God was indignant. He continues the argument with the following,

"... for the latter expression would have become a person who repented of what he had done, an idea inconsistent with the nature of God, which foresees everything. But the other doctrine is a general one, being the expression of a man who means to explain by it that anger is the fountain of all sins." (2)

Further evidence to substantiate Pohlenz' conclusion should not be necessary, but one further quotation is given to complete the picture of Stoic ethics in Philo.

"At all events the holy scriptures being well aware how great is the power of the impetuosity of each passion, anger, and appetite, puts a bridle in the mouth of each, having appointed reason as their charioteer and pilot." (3)

In conclusion, one may summarize the results of the investigation into Philo's beliefs concerning the wrath of God by stating that the evidence of the influence of Greek philosophic thought is conclusive and

- (1) On the Unchangeable Nature of God, #XV
- (2) Ibid., XV
- (3) Alleg. Sacred Laws, Bk. III, XL

abundant. Philo was conscious of the problem of harmonizing the Old Testament with Greek doctrines. He solved the problem for himself by two propositions: first, the anthropopathic language of the Bible is figurative and not literally true; second, these representations of an angry God serve a pedagogic purpose; they serve to restrain from sin the foolish who cannot be won to virtue by other means.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WRATH OF GOD IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

The concept of the wrath of God in the New Testament grows out of the Old Testament idea. There are, however, some important and striking differences between the two. The first of these is the comparatively small part it plays in the New Testament. There are only thirty-one direct references to the wrath of God in contrast to almost three hundred in the Old Testament. Even when allowance is made for the greater length of the Old Testament a striking contrast remains. The Old Testament averages more than one reference to every three pages of one edition of the American Standard Version. For this same edition in the New Testament there is an average of one reference to eight pages.

The second striking difference is in the distribution of these references. The concept is general throughout the Old Testament. In the New Testament it is confined to only a few of the books. Of the twenty-seven books of the New Testament eighteen books, or two thirds of the total, do not mention it at all. Of the thirty-one references nineteen are found in two books alone: nine in Romans, and ten in Revelation. Six more references come from writings attributed to Paul: three from I Thess., two from Eph., and one from Col. Thus two writers, Paul and the author of Revelation, account for all but six of the New Testament references to divine anger. These six include two from the Epistle to the Hebrews that are quotations from the Old Testament. The others are from the Gospels: one from Matthew, two from Luke, and one from John. One of the Lukan references is merely a parallel to the Matthean reference.

This difference in frequency and distribution of references to wrath on the part of God needs some explanation. It does not necessarily indicate a lack of belief in the wrath of God. There is no philosophically

based denial of the validity of that concept. It seems to be merely a shift in emphasis rather than a shift in belief. There are fewer references to wrath in the New Testament/^{writers} because that concept had a less important place in their thought. It was dimmed by the more vivid consciousness of the goodness of God and of redemption brought by Jesus. This shift in emphasis is due to the influence of the teaching of Jesus; it reflects his own teaching of God as a loving and forgiving Father. Another factor is the religious experience of Christians made possible by Jesus, their consciousness of forgiveness and reconciliation.

A third difference between the Old and New Testaments is that in the latter the idea of wrath is almost entirely eschatological. Indeed Ritschl maintained that it was exclusively eschatological. This will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

A correlate of the eschatological emphasis is that in the New Testament wrath loses the primitive anthropopathic character of many of the Old Testament references; it is no longer pictured as a psychological emotion. This is pointed out by such a conservative writer as Kubel, who in Ritschl's time vigorously contended for the validity and permanent value of the concept of divine wrath. Kubel states,

"Die anthropopathischen Gemälde des Zorns Gottes als Pathos, leidenschaftlicher Erregtheit mit somatischen Affekten u.s.w. fehlen in N.T." (1)

The anger of God is not a momentary or temporary outburst of passion in the New Testament, but a constant attitude of opposition to sin. (2)

Another significant point is that no verb expressing anger is predicated of God in the New Testament, only a noun form being used. Pohlenz points this out in the following,

"Besonders bezeichnend ist dafür, dass nirgends die im A.T. so häufigen Ausdrücke wie 'Gott ergrimte' gebraucht werden, son-

(1) Kubel: "Zorn Gottes" in Prot. Realenc., v. 21, p. 724

(2) Pohlenz: op. cit., p. 10

"dern stets das Substantive ὀργή Θεοῦ und dass zu diesem terminus technicus Verba hinzutreten wie ἔρχεται ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐνδείξασθαι, die zur Ausmalung eines psychischen Vorganges so unpassend wie möglich waren." (1)

The word ὀργή which is used in the majority of the New Testament references had as its primary meaning nature, temperament, or temper. The only other word used is θυμός which is found six times in Revelation. It originally meant soul, the seat of emotions, or the mind as the agent of thought. It is like the Latin anima.

One more general consideration is important. There is a development in the direction of loosing or separating wrath from God's inner Being. This tendency was noted in the Old Testament also in certain references using the word עֶצֶר. In the New Testament the separation is less ambiguous and further developed towards hypostatization. Pohlenz states,

"Namentlich ein Prädikat wie ἔρχεται ἐπὶ zeigt dass hier die Ansätze zu einer Hypostasierung vorliegen, zu einer Entwicklung, wie σοφία • λόγος und andere Begriffe durchgemacht gaben." (2)

One of the clearest illustrations of this separation of wrath from God is seen in Rom. 5:8, 9 which states that God's love to us is commended by Christ's death through which we are justified and saved from wrath.

Turning from these general considerations to Paul's use of the concept, the question arises whether his use of the term was exclusively eschatological. Ritschl's contention that it was has been hotly debated. The effort to refute his claim that Paul used wrath of God only in reference to a wholly future judgment centers chiefly upon Rom. 1:18. In its present context this may be interpreted as referring to a past rather than a future event. Ritschl avoided this by rather arbitrary textual manipulation which his opponents attack.

Another reference which has been the source of debate is I Thess. 2:16.

(1) Ibid., p. 14

(2) Ibid., p. 15

This is interpreted by some writers as a proleptic use of the aorist ἐφθασεν, the idea being that divine wrath is imminent. (1) It has also been suggested that this refers to a past calamity: some forgotten excess of a Roman procurator, a famine, the edict of Claudius expelling the Jews from Rome. (2) This interpretation seems inadequate in view of the severity of the threatened doom implied by the last clause. A third explanation is given in the following,

"But the closing sentence of v. 16 has all the appearance of a marginal gloss, written after the tragic days of the siege in 70 A.D. (so e.g. Spitta, Pfeleiderer, Primitive Christianity, i. 128, 129, Schmiedel, Trechmann die Paul. Vorstellungen von Auferstehung u. Gericht, 83, Drummond, etc.)" (3)

A third passage of interest is Rom. 13:4. In this Paul depicts the civil authorities or rulers as the instruments of God's wrath. This verse does not necessarily have any eschatological coloring. Ritschl may have overstated the case in contending that the New Testament concept of divine wrath was purely eschatological, but emphasis on future judgment was central as Pohlenz points out. (4)

The eschatological element is dominant in Revelation. The concept is definitely non-psychological and apocalyptic. It shows the influence of certain Old Testament passages. Six of the nine references use the figure of wrath as wine: Rev. 14:10, 19; 15:7; 16:1, 19; 19:15. This figure is found in Isa. 51:17 and Jer. 25:15. Just as clearly Revelation 14:8 seems to show the influence of Jer. 51:7, 8. These also have the cup of wine metaphor. It is interesting that the Septuagint of Jer. 25:15 has altered the idea of wrath. The Greek of the two other references is like the Hebrew.

- (1) Frame, J.E.: ICC on Thessalonians, p. 114
- (2) Denny, J.: The Epistles to the Thessalonians, pp. 91-2
- (3) Moffatt, J.: The First and Second Epistles to the Thessalonians (The Expositor's Greek Testament, v. 4), p. 29
- (4) Op. cit., p. 13

Next we must consider the question: what did Jesus teach concerning the wrath of God. Did he accept the Old Testament teaching, or did he feel the need of superseding it? Did he feel the same need of modifying it that is evident in his rejection of the lex talionis, or his teaching concerning divorce? The answers to these questions cannot be given dogmatically due to the lack of conclusive evidence. The data directly bearing upon the question in the Synoptics is scanty. In spite of this there are certain facts which help in arriving at a conclusion.

One of the pertinent facts is that nowhere in the Synoptics is Jesus represented as attributing wrath to God. Pohlenz makes this clear in the following statement,

"Jesu Predigt operiert mit dem Zorne Gottes garnicht. An der einzigen Stelle, wo die synoptischen Evangelien den Begriff erwahnen, ist es bezeichnenderweise Johannes der Tauffer, der die Worte spricht (Mt. 3:7 Luc 3:7);....."(1)

There is one other Synoptic reference which Pohlenz has overlooked:

Luke 21:23. This comes in the eschatological discourse which is generally thought to be, in part at least, not from Jesus himself. This verse is peculiar to Luke and not in the Matthean and Markan versions of the eschatological discourse. It is also somewhat ambiguous. The wrath may mean divine wrath in an eschatological sense. It may also be interpreted as the purely human wrath of the Romans, if the verses following it are considered. Luke's version of the eschatological discourse more than the others shows that the writer had the destruction of Jerusalem in mind. This single verse then is so ambiguous and of such doubtful authenticity that little weight need be given to it.

One verse in the Fourth Gospel, Jn. 3:36, represents Jesus as using the phrase the wrath of God, but it also cannot be given great weight because of the general view of scholars that the Fourth Gospel is not to

(1) Ibid., p. 10

be used as a primary source as the Synoptics. With these two unimportant exceptions we have no record reporting Jesus as teaching directly that God is subject to anger. Too much must not be made of this omission. While it is significant, an argument from silence is always precarious. This is many times more true in the case of Jesus than those whose teaching have been recorded more fully. We know that Jesus must have said and taught much that was unrecorded. It is impossible to state that because the Synoptics do not report Jesus as using the term the wrath of God that he did not employ it at all. It is safe, however, to conclude that he laid no stress upon the idea. If the phrase had been commonly used by him, if it had been a favorite expression, it is probable that it would have appeared at least occasionally in the Synoptics.

Some other facts which are pertinent to the question, and which work against a blunt denial that Jesus believed in divine wrath, need to be considered. First, he is nowhere reported as denying anger to God. He does not seem to have been influenced by Greek thought, and he probably did not study the problem from the metaphysical point of view.

Second, he spoke of judgment and of punishment of sin, although his emphasis was more upon the grace of God, His love, and His forgiveness. It is also worthy of note, on the other hand, that the passages which do treat of punishment and judgment do not employ anthropopathic language concerning God.

What did Jesus teach regarding future punishment and judgment? A critical examination of the Synoptic material on this problem reveals that a great deal of the harshness of this teaching is due to secondary accretions which are not from Jesus. Matt. 5:21-23 warns against Gehenna. This word undoubtedly is derived from the Hebrew גֵּהֶנּוֹם, which means valley of Hinnom, a valley near Jerusalem. This in late Hebrew literature is used

as a symbol for the place of punishment of the wicked. Sharman states that this valley was reputed to have been the depository of the dead bodies of criminals, carcasses of animals, and refuse of the city. (1) Thus Jesus' words may not have reference to an eternal punishment. Another reference to Gehenna is Matt. 5:29-31 with parallels in Mark 9:43-47. A third is Matt. 10:28 with a parallel in Luke 12:4. These may be interpreted as referring to the fate of the body and not the life of the soul after death.

Another expression interpreted as a reference to future punishment is the reference to weeping and gnashing of teeth. In Matt. 8:11, 12 this expression occurs in a passage which was derived from Q and inserted by the author into the story of the healing of the centurion's servant. The Lukan parallel, 13:28, 29, is generally held to be more original. It seems to be a vivid description of jealous anger in Luke and lacks the eschatological color of Matthew. Sharman holds that Matt. 13:42, 50; 22:13; 24:51; and 25:30, each of which contains the expression, are not from Jesus. (2) His view is shared by Montefiore, Davies, and others. (3) In each case the Lukan parallel does not contain the phrase. The Lukan versions seem to be closer to the original. The additions in Matthew miss the point of the parable or alter it. These additions seem to have been in M, the source peculiar to Matthew. They were probably not added by the author of Matthew himself.

Another section which throws light upon Jesus' teaching concerning future judgment is Matt. 23:13-35 and its Lukan parallel, Luke 11:39-52. This section contains the woes against the Pharisees. Matt. 23:33 seems to reflect the words attributed to John the Baptist in Matt. 3:7 (Luke 3:7)

- (1) Sharman, H.B.: The Teaching of Jesus about the Future, p. 256
- (2) Sharman, H.B.: The Teaching of Jesus about the Future, p. 240
- (3) Montefiore, C.G.: The Synoptic Gospels, v.2, pp. 289, 302, 315,
Davies, J.N.: "Matthew" in Abbingdon Bible Commentary, p. 977f.

The use of Gehenna, as stated above, need not refer to an eternal punishment. The two following verses, Matt.23:34, 35, represent an Old Testament doctrine which cannot be ethically justified, the doctrine that God causes those against whom He is angry to sin in order that He may be justified in punishing them. These words, however, do not come from Jesus. Montefiore says there can be little doubt this passage is from a Christian who believed the Jews responsible for the death of Jesus. (1) Robinson states,

"Luke also attaches his version of this passage to the 'Woes', and it is clear that it must have been appended to it in the original document used by both. Luke gives the passages as a quotation from a work otherwise unknown, The Wisdom of God, and it is possible that its presence is due to the identification of Jesus with Wisdom." (2)

Two other parables deal with the question of future judgment: one peculiar to Matthew, 25:31-46, the other peculiar to Luke, 16:19-31. These are both considered secondary by many scholars. Sharman regards Matt. 25:31-46 as a later Christian homily. (3) Robinson says it has the appearance of a Jewish story adapted for Christian purposes. (4) Montefiore says that in its present form it cannot be authentic, i.e. spoken by Jesus. (5) Of Luke 16:19-31, the Parable of Dives and Lazarus, Montefiore says,

"The eschatology and details of the word-painting seem unlike those habitual to Jesus. If he ever spoke the parable, it has been altered since he spoke it." (6)

Creed says that the possibility that the parable echoes Christian reflection upon Jewish disbelief in the resurrection must be allowed. (7) Easton points out that the interpretation of this parable has been affected by Gressmann's monograph, Vom reichen Mann und armen Lazarus. It shows by a wealth of parallel material that the story is derived from a current tale

(1) Op. cit., pp. 302-3

(2) Robinson, T.H.: The Gospel of Matthew, p. 192

(3) Op. cit., pp. 237-246

(4) Op. cit., p. 208

(5) Op. cit., p. 323

(6) Ibid., p. 539

(7) Creed, J.M.: The Gospel according to St. Luke, p. 253

whose origin is traced to Egypt. Easton states that Christ gave the material a somewhat sharper ethical emphasis. (1) In both these parables it should be borne in mind that their main purpose is ethical motivation rather than teaching concerning the future life.

The conclusion of the above investigation is that there is no very positive proof that Jesus taught of an eternal punishment. He undoubtedly warned that God punishes the sinful. He did not minimize the tragic consequences of wickedness, but he did not necessarily hold that the punishment of the sinner would be eternal. On the other hand, there is no evidence which proves he did not hold the customary view of his day concerning the question.

Jesus rejected the primitive Hebrew idea that catastrophies and calamities were the direct punishment of individual sin. He did not hold that these are manifestations of God's anger. This is evidenced by Luke 13:1-5, in which he denies that the men killed by the tower of Siloam accident or the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with the sacrifices were greater sinners than others. If the words of John 9:2, 3 are an authentic report, they would give additional evidence to support this conclusion, but they cannot be given great weight.

Passages which have an indirect bearing on the question of Jesus' belief in the anger of God are Matt. 18:34; 22:7; and Luke 14:21. These are all statements from parables in which a lord, or a king, is said to be angry. It is possible to interpret the king, or the lord, as representing God. If this is correct, it might be argued that they indicate a belief in an angry God. One cannot press this point because of the fact that the language in parables is that of stories rather than theological definitions. It is an important principle of interpretation that parables are intended

(1) Easton, B.S.: The Gospel according to St. Luke, p. 254

to teach one central lesson, and subordinate parts of the story need not carry special symbolic significance as in the allegory. Part of it may merely be stage-setting purely for the sake of the story. The picture of the anger of the king cannot therefore be used to prove that Jesus thought God was subject to anger.

Other passages of minor importance are Matt. 5:22 and Mark 3:5. The former is a warning against anger. It is no proof of Stoic influence. While couched in strong language, it is adequately explained from other sources. The Old Testament teaching and Jesus' own moral insight are sufficient. The second passage describes Jesus as angered by the hardness of the hearts of the Pharisees. Pohlenz points out that Jesus was no Stoic guide, who like a storm-beaten rock remains untroubled and inaccessible to suffering and emotion. He was moved by pity, joy, and sorrow. Anger moved him at the hardness of the Pharisees' hearts and at the cleansing of the temple. (1)

With the data now assembled one may come to some conclusion. Jesus neither denied nor affirmed belief in anger as an attribute of God. He perhaps shared the Hebrew belief in the anger of God while rejecting the grosser, primitive, and non-ethical elements. He probably did not reject the idea on metaphysical grounds; he shows no evidence of Greek influence. It was not an intellectual problem for Jesus apparently. The concept does not appear to have had an important place in his thinking. Pohlenz' conclusions seem sound. He states,

"Es würde nicht schwer sein, einzelne Worte aus seinen Reden nach der einem oder anderen Seite zu deuten. Geht man aber unbefangen an sie heran, so ist es klar, dass er keine feste Stellung eingenommen hat. Aber das sagt genug. Das Problem, das für den in einem Zentrum griechischer Kultur lebenden Philon brennend ist oder vielmehr schon seine Lösung gefunden hat, liegt ausserhalb von Jesu Gesichtskreis. Er kennt den Vater, und durch ihn sollen

(1) Op. cit., p. 9

"diesen auch seine Hörer kennen lernen, aber nur wie die Kinder ihren Vater kennen. Sie sehen in ihm den Inbegriff alles Hohen und Guten and wissen, dass sie ihm nachstreben müssen, wollen sie vollkommen werden. Weitere Spekulation über seine Wesen und seinen Charakter liegt ihnen fern." (1)

Finally, it also seems safe to assert that the shift in emphasis away from the wrath of God in the New Testament is a reflection of Jesus' teaching and influence. It is a result of Jesus' confidence in the love and goodness of the Heavenly Father.

(1) Ibid., p. 10

CHAPTER V.

THE WRATH OF GOD IN THE WRITINGS OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS AND
THE FIRST APOLOGISTS.

When Christianity spread into the Graeco-Roman world it was natural that conflict concerning the wrath of God should arise. The Old Testament picture of an angry God and the Greek ideal of a passionless deity were incompatible. When the two ideas came together intellectual ferment could not be avoided. It did not merely produce intellectual battles between those who championed the Old Testament concept and those who held Greek views. It produced inner conflicts within some of the early Christian writers themselves. It was an intellectual problem to harmonize their reverence for the Old Testament as Scripture and their philosophic concepts of God. This problem was for them perhaps somewhat similar to the intellectual difficulty of those who had the problem of reconciling the theory of evolution with the dictation theory of inspiration.

In this problem of reconciling the Old Testament and the Greek concept of a passionless deity there were several possible alternatives. The Greek ideal could be rejected completely. Some seemed to hold inconsistent views concerning God's wrath without being aware of their inconsistency, or of the intellectual problem involved. In other writers there is evidence of an intellectual conflict because there has not been found an adequate solution to the problem of these inconsistent views. To accept the Greek ideal completely and reject the idea of an angry God made some sort of an explanation of the Old Testament references to Yahweh's wrath necessary.

CLEMENT OF ROME.

One of the earliest Christian writers, c.97 A.D., does not seem to be aware of the problem. He quotes Isa. 26:10, which mentions the wrath of

God, without any explanation or interpretation to indicate that he took it other than at its face value. (1) An angry God was not an intellectual problem to him. He also quotes the story of Exodus 32, in which Moses is pictured as pleading with Yahweh in an unsuccessful effort to restrain Yahweh's anger after the sin of the golden calf. (2) Clement praises Moses for his prayers for the people. There is no recognition of a moral problem in the wrath of Yahweh and the fact that Moses is pictured as more gracious and ready to forgive than God. There is one slight evidence of the philosophic ideal upon Clement. In a passage exhorting men to praise God he states,

"Let us reflect how free from wrath He is towards all His creation." (3) Due to the paucity of references to the wrath of God in the Epistle it is difficult to determine his views exactly. These three references form a slender basis for judgment, but they are the only ones which bear directly upon the subject.

IGNATIUS.

This same difficulty of meager data is met again in the next writer to be mentioned. Ignatius in his letters, written in 107 or 116 A.D., has only one direct reference to the wrath of God. It states,

"For let us either fear the wrath to come, or let us love the present joy that now is." (4)

From this reference Ignatius seems to hold a New Testament concept of the wrath of God. He uses the term to depict a future eschatological event and has no reference to a primitive emotion. Two other points are worthy of note. Ignatius is a stern and uncompromising foe of docetism. He devotes the Epistle to the Trallians to a polemic against it and also touches upon the subject in other epistles. This is of interest in connection with the impassibility of God because the debate upon this subject

(1) First Epistle of Clement: L (AF, v.1, p. 18) (2) Ibid., LIII (AF, v.1, p. 19)

(3) Ibid., XIX (AF, v.1, p. 10)

(4) Epistle to the Ephesians, XI (AF, v.1, p. 54)

also involved the impassibility of Christ. Ignatius also seems to hold that the New Testament is superior to the Old. He states that the latter is good, but that the gospel transcends it by reason of its telling of the appearance of Jesus Christ, His passion and resurrection. (1)

ARISTIDES.

The apologists, unlike Clement and Ignatius, usually take the Greek philosophic view for granted. From this they attack the Greek religion which in Homer and mythology picture the Greek gods in very primitive and anthropomorphic and anthropopathic terms. Aristides, one of the earliest of the apologists, c.125 A.D., begins his apology as follows,

αὐτὸν οὖν λέγω εἶναι θεόν τὸν συστησάμενον τὰ πάντα καὶ διακρατοῦντα, ἀναχρον καὶ αἰδίου ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀπροσδεῖ, ἀνώτερον πάντων τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἐλαττωμάτων, ὀργῆς τε καὶ λήθης καὶ ἀγνοίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν

(2)

With this philosophic definition of deity as a starting point Aristides pointed out that those who believe man is a god err, since man is "subject to anger and jealousy and desire and change of purpose and has many infirmities." (3) Later he says,

"Let us proceed then to the Greeks, that we may see whether they have any discernment concerning God. The Greeks, indeed, though they call themselves wise proved more deluded than the Chaldean in alleging that many gods have come into being, some of them male, some female, practised masters in every passion and every variety of folly. And the Greeks themselves represented them to be adulterers and murderers, wrathful and envious and passionate, slayers of fathers and brothers, thieves and robbers, crippled and limping, workers in magic, and victims of frenzy." (4)

EPISTLE TO DIOGNETUS.

From this same period an unknown author expresses a similar view of God to the one found in the definition of Aristides. It is couched in less philosophical terms and has more emphasis upon ethical than metaphysical

(1) Epistle to the Philadelphians, IX (AF, v. 1, p. 84)

(2) Quoted from Pohlenz: Vom Zorne Gottes, p. 17

(3) Apology of Aristides, VII (AF, v. 9, p. 268)

(4) Ibid., pp. 268-9

factors. In the Epistle to Diognetus, c.130 A.D., we read,

"For God, the Lord and Fashioner of all things, who made all things, and assigned them their several positions, proved Himself not merely a friend of mankind, but also long-suffering (in his dealings with them.) Yea, He was always of such a character, and still is, and will ever be, kind and good, and free from wrath, and true, and the only one who is (absolutely) good;"(1)

JUSTIN MARTYR.

Turning to another of the apologists we find the Greek point of view again expressed. In Justin Martyr's "Dialogue with Trypho" we read,

"....the Holy Ghost reproaches men because they were made like God, free from suffering (ἀπαθείς) and death provided they kept His commandments." (2)

The Greek ideal is also expressed in the following passage,

"These have conquered me - the divinity of the instruction, the power of the Word: for as a skilled serpent-charmer lures the terrible reptile from his den and causes it to flee, so the Word drives the fearful passions of our sensual nature from the very recesses of the soul; first driving forth lust, through which every ill is begotten - hatreds, strife, envy, emulations, anger, and such like." (3)

Along with the Greek ideal Justin seems to hold a belief in God's wrath. These conflicting concepts do not seem to have been an intellectual problem to him. He holds these two views, but makes no attempt to justify or reconcile them. Justin quotes freely passages from the Old Testament referring to the wrath of God. He quotes Ezek. 20:19-26 (4), Isa.63:6 (5), Deut. 32:16-23(6) , and Isa. 5:18-25 (7). Also in quoting Greek authors to show their knowledge of one true God he includes the following quotation,

"He ever with the wicked man is wroth" (8)

- (1) Epistle to Diognetus, VIII (AF, v. 1, p. 28)
- (2) Trypho, cxxiv (AF, v.1, p. 262)
- (3) Discourse to the Greeks, V (AF, v. 1, p. 272)
- (4) Trypho, xxi (AF, v. 1, p. 204)
- (5) Ibid., xxvi (AF, v. 1, p. 207)
- (6) Ibid., cxix (AF, v. 1, p. 258)
- (7) Ibid., cxxxiii (AF., v.1, p. 266)
- (8) Sole Government of God, iv (AF, v.1, p. 291)

He does not shrink from using the expression the wrath of God himself, although he does not use it often. Once he states,

"For you would have stood in awe of God's wrath, and would not have been lawless wandering sons." (1)

A second reference speaks of the wrath of God, but it really is an assertion concerning the grace of God.

"For even as you provoked Him to anger by your idolatry, so also He has deemed those who were idolaters worthy of knowing His will and of inheriting His inheritance." (2)

A third reference also points out the fact that God is gracious in spite of its reference to the anger of God.

"It is plain then that if He thus be angry with them, and threaten to leave very few of them, He promises to bring forth certain others, who shall dwell in His mountain." (3)

TATIAN.

Tatian, another apologist of this period of whose writings only a portion has survived, reveals in spite of this that he was thoroughly conscious of the ethical problems involved in an unworthy picture of God. He reveals this in the pointed query,

"How can I reverence gods who are eager for presents, and angry if they do not receive them?" (4)

HERMAS.

Another and different type of writing of disputed authorship, which is perhaps to be dated in this period, is like Justin in showing the influence of Greek philosophy and at the same time a retention of an inconsistent concept of God's wrath. This writing, the Shepherd of Hermas, shows the Greek attitude towards anger more clearly in Book II. In this book the Fifth Commandment is against anger. Chapters one and two deal with this topic. In the first of these it is stated that the Lord dwells

(1) Trypho, cxxiii (AF, v. 1, p. 261)

(2) Ibid., cxxx (AF, v. 1, p. 265)

(3) Ibid., cxxxv (AF, v. 1, p. 267)

(4) Address to the Greeks, x (AF, v. 2, p. 69)

in long-suffering, but the devil in anger. It is also stated in this same chapter that unless you guard against anger, you and all your house lose hope of salvation. (1) This estimate of anger seems to reflect the Greek loathing of the emotion. This same idea of anger is expressed in Commandment Sixth, chapter 2, with equal force. It states,

"Look now at the works of the angel of iniquity. First, he is wrathful, and bitter, and foolish, and his works are evil, and ruin the servants of Gods....when anger comes upon you, or harshness, know that he is in you." (2)

Pohlenz says this attributing of anger to evil spirits had as much influence as Greek philosophy in doing away with the concept of anger as an attribute of God. It naturally precludes the idea of anger in God. (3) In spite of this there is no hesitation in speaking of God as angry in Hermas. In the First Vision, chapter one, we read,

"God.....is angry with you for having sinned against me." (4)

In the third chapter of this vision is another reference to God's anger. In this reference there is a beginning of a justification or explanation of God's anger. It is to prod one into efforts to convert one's household. (5) In the Third Vision, chapter six, is a third reference to divine anger. It states,

"Wherefore they have been cut off and cast far away on account of the anger of the Lord, for they have roused Him to anger." (6)

A fourth reference points to the possibility of graciousness on the part of God, and warns of His anger at the same time,

"Trust the Lord, ye who doubt, for He is all-powerful, and can turn His anger away from you, and send scourges on the doubters." (7)

In Book Two we have no direct reference stating that God is angry such as is found in Book I. Perhaps the nearest approach to it is the picture of the anger of the angel of repentance. In Commandment XII of chapter four

(1) AF, v. 2, p. 23

(3) Op. cit., p. 16

(5) AF, v. 2, p. 10

(2) AF, v. 2, p. 24

(4) AF, v. 2, p. 9

(6) AF, v. 2, p. 14

(7) AF, v. 2, p. 18

this is depicted in these words,

"These things he said to me in tones of deepest anger, so that I was confounded and exceedingly afraid of him, for his figure was altered so that a man could not endure his anger." (1)

ATHENAGORAS.

Returning to the apologists we find in Athenagoras the Greek philosophical concept of God clearly stated; there is no admixture of the Old Testament picture of an irate God. Unlike Justin or Hermas there are no quotations from the Old Testament predicating anger of Yahweh, nor does Athenagoras use the New Testament phrase ὀργή Θεοῦ even in quotation. The completeness with which Athenagoras has accepted Greek thought upon this subject is made clear by the following quotation,

"But should it be said that they had fleshly forms, and blood and seed, and the affections of anger and sexual desire, even then we must reward such assertions as nonsensical and ridiculous; for there is neither anger, nor desire and appetite, nor procreative seed in gods. Let them then, have fleshly forms, but let them be superior to wrath and anger, that Athena may not be seen 'Burning with rage and inly wroth with Jove;' nor Hera appear thus;-'Juno's breast could not contain her rage'," (2)

Again he makes fun of primitive anthropopathic Greek mythology, outgrown by later Greek philosophy. He mocks,

"'He raged, as Mars, when brandishing his spear.' Hush! Homer, a god never rages." (3)

That ethical considerations have an important part in this view of Athenagoras is revealed when he says,

"For I call even men rude and stupid who give way to anger and fear." (4)

It is impossible to tell how Athenagoras reconciled his views with the Old Testament pictures of Yahweh which conflicted with them. It is possible he did not realize the need of such reconciliation. If he was conscious of such need, he gives no indication of how he met the problem.

(1) AF, v. 2, p. 29

(3) Ibid., p. 139

(4) Ibid., p. 139

(2) Athenagoras: A Plea for Christians, xxi
(AF, v. 2, p. 138)

THEOPHILUS.

Not all writers of this period were so completely dominated by the Greek ideal. In Theophilus, a writer who died in 181 A.D., we find a viewpoint which is much closer to that of the New Testament. Like Ignatius he used the term in an eschatological sense without implying in it any primitive psychological emotion. The future eschatological content of the term for Theophilus is seen in the following quotation,

"But to the unbelievers and despisers, who obey not the truth.... there shall be anger and wrath, tribulation and anguish...."(1)

Theophilus appears to be aware that this point of view does raise a philosophic problem. He is conscious that the question of anger on the part of God is debatable and not universally held. He also makes some effort to justify his view. He insists that God's anger is justified because he is angry only with the wicked who deserve His anger. This is naturally the first step to be taken in an effort to harmonize the concept of God's anger and ethical teaching. Theophilus takes this first step when he says,

"....if I call Him Fire, I but mention His anger. You will say, then, to me, 'Is God angry?' Yes; He is angry with those who act wickedly, but He is good, and kind, and merciful to those who love and fear Him..." (2)

That he goes no further in an effort to justify his views and that he has no more than this to say upon the subject indicates that the problem was not a serious one for him. The controversy over this point had not yet become an important issue.

(1) To Autolycus, Bk. I, ch. xiv (AF, v. 2, p. 93)

(2) Ibid., Bk. I, ch. III (AF, v. 2, p. 90)

CHAPTER VI.

MARCION AND HIS OPPONENTS

There were two factors of importance which brought the controversy concerning the wrath of God to an open issue. The inconsistency of Greek philosophic thought and some of the primitive representations of God in the Old Testament became now a conscious intellectual problem. The issue was clear-cut. One factor in bringing it to a head was the work of the Stoic philosopher Celsus, c. 177 A.D. He was a vigorous opponent of Christianity. His keenness of intellect made his attacks upon Christianity of more importance than those of lesser acumen. The attacks of the apologists upon Greek religion on the basis of their representations of the gods as anthropopathic, anthropomorphic, and immoral was sure to bring a rebuttal. It was Celsus who saw that the Old Testament was not free from these defects in its entirety and was vulnerable at some points. He ridiculed those representations of God in the Old Testament which picture Him as subject to human passions. His scornful jibes at those primitive concepts of God made them an intellectual problem for Christians of that time.

A second factor in bringing this about was the activity of heretical Gnostic groups. Their concept of God was closer to that of Celsus than that of the Old Testament according to Pohlenz. (1) They tried to get as far away from anthropomorphic and anthropopathic concepts of God as possible. This led to their teaching of a remote and completely transcendent God separated from man by a series of aeons or emanations from God. Along with transcendence was a tendency to define God in purely negative terms. Pohlenz points out,

"Unter den rein negativen Bestimmungen, die danach für den

(1) Op. cit., p. 18

" οὐκ ὧν θεός allein aufzustellen sind, befindet sich
 natürlich auch die ἀπάθεια " (1)

Some of the leaders of the Gnostic movement were Saturnilus, who taught at Antioch prior to 150 A.D.; Basilides, who taught at Alexandria c.130 A.D.; and more important still Valentinus, who taught at Rome 135-165 A.D. By far the most important of those who held heretical ideas at this time was Marcion. He came to Rome in 139 A.D. and was excommunicated in 144 A.D. After his excommunication he organized separate churches which lasted into the fourth century. Marcion held that he based his teaching upon that of Paul. He held that from the latter it must be concluded that between the merciful Father of the New Testament, who is the Supreme God, and the Creator and Judge of the Old Testament there is such a great gulf that they cannot refer to the same deity. Marcion thereupon searched the Old Testament for any trace of imperfection or human weakness in the demiurge or Old Testament god to prove the inferiority of the latter. Especially does he criticize the zeal for sacrifice and for revenge, human emotions such as anger and repentance. The latter is thought unworthy of the Supreme Deity because it implies lack of foresight, ignorance in God being unthinkable.

It is obvious that this postulation of an inferior god or demiurge and the depreciation of the Old Testament arose because of the conflict of the Greek doctrine of the impassibility of God and primitive ideas in the Old Testament. Marcion's solution of the dilemma was to disparage the Old Testament and to cling to his philosophic convictions. It is also obvious that Marcion did not derive this teaching from Paul. Its real source was Stoic influence. Two evidences for this are offered by Pohlenz. He states,

"Dass er dabei von der Stoa ausgegangen sei, behauptet Ter-

"tullian mehrfach, und diesmal ist es keine Sykophantie." (1)

His second evidence is Marcion's use of a typically Stoic definition of repentance. Pohlenz further suggests the influence of Carneades.

Since Paul uses the expression the wrath of God, Marcion's solution of the dilemma necessitated some explanation of that fact. Marcion meets this difficulty in two ways. These passages are either spurious interpolations, or else they refer to the demiurge of the Old Testament. The weakness of this explanation made it an easy point of attack for Marcion's opponents.

Marcion's solution of the problem was unsatisfactory for many reasons. His concept of God was more acceptable to many Christians than the irate God of the Old Testament. No solution, however, which cast aside the Old Testament could be satisfactory. Another great weakness of Marcion's theory was that it virtually discarded monotheism. His opponents were quick to see this defect and centered their attack upon it.

IRENAEUS.

One of Marcion's adversaries was Irenaeus. That Irenaeus shared the Greek philosophic thought concerning God is evident from his discussions in combatting Gnosticism. He attacked the Gnostic doctrine which attributed passibility to one of the Aeons alone, Sophia. He pointed out the inconsistencies of this belief. He stated that it is impossible for some of the Aeons to be passible and some impassible. He continued by arguing that if all are passible passion is carried back to Nous and the Father Himself. (2) Nous is here equivalent to the Logos. The center of Irenaeus' attack upon Gnosticism is thus seen to be that they attribute passibility to God. This same argument is found in the following quotation.

".... since they (Aeons) are of the same substance with the Author of their production, they must either all remain forever impas-

(1) Ibid., p. 21

(2) Against Heresies, Bk. 2, xvii, 7 (AF, v. 1, p. 382)

"sible, or their Father Himself must participate in passion." (1)

A third time Irenaeus reiterated this fallacy which he found in the logic of the Gnostics. He asks,

"But if it is impious to ascribe ignorance and passion to the Father of all, how can they describe an Aeon produced by Him as being passible; and while they ascribe the same impiety to the very wisdom (Sophia) of God, how can they still call themselves religious men?" (2)

Further evidence that Irenaeus was influenced by Greek philosophic views may be adduced from a passage in which he states that God was not angry like a man. While it is not a categorical denial of anger, it does indicate the trend of his thought. The statement, referring to Ps. 50, is as follows,

"For it was not because He was angry, like a man, as many venture to say, that He rejected sacrifices; but out of compassion to their blindness....." (3)

Against the view that Irenaeus whole-heartedly accepted the Greek point of view one might point out that he quoted I Ki. 11: 1, which states that God was angry with Solomon. (4) He made no attempt to explain or justify this statement. Another reference is too ambiguous for evidence. It states that Lot's daughters imagined all mankind perished "and that the anger of God had come upon the whole earth." (5) This is capable of two interpretations. It may mean that Lot's daughters were mistaken only in believing that all mankind was destroyed and the extent of God's anger. On the other hand, it can be argued that the attributing of anger to God at all was equally wrong and imaginary as their belief that all mankind was destroyed.

Further evidence upon Irenaeus' views is given in his replies to Marcion. His chief point of attack is, as with most of Marcion's opponents,

(1) Ibid., Bk. 2, xvii, 1 (AF, v. 1, p. 381)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 2, xvii, 6 (AF, v. 1, p. 382)

(3) Ibid., Bk. 4, xvii, 2 (AF, v. 1, p. 483)

(4) Ibid., Bk. 4, xxvii, 1 (AF, v. 1, p. 499)

(5) Ibid., Bk. 4, xxxi, 2 (AF, v. 1, p. 505)

an insistence upon monotheism. In his arguments for just one God, he combats Marcion's idea of depriving God of all judicial activity and delegating it to the demiurge. He insists that there cannot be one God who is just and not good, and another who is good but not just. Marcion's position is given in the following quotation,

"Again that they might remove the rebuking and judicial power from the Father, reckoning that as unworthy of God, and thinking that they had found out a God without anger and (merely) good, they have alleged that one (God) judges, but another saves....." (1)

Irenaeus' reply to this is to argue that justice and goodness do not preclude each other but belong together. The above quotation is of especial interest because it gives a clue to Irenaeus' method of harmonizing the Greek doctrine of God and the passages in the Old Testament contradictory to it. He does not give a clear or detailed explanation of his solution of this problem. Pohlenz states that we do not know how he solved it. (2) From Irenaeus' reply to Marcion, however, it may be inferred that he would explain the references to God's judicial activity without implying by it any genuine emotion on His part.

One further argument is raised against Marcion. Irenaeus points to the fact that the Old and New Testaments both refer to God's wrath. He quotes Paul's use of the term in Eph. 5:6, 7, and in Rom 1:18. (3) He continues,

"Inasmuch, then as in both Testaments there is the same righteousness of God (displayed) when God takes vengeance, in the one case indeed typically, temporarily, and moderately; but in the other, really enduringly, and more rigidly: for the fire is eternal, and the wrath of God which shall be revealed from the face of our Lordentails a heavier punishment." (4)

THE CLEMENTINE WRITINGS.

In the Clementine Writings there is another interesting opponent of

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|---|--------------------------------------|
| (1) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 3, xxv, 2 (AF, v. 1, p. 459) | (2) <u>Op. cit.</u> , p. 24 |
| (3) <u>Against Heresies</u> , Bk. 4, xxvii, 4 | (4) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 4, xxviii, 1, |
| (AF, v. 1, p. 500) | (AF, v. 1, p. 501) |

Marcion. In the Recognitions the chief argument seems to be an insistence upon the need of chastisement. This appears in the following quotation,

"But if, as you say, there be some God more benignant than all, it is certain that he will not be angry with us; or if he be angry, he is evil. For if our God is angry and punishes, He is not evil but righteous, for He corrects and amends His own sons." (1)

This same argument appears again, when the author asks,

"For what have the philosophers contributed to the life of man, by saying that God is not angry with men? Only to teach them to have no fear of any punishment or judgment, and thereby to take away all restraint from sinners." (2)

A further argument against denying all anger to God is made in the distinction between righteous and unrighteous anger. In this distinction the author takes away from what he calls righteous anger much of the quality of emotion. Here as in Irenaeus is an attempt to reconcile Greek thought and the Old Testament by explaining the references in the Old Testament to the anger of God as unemotional judiciary activity. The author has not yet arrived at a clear-cut distinction, but the trend of his thought certainly lies in that direction. Just how far he had traveled may be judged from the following passage,

"But also the philosophers say that God is not angry, not knowing what they say. For anger is evil, when it disturbs the mind, so that it loses right counsel. But that anger which punishes the wicked does not bring disturbance to the mind; but it is one and the same affection, so to speak, which assigned rewards to the good and punishment to the evil; for if He should bestow blessings upon the good and the evil, and confer equal rewards upon the pious and the impious, He would appear to be unjust rather than good." (3)

In the above quotation the emphasis is upon the justice and impartiality in distinguishing righteous from unrighteous anger, but subordinate to it is the thought that righteous anger does not bring disturbance to the mind.

(1) Recognitions, Bk. 2, lvi (AF, v. 8, p. 113)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 10, 1 (AF, v. 8, p. 205)

(3) Ibid., Bk. 10, xlviii (AF, v. 8, p. 205)

In the Homilies we have quite a different solution to the problem. Here the author seems to be much more in accord with Greek philosophic thought. He argues eloquently for the view that God must be perfect and free from all human weaknesses. A portion of this argument suffices to illustrate this point,

"And if He deliberates, and changes His purpose, who is perfect in understanding and permanent in design? If He envies, who is above rivalry? If he hardens hearts, who makes wise? If He dwells in a tabernacle, who is without bounds? If He is fond of fat, and sacrifices, and offerings, and drink-offerings, who then is without heed, and who is holy, and pure, and perfect?" (1)

How then does the author explain the passages in the Old Testament which Marcion holds unworthy of the Supreme God and attributes to the demiurge? He assumes that these passages are untrue and spurious. This assumes an extensive Greek falsification of Scripture. His argument that Scripture has been corrupted is that it contains many falsehoods against God. The test by which spurious passages are judged false is the simple rule that everything that is spoken or written against God is false. (2) That some passages are false the author holds is evidenced by the fact that they contradict other passages. He states,

"Thus the sayings accusatory of God who made the heaven are both rendered void by the opposite sayings which are alongside of them and are refuted by the creation." (3)

One point which this author emphasizes is that God cannot be said to repent as that would imply that he lacks fore-knowledge, an imperfection the more unthinkable in God because some were only human who were believed to possess fore-knowledge. This argument appears in the following,

"But if Adam, being the work of God, had foreknowledge, much more the God who created him. And that is false which is written that God reflected, as if using reasoning on account of ignorance; and that the Lord tempted Abraham, that He might know if he would endure it....."(4)

- (1) Homilies, Bk. 2, xliii-xliv (AF, v.8, p.237) (2) Ibid., Bk.2,xl,
 (3) Ibid., Bk. 3, xlvi (AF, v. 8, p. 246) (AF, v.8, p.236)
 (4) Ibid., Bk. 3, xliii (AF, v.8, p. 246)

In the very next chapter, he returns to this argument. He says,

"But if He gave foreknowledge to Moses, how can it be said that He had it not Himself? But He has it. And if He has it, as we have also shown, it is an extravagant saying that He reflected, and that He repented and that He went down to see, and whatever else of this sort." (1)

The very violence of this solution of the problem by denying the validity of a considerable portion of Scripture gives striking evidence to the acuteness of the problem. It is also equally good evidence of the strong influence of Greek thought. The author of these writings did not come to this revolutionary stand without a struggle. Pohlenz points this out when he says,

"Schwere innere Kämpfe muss der Verfasser durchgemacht haben, bis er auf diesen gewaltsamen Ausweg verfiel. Denn er war sich sehr wohl bewusst, dass er durch diesen die Autorität der Schrift selber in Frage stellte und als Kriterium in Grunde nur die Gottesidee der eignen Seele anerkannte, und hat deshalb seine Lehre ausdrücklich als esoterisch behandelt (II, 39). Aber über alle Bedenken half ihm hinweg die felsenfeste Überzeugung von der Vollkommenheit Gottes, in der die ἀπρόσβλητα der wichtigste Zug ist." (2)

This solution, however, was too drastic to be satisfying. Just as Marcion's solution it retained the Greek ideal of a perfect and impassible God only at the expense of discrediting the Old Testament. Unlike Marcion, this author does not give the whole Old Testament a subordinate and inferior rank. But any solution which undermined the authority of even a portion of it could not gain general acceptance. Therefore, the search for another and better solution continued.

TERTULLIAN.

A third major opponent of Marcion was Tertullian. In his writings one does not always find perfect consistency. His inner struggle to reconcile the Greek ideal and the teaching of Scripture was never brought to a completely satisfactory conclusion. His attempt at a solution differs

(1) Ibid., Bk. 3, xliv (AF, v. 8, p. 246)

(2) Op. cit., p. 25

from that of the other two chief opponents of Marcion. Although Tertullian devotes a long treatise to the refutation of Marcion, his final solution of the problem drives him into a position which has some surprising similarities to that of his adversary.

Some quotations could be cited to give evidence that Tertullian held that the orthodox view which unquestioningly accepted the idea of the wrath of God. For example, he does not hesitate to employ quotations from both the Old and New Testaments which contain the idea. He quotes Isaiah 1:4 (1), Deut.32:20, 21 (2), Deut.6:12 (3), Deut.13:16 (4), and Eph.2:3 (5). This last quotation is followed by an interesting comment which has reference to Marcion's views. He says,

"Let the heretic, however, not contend that, because the Creator called the Jews children, therefore the Creator is the Lord of wrath." (5)

He continued that argument by asserting that the Jews were the children of the Creator not by nature, but by election, and he refers their being children of wrath to nature, not to the Creator. By this ingenious argument he avoids Marcion's identification of the Creator or demiurge with the Lord of Wrath.

For the sake of completeness two other Scripture references cited by Tertullian might be added. He quoted "Be ye angry and sin not." (6) This may refer to Ps.4:4 or Eph.4:26. He also cited "a fire has been kindled in mine anger", a reference to Isa.30:27 or 30:30. (7) He referred to the incident of Num.25:1 ff. Concerning it he states,

"For this lapse, too, into idolatry, sister to adultery, it took the slaughter of twenty-three thousand by the swords of their countrymen to appease the divine anger. After the death of Joshua the son of Nave they forsake the God of their fathers, and serve idols, Baalim and Asheroth, and the Lord in anger de-

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| (1) <u>Against Marcion</u> , Bk.3, 6 (AF, v.3, p.325) | (2) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk.4, 31 (AF, v.3, p. 402) |
| (3) <u>Scorpiace</u> , 2 (AF, v.3, p. 634) | |
| (4) <u>Ibid.</u> , (p. 635) | (5) <u>Against Marcion</u> , Bk.5, 17 (AF, v.3, p. 464) |
| (6) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk.5, 18 (AF, v.3, p. 468) | |
| (7) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk.4, 29 (AF, v.3, p. 399) | |

"livered them up to the hands of spoilers....." (1)

In this reference we see that Tertullian did not confine his affirmations of divine anger to quotations from Scripture. This reference is based upon Scripture, but Tertullian uses the idea quite independently also.

An independent use of the idea is found in his Apology. In this case he is combatting the accusation of the opponents of Christianity, who claimed that the failure of the Christians to worship the gods had brought upon them various calamities. Tertullian's reply to this accusation contains the idea of the wrath of God, while denying that the Christians have been the cause of any catastrophies. He cleverly turned the argument against his opponents, as the following passage shows,

"But had men sought, they would have come to know the glorious object of their seeking; and knowledge would have produced obedience, and obedience would have found a gracious instead of an angry God. They ought then to see that the very same God is angry with them now as in ancient times, before Christians were so much as spoken of.... And for all that is said, if we compare the calamities of former times, they fall on us more lightly now, since God gave Christians to the world; for from that time virtue put some restraint on the world's wickedness, and men began to pray for the averting of God's wrath." (2)

Further on, he again turns the argument upon his opponents, when he contends that it is more logical to believe that the heathens caused the calamities by failing to worship the true God, than Christians by failing to worship the pagan deities, because the number of Christians is comparatively small. This argument is made in the following statement,

"It should seem the more natural thing to believe that it is the neglected One who is angry, and not they to whom all homage is paid." (3)

Tertullian in the whole argument expressly accepts the idea of wrath in God. That this idea had some reality for him and was not mere rhetoric employed to controvert his opponents is clear when a few lines later we

(1) Scorpiace, iii (AF, v. 3, p. 636)

(2) Apology, xl (AF, v. 3, p. 48)

(3) Ibid., xli, (AF, v. 3, p. 48)

read,

"Having learned these things from His own lips, we love His goodness, we fear His wrath....." (1)

If we took into consideration the above references alone, we might classify Tertullian as rejecting the Greek ideal completely. We have only seen half the picture. References which are indicative of Greek influence must also be considered. For the other side of the picture the evidence is perhaps not as abundant and clear, but it is unmistakable. First, one may note that Tertullian criticized Homer for "imbuing the gods with the falls (casibus) and passions of men." (2) Another direct bit of evidence of Greek influence is found in his discussion of the passibility of the soul. He states,

"... if the soul is to merit being accounted a god, by reason of all its qualities being equal to the attributes of God, it must then be subject to no passion." (3)

A third bit of direct evidence is found in Tertullian's contention that the Father is incapable of suffering. (4) A minor bit of evidence is found in his statement that impatience is of the devil, and anger the son of impatience. (5) It seems difficult to think that Tertullian readily attributed anger to God in view of the above postulated derivation. There is another statement which indicates some concession to the Greek point of view. It is as follows,

"For, inasmuch as God neither commits sin nor condemns a good action, in so far there is no room in Him for repentance of either a good or an evil deed." (6)

He explained the references to repentance of Yahweh in the Old Testament on the basis that divine repentance differs from human. As a proof of this he gives an inexact quotation of I Sam.15:29. He pointed out that the

(1) Ibid., xli (AF, v.3, p.48)

(2) Ad Nationes, Bk. I, 10

(3) Treatise on the Soul, xxiv
(AF, v.3, p. 203)

(AF, v.3, p. 120)

(4) Against Praxeas, xxix

(5) On Patience v (AF, v.3, p.710)

(AF, v. 3, p. 626)

(6) Against Marcion, Bk. II, xxiv
(AF, v.3, p. 316)

Greek word for repentance μετάνοια does not mean confession of a sin but a change of mind. He concluded that it is permissible to attribute this to God without any blame, God's attitude being determined by varying circumstances.

Tertullian thus is seen to hold views which are at least upon the surface conflicting and inconsistent. He was not unaware of their lack of harmony, and it is possible to trace some efforts on his part to reconcile them. One suggestion which he made in justification of his views is that anger of God, like repentance, differs from that of man. He expressed this thought in the following words,

"So also in regard to those others, - namely, anger and irritation: we are not affected by them in so happy a manner, because God alone is truly happy, by reason of His property of incorruptibility. Angry He will possibly be, but not irritated, nor dangerously tempted; He will be moved, but not subverted." (1)

The second suggestion towards justification is that God's anger is always righteous; it comes as punishment only to those who deserve it. He states,

"God will be angry, with perfect reason, with all who deserve His wrath; and with reason, too, will God desire whatever objects and claims are worthy of Himself." (2)

He amplified this thought in another passage. Here he claimed that God ought to be angry with sinners, that the moral government of the world demands this. One finds here the germ of the argument which Lactantius developed later. Tertullian used it in a criticism of Marcion's God for lack of anger. He stated,

"Now, if he is susceptible of no feeling of rivalry, or anger, or damage, or injury, as one who refrains from exercising judicial power, ¹ cannot tell how any system of discipline - and that, too, a plenary one - can be consistent in him..... Most listless, therefore is he, since he takes no offence at the doing of what he dislikes to be done, although displeasure ought to be the companion of his violated will. Now if he is offended, he ought to be angry; if angry, he ought to inflict punishment. For such infliction is the just fruit of anger, and anger is the

(1) Ibid., Bk. 2, xvi (AF, v. 3, p. 310)

(2) Treatise on the Soul, xvi (AF, v. 3, p. 195)

"debt of displeasure, and displeasure (as I have said) is the companion of a violated will." (1)

Another suggestion is that anger is for the purpose of chastening. This is stated as follows,

"'Whom I love' saith He, 'I chasten.' O blessed servant, on whose ammdment the Lord is intent! with whom He deigns to be wroth!" (2)

Tertullian's chief weapon against Marcion is to prove the inconsistency of delegating all justice to the demiurge and all grace to the New Testament God. He pointed out that Israel and all mankind have sinned against their Creator. He continued that argument with the following,

"Marcion's God, however, could not have been offended, both because he was unknown to everybody, and because he is incapable of being irritated. What grace, therefore, can be had of a god who has not been offended." (3)

In the above passage Tertullian seems to make grace synonymous with forgiveness, for he says it cannot exist except after offence, nor peace except after war. He cleverly argued from the Pauline salutations of grace and peace that Paul referred to a God who had been offended, thus Marcion's interpretation of the Pauline God was erroneous. He used other Pauline passages to refute Marcion's views. One of these is Col. 1:20. The pith of his comment upon this is summed up in the sentence,

"Thus the very retribution which overtook both Jews and Greeks proves that God is both a jealous God and a Judge, inasmuch as He infatuated the world's wisdom by an angry and judicial retribution." (4)

A similar criticism of Marcion's views is expressed in a latter passage. Here he criticized Marcion's excision of "the flaming fire" from II Thess. 1: 6-8. He insisted Paul's Lord is the awarder of both weal and woe, and must either be Marcion's demiurge or like him. His defense of the genuineness of the "Flaming Fire" is that the vengeance spoken of

(1) Against Marcion, Bk. I, xxvi (AF, v. e, pp. 291-2)

(2) On Patience, xi (AF, v. 3, p. 714)

(3) Against Marcion, Bk. 5, v (AF, v. 3, p. 439)

(4) Ibid., Bk. 5, v (AF, v. 3, p. 439)

in the next verse requires it. He therefore concluded,

".... that Christ belongs to a God who kindles the flames (of vengeance), and therefore to the Creator, inasmuch as He takes vengeance on such as know not the Lord, that is, on the heathen." (1)

In this same passage he pointed out an inconsistency in Marcion's interpretation of I^I Thess. 1:9, 12. He contended that this refers to the Antichrist and not the emissary or Christ of the Creator as Marcion holds. He stated,

"If therefore he be Antichrist, (as we hold), and comes according to the Creator's purpose, it must be God the Creator who sends him to fasten in their error those who did not believe the truth, that they might be saved; His likewise must be the truth and salvation, who avenges (the contempt of) them by sending error as their substitute - that is, the Creator, to whom that very wrath is a fitting attribute, who deceives with a lie those who are not captivated by the truth." (2)

He continued the argument by pointing out how inconsistent it is for Marcion to interpret the passage as the Christ of the demiurge employed to avenge the truth of Marcionism. He then concludes,

"In short it is incontestable that the emissary, and the truth, and the salvation belong to Him to whom also appertain the wrath, and the jealousy, and the 'sending of the strong delusion', on those who despise and mock, as well as upon those who are ignorant of Him; and therefore even Marcion will have to come down a step, and concede to us that his god is 'a jealous god.' (This being an unquestionable position, I ask) which God has the greater right to be angry?" (3)

In his effort to prove that the idea of wrath and vengeance is not exclusively an attribute of the God of the Old Testament, Tertullian pointed to evidence of these in Christ. In reference to the Lukan version of the Beatitudes which have corresponding woes, he comments,

"For see how he condescends to curse, and proves himself capable of taking offense and feeling anger! He actually pronounces a woe! ... Moreover, both admonition and threatening will be the resources of him who knows how to feel angry. For no one will forbid the doing of a thing with an admonition or a threat, except him who will inflict punishment for the doing

(1) Ibid., Bk. 5, xvi (AF, v. 3, p. 463)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 5, xvi (AF, v. 3, p. 464)

(3) Ibid., Bk. 5, xvi (AF, v. 3, p. 464)

"of it. No one would inflict punishment except him who was susceptible of anger." (1)

In this quotation one notes that Tertullian again states the argument of the necessity of anger as the basis of moral government. He answered the objection that Christ here is giving not his own feeling but that of the Creator to contrast the latter's severity with the love of Christ. He showed that this would imply approval of evil on the part of Christ. The argument is given in brief in this passage,

".... since the woe which has regard to the rich is the Creator's, it follows that it is not Christ, but the Creator, who is angry with the rich; while Christ approves of the incentives of the rich - I mean their pride, their pomp, their love of the world, and their contempt of God, owing to which they deserve the woe of the Creator. But how happens it that the reprobation of the rich does not proceed from the same God who had just before expressed approbation of the poor." (2)

Tertullian turned this argument around. He pointed out that not only is there evidence of wrath and vengeance in the New Testament but that grace and mercy are not unknown to the God pictured in the Old Testament. He says in proving that the Creator was a God of mercy,

"How ready to forgive Ahab, the husband of Jezebel, the blood of Naboth, when He deprecated His anger." (3)

From the above discussion of Tertullian's polemic against Marcion one would suppose that he held a conservative and orthodox Old Testament concept of the wrath of God. The influence of Greek thought seems to have been slight, merely causing Tertullian to refine it upon the ethical side by his insistence on its justification, its value in chastening, its necessity in moral government. He appears not to distinguish anger as an emotion as separate from judicial punishment. His final proof of the validity of the concept of an angry God is the natural fear of the divine. He stated that the objection of the Greeks that anger implies corruption and passion on the part of God, which is impossible in Deity. He replied to this by

(1) Ibid., Bk. 4,xv (AF, v.3, p. 368)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 4,xv (AF, v.3, p. 368) (3) Ibid., Bk. 5,xi (AF, v. 3, p. 452)

asking,

"Whence, then the soul's natural fear of God, if God cannot be angry? How is there any dread of Him whom nothing offends? What is feared but anger? Whence comes anger, but from observing what is done?" (1)

In spite of all this Tertullian does in the final analysis surrender to the Greek ideal. He comes to a position which has startling resemblances to Marcion's solution. All these references to the wrath of God in the Old Testament do not really allude to the Father, who is impassible, but to the Logos. He states that all judgment was given to the Son from the very beginning. It was the Son who overthrew the tower of Babel, sent the flood and destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah by fire and brimstone. (2) He states that all the weaknesses and imperfections to which the heretics object as unworthy of God were suitable enough for the Son who was to take upon himself human sufferings and even death. Pohlenz points out that this position is a tacit acceptance of the philosophic God of Marcion. (3) The difference between Marcion's and Tertullian's solution seems to be that the latter identifies Marcion's demiurge with the Logos. This solution had one very important advantage over that of Marcion. As Pohlenz points out it saved the veneration of the Old Testament, but it did so at the expense of the Logos, the pre-existent and historic, for the Logos plays in Tertullian a similar role to the demons in later Platonism. (4) This solution was probably not wholly satisfactory. Tertullian's own mind appears to have been a battle-field upon which the Greek and Hebrew concepts fought for supremacy. The battle seems to have been long-continued; neither side seems to have won a conclusive and decisive victory.

(1) The Soul's Testimony, II (AF, v. 3, p. 176)

(2) Against Praxeas, xvi (AF, v. 3, pp. 611-2)

(3) Op. cit., p. 28

(4) Ibid., p. 29

CHAPTER VII.

THE SOLUTION OF THE ALEXANDRIANS

Marcion's opponents succeeded eventually in defeating him. It was not difficult to find flaws in his logic, and his virtual giving up of monotheism proved an especially vulnerable point. It was a more difficult task to find a satisfactory solution of the problem of reconciling Greek theology and Hebrew Scripture. In this the Alexandrians were much more successful than the three chief contenders against Marcion discussed in the last chapter.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

Contemporary with Tertullian was the great head of the Alexandrian School, Clement. He does not show as much homage to the Hebrew scriptural view as does his Roman contemporary. He appears to have been much more thoroughly imbued with Greek ideals. Pohlenz says of him,

"Klemens lebt und webt in der stoischen Affektenlehre." (1)

It is significant that Clement's predecessor and teacher, Pantaenus, was a converted Stoic philosopher.

Clement, although wholly in accord with the Greek view, occasionally refers to the wrath of God. He cites passages from both Old and New Testament containing the idea: e.g. Ps. 78:38 (2), and Col. 3:6 (3). The first of these, however, puts the emphasis upon the fact that God is merciful and does not stir up all his wrath. The second is felt by Clement to need some justification. He justifies anger on the part of God by the following comment upon this verse:

".... not to be angry at those who act wantonly is a clear proof of a disposition inclining to the like." (4)

Another illustration is Ps. 2:10, 12. His comment upon these is the

(1) Op. cit., p. 29

(2) The Instructor, Bk. I, ix

(3) Ibid., Bk. III, xi (AF, v. 2, p. 288) (AF, v. 2, p. 231)

(4) Ibid., Bk. III, xi (AF, v. 2, p. 288)

following,

"Do you not fear, and hasten to learn of Him, - that is, to salvation, - dreading wrath...." (1)

A little further on in this same chapter Ps.95:8-11 is quoted, with the following comment,

"Why, then should we any longer change grace to wrath...." (2)

In the next chapter another mention of the wrath of god occurs, in this case not connected with a Scripture reference. Clement says of God,

"His anger augments punishment against sin; His love bestows blessings on repentance." (3)

Another independent use of the wrath of God is found in the following statement,

"'An intoxicated woman is great wrath' it is said, as if a drunken woman were the wrath of God." (4)

Clement, on the other hand, indicates his Stoic sympathies by his fondness for quotations which warn against anger. He quotes Col.3:21 (5) and Eph.4:26 (6). In connection with the latter reference Clement defines wrath as the impulse of concupiscence in a mild soul, especially seeking irrational revenge. He interprets the Ephesian quotation from Ps.4:4 as teaching that we ought not to assent to the impression, and not to follow it up by action, and so to confirm wrath. He also states that the broad and roomy way leading to destruction is open to pleasures and wrath. In another passage where Ep.4:26 is quoted he says,

"Wisdom pronounces anger a wretched thing, because 'it will destroy the wise'." (7)

Clement's adherence to the views of Greek philosophy is unmistakable. He criticizes the heathen representations of the gods because they are de-

(1) Exhortation to the Heathen, ix
(AF, v.2, p. 195)

(4) The Instructor, Bk. 2, ch. 2,
(AF, v.2, p. 246)

(6) Ibid., Bk. 5, ch. 5,
(AF, v. 2, pp. 450-1)

(2) Ibid., ix (AF, v.2, p. 196)

(3) Ibid., x (AF, v.2, p. 201)

(5) Stromata, Bk. 4, ch. 8,
(AF, v.2, p. 420)

(7) The Instructor, Bk. 3,
ch.12 (AF, v.2, p. 294)

picted as subject to passions. One passage states,

"Homer, while representing the gods as subject to human passions, appears to know the Divine Being, whom Epicurus does not so revere....." (1)

His objection to representing gods as subject to human passions is implied in the above quotation, but it becomes explicit in the following one, in which he refutes the charge that Christians by failing to worship the old gods have caused calamities:

"For either those gods of theirs are injured by men, and are shown to be inferior to men on being injured by us; or, if not so, how is it that they are incensed at those by whom they are not injured, like a testy old wife roused to wrath? It is natural, then having a superstitious dread of those irascible (gods), they imagine that all events are signs and causes of evil." (2)

Still more clearly Clement's thorough acceptance of the Greek point of view is found in definite assertions of the impassibility not only of God the Father, but also of the Son. He states near the beginning of a work chiefly concerned with the work and person of Christ,

"..... our Instructor is like His Father God, whose Son He is, sinless, blameless, and with a soul devoid of passion.... For nothing is so urgent in the first place as deliverance from passions and disorders....." (3)

As the last portion of the above quotation indicates, not only was impassibility an attribute of Christ, but it was also the goal of the Christian. Clement is at one with the Stoics in his estimate of self-control and freedom from passion as an absolutely necessary attribute of the good man. That he included in this ideal not merely freedom from the baser emotions but even from those which are ordinarily thought praiseworthy is proved by the following quotation:

"But He (Christ) was entirely impassible (ἀπαθής); inaccessible to any movement of feeling - either pleasure or pain. While the apostles, having most gnostically mastered, through

(1) Stromata, Bk. 5, ch. 14 (AF, v.2, p. 471)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 7, ch. 4, (AF, v. 2, p. 529)

(3) The Instructor, Bk. I, ch. 2 (AF, v. 2, p. 210)

"the Lord's teaching, anger, and fear, and lust, were not liable even to such of the movements of feeling as seem good, courage, zeal, joy, desire....." (1)

Further on in this passage Clement expressly points out that a Gnostic, the term he uses for his ideal man, can have nothing to do with such a base emotion as anger. In this same passage he again states that all emotions, those which are considered good as well as the ones admitted to be evil, must be eradicated. He states,

"Nor is he (the Gnostic) angry; for there is nothing to move him to anger, seeing he ever loves God, and is entirely turned towards Him alone, and therefore hates none of God's creatures..... For it is ridiculous to say that the Gnostic and perfect man must not eradicate anger and courage We must therefore rescue the Gnostic and perfect man from all passion of the soul. For knowledge (gnosis) produces practice, and practice habit or disposition; and such a state as this produces impassibility, not moderation of passion. And the complete eradication of desire reaps as its fruit impassibility. But the Gnostic does not share either in those affections that are commonly celebrated as good..... Nor yet does he share in high spirit, for it takes its place alongside of wrath." (2)

This point of view was evidently central in Clement's ethic. He voiced it more than once. The following is a further illustration of it,

"This is the really good man, who is without passions; having through the habit or disposition of the soul endued with virtue, transcended the whole life of passion. But self-control, desirable for its own sake, perfected through knowledge, abiding ever, makes the man lord and master of himself; so that the Gnostic is temperate and passionless, incapable of being dissolved by pleasures and pains, as they say adamant is by fire." (3)

To accept so whole-heartedly the Greek point of view made necessary some explanation of the various references in the Bible which express a contrary view. If one champions the view that God is impassible, one must find some justification for the many passages which ascribe to God wrath, jealousy, and other emotions. Clement was conscious of this need of justification. He has indicated in his writings the direction in which

(1) Stromata, Bk. 6, ch. 9 (AF, v. 2, p. 496)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 6, ch. 9 (AF, v. 2, pp. 496-7)

(3) Ibid., Bk. 7, ch. 11 (AF, v. 2, p. 542)

he attempted a solution of the problem. As has already been mentioned, he brings forward the justification that not to be angry with evil is to condone it and gives evidence of a disposition to do similar evil. This argument, which is similar to the chief contention of Lactantius, shows a failure to distinguish sharply anger as an emotion from judicial disapproval. A second explanation of these references is that they are purely figurative language. Clement is here employing a solution which had been suggested about two hundred years earlier by Philo. It is interesting that Clement and Philo both lived in Alexandria. The passage in which Clement repeats the argument of Philo is as follows,

"But we, as would appear, do not cease in such matters to understand the Scriptures carnally; and starting from our own affections, interpret the will of the impassible Deity similarly to our perturbations; and as we are capable of hearing; so, supposing the same to be the case with the Omnipotent, err impiously." (1)

In another passage Clement amplifies the thought that God's wrath is not to be understood to mean human passion. In this passage he also adds the thought of men's need of chastening and correction. He also points out the necessity of punishment for the ends of justice. In these suggestions also Clement was preceded by Philo. Clement gives his views in the following,

"'How then,' say they, 'if the Lord loves man, and is good, is He angry and punishes?'..... For many of the passions are cured by punishment, and by the inculcation of the sterner precepts, as also by instruction in certain principles..... For the Divine Being is not angry in the way that some think; but often restrains, and always exhorts humanity, and shows what ought to be done.... And God does not inflict punishment from wrath, but for the ends of justice; since it is not expedient that justice should be neglected on our account." (2)

Clement further endeavors to give a completely ethical interpretation of these passages by arguing that the punishment of the disobedient is to

(1) Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. xvi (AF, v. 2, p. 363)

(2) The Instructor, Bk. I, ch. 8 (AF, v. 2, pp. 225-6)

their advantage and positively refuses any credence to the notion that God takes vengeance. He continues the discussion by quoting the Book of Wisdom. The quotation states that God is Lord of both wrath and mercy. He concludes his attempt to give a completely ethical interpretation of God's wrath with the following,

"Besides, the feeling of anger (if it is proper to call His admonition anger) is full of love to man, God condescending to emotion on man's account; for whose sake also the Word of God became man." (1)

This statement is a trifle ambiguous. The first part seems to deny that God's anger is an emotion; it is merely an admonition. The latter part seems to indicate that it was an emotion which God condescended to take upon Himself for man's sake. If pressed, Clement would probably state that these were not real human emotions.

ORIGEN.

Clement's thorough-going acceptance of the Greek point of view was shared by his pupil and successor, Origen. He refers to the question of the passionlessness of God often. His treatment of the problem is more thorough than that of Clement or any of his predecessors. Origen employs some of Clement's suggestions toward a solution of the problem. He also depends upon Philo according to Pohlenz. (2)

Origen's complete agreement with Greekthinking can be proved by a single statement occurring in a passage in which Origen is arguing against the position of the Marcionites. He states,

"And now, if on account of those expressions which occur in the Old Testament, as when God is said to be angry or to repent, or when any other human affection or passion is described, (our opponents) think that they are furnished with grounds for refuting us, who maintain that God is altogether impassible, and is to be regarded as wholly free from all affections of that kind, we have to show that similar statements are found even in the

(1) The Instructor, Bk. 2, ch. 8 (AF, v. 2, p. 228)

(2) Op. cit., p. 32

"parables of the Gospel;....."(1)

In this quotation Origen employs an argument against Marcion which Irenaeus and Tertullian had also used. He shows that the New Testament contained the idea of the wrath of God and that there are therefore not two distinct and separate gods; a good, but not just, god of the New Testament, and a just, but not good, god of the Old Testament. He insists that the God of both Old and New Testaments is one God who is both just and good. In support of this view he cites the parable of the wicked husbandman, and Luke 19:14, as evidence that the New Testament God is a God of justice who punishes and who is said to be angry. He also points out in a passage which reveals his ethical insight that the Old Testament God was sometimes pictured as not even just. He asks,

"Or will they rather be of the opinion that He is even now just, but is patiently enduring human offences, while that then He was not even just, inasmuch as He exterminated innocent and sucking children along with cruel and ungodly giants?" (2)

Origen, however, goes beyond Tertullian and Irenaeus by not stopping with calling attention to fallacies in the logic of Marcion. He is not content until he has found a complete rationale for the passages in both Old and New Testaments which are not in harmony with the Greek ideal. His first explanation occurs in the discussion from which the two preceding quotations have been taken. He reiterates the Alexandrian argument of both Philo and Clement that these passages are not to be understood literally. He expresses this thought in the following sentence,

"But when we read either in the Old Testament or the New of the anger of God we do not take such expressions literally, but seek in them a spiritual meaning, that we may think of God as he deserves to be thought of." (3)

In his polemic against Celsus he repeats that these expressions can only be understood figuratively. He further explains these passages as

(1) De Prin., Bk. 2, iv, 4 (AF, v. 2, p. 277)

(2) Ibid., (p. 278)

(3) Ibid., (p. 278)

an accommodation to human weakness. He states,

"But as, in what follows, Celsus, not understanding that the language of Scripture regarding God is adapted to an anthropopathic point of view, ridicules those passages which speak of words addressed to the ungodly, and threatenings directed against sinners, we have to say that as we ourselves when talking with very young children, do not aim at exerting our own powers of eloquence, but adapting ourselves to the weakness of our charge, both say and do those things which may appear to us as useful for the correction and improvement of the children as children, so the word of God appears to have dealt with the history, making the capacity of the hearers, and the benefit which they were to receive, the standard of the appropriateness of its announcements (regarding Him)." (1)

In the above passage a third point in Origen's explanation of the wrath of God passages may be discovered. It is implied that they have disciplinary value. This point he makes explicit a little further on when he states,

"We speak, indeed of the 'wrath' of God. We do not, however, assert that it indicates any 'passion' on His part, but that it is something which is assumed in order to discipline by stern means those sinners which have committed many and grievous sins." (2)

He quotes Ps. 6:1 and Jer. 10:24 as evidence that wrath is a means of discipline. He also refers to the incident of David's numbering the people (II Sam. 24, I Chr. 21) and also quotes Eph. 2:3 as evidence that wrath is not a passion with God, but a punishment brought on us by our own sins.

From the preceding paragraph Origen's fourth point has already been indicated. He insisted on the non-emotional character of the attribute of God which the Scripture calls wrath. In commenting on Rom. 2:5 he says,

"How, then, can any one treasure up for himself 'wrath' against 'a day of wrath', if 'wrath' be understood in the sense of 'passion'? Or how can the 'passion' of wrath 'be a help to discipline'?" (3)

Ps. 37:8 and Col. 3:8 are also quoted to show that wrath in God cannot

(1) Against Celsus, Bk. 4, lxxi (AF, v. 4, p. 529)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 4, lxxii (AF, v. 4, p. 529)

(3) Ibid., p. 529

mean a passion. Origen holds that it is impossible that the Scripture should mean that God was involved in the same passion from which it commands us to be altogether free. He cites the fact that sleep is figuratively used of God in support of his figurative interpretation of wrath. Origen's clear distinction of the emotional side of anger as separable from its punitive and disciplinary aspects is an important contribution. This enabled him to go further in the solution of the problem than Clement had done, although it had been suggested earlier by Philo.

Origen's view of these references to the wrath of God is that they have nothing to do with a psychological perturbation. That to him would be unthinkable. They are merely a common figurative expression for the judicial punishment of God. This is indicated in a passage which is interesting and instructive in its exposition of an argument Celsus used in attacking Christianity and Origen's method of refuting him. He states,

"And as a sequel to his non-understanding of the statements regarding the 'wrath' of God, he continues: 'Is it not ridiculous to suppose that, whereas a man, who became angry with the Jews, slew them all from the youth upwards, and burned their city (so powerless were they to resist him), the mighty God, as they say, being angry and indignant, and uttering threats, should (instead of punishing them) send His own Son, who endured the sufferings which He did?' If the Jews, then, after the treatment which they dared to inflict upon Jesus, perished with all their youth, and had their city consumed by fire, they suffered this punishment in consequence of no other wrath than that which they treasured up for themselves; for the judgment of God against them, which was determined by the divine appointment, is termed 'wrath' agreeably to a traditional usage of the Hebrews." (1)

In answering a second objection of Celsus, Origen makes clear his view of God's anger as a perfectly ethical and non-emotional dispensation of justice for disciplinary purposes. Celsus criticized the idea of conflagration ending the world at the judgment day. He states,

"But we say that God brings fire upon the world, not like a cook, but like a God, who is the benefactor of them who stand

(1) Ibid., p. 530

"in need of the discipline of fire....." (1)

In connection with the discussion of this point, Origen cites Isa. 48:9 in support of his views.

In his efforts to give a thoroughly ethical interpretation to these passages referring to wrath, Origen connects God's anger with love. This is an expedient which many later writers followed in their similar endeavors to justify these references and the concept in general. It was a favorite argument of those who argued for the reality and value of the concept in opposition to Ritschl in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The argument is expressed by Origen in the following words,

"This has brought us to see that God convicts some by His anger, since His love to men is so great that He will not leave any without conviction and chastening...." (2)

Origen's consciousness of the need of finding ethically unobjectionable interpretations of the idea of wrath was implied in the passages from his writing previously cited in which he explains God's wrath as a disciplinary measure, always brought on by man's own sin. This latter point becomes evident in a passage in which he comments upon Rom. 2: 4, 5. (3) He applies these verses to Pharoah, stating that Pharoah was treasuring up wrath because of his hard and unrepentant heart. He gives this story a more ethical tone by stating that Pharoah's hard and unrepentant heart was merely proved and made manifest by the ten plagues.

With the Greek philosophical point of view one would not expect Origen to quote freely passages from the Bible which refer to God as angry. He does avoid quoting these passages. There is, however, one of these which is an exception. He quotes Dt. 32:21 three times. (4) His fondness for this quotation lies in the fact that he sees in it a prophecy of Christ-

(1) Ibid., Bk. 5, 15 (AF, v. 4, p. 549)

(2) Comm. on John, Bk. 6, #37 (AF, v. 9, p. 378)

(3) De Prin., Bk. 3, I #11 (AF, v. 4, p. 312)

(4) De Prin., Bk. 4, I, #4; Against Celsus, Bk. 2, 78; Bk. 3, 63
(AF, v. 4, pp. 352, 464, 493)

ianity. Upon the basis of I. Cor.1:18-30 he identifies the foolish nation, those that are not a people of Dt. 32:21, with Christians. Even in his references to this verse Origen's main position is not contradicted. He would claim that the language was not to be taken literally. This cautious use of this passage is shown in the following comment upon the first of these references (underscoring ours),

"Now it is possible to understand with all clearness how the Hebrews, who are said to have moved God to jealousy by that which is not God, and to have provoked Him to anger by their idols, were (themselves) aroused to jealousy by that which was not a people....." (1)

Repentance and jealousy are like anger not to be understood literally. Origen's solution of the problem, reconciling his Greek philosophical views with the Old Testament, includes the following points: 1) these references to emotion are figurative, 2) they are an accommodation to human weakness, 3) they have disciplinary value, 4) they do not refer to a psychological disturbance, 5) they are punishments for sin and are deserved, 6) they are expressions of God's love. With these points Origen provided a solution of the problem which was satisfactory. He went as far as it was possible to go in that period. No ancient writer and few modern writers have gone further. It is difficult to see where further progress could have been made without the modern concept of inspiration and the idea of progressive revelation.

The doctrine of the impassibility of God was held also by Origen's pupil, Dionysius, who was for a time head of the school at Alexandria. This is demonstrated by the following quotation from his writings,

"For then they will have to furnish an explanation of the fact that, though both are supposed to be unregenerated, God is nevertheless impassible, immutable, imperturbable, energetic; while matter is the opposite, impressible, mutable, variable, alterable." (2)

(1) De Prin., Bk. 4, I #4 (AF, v. 4, p. 352)

(2) From the Books against Sabellius (AF, v. 6, p. 91)

Origen's solution of the problem was very influential. The idea of the impassibility of God was generally accepted, and in some quarters taken for granted. The question shifted to the impassibility of the Son in the fourth century.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ANTE-NICENE ROMANS.

The idea of the impassibility of God was not so strongly held among the Romans as among the Greeks. The Romans were less interested in speculative philosophy and more interested in practical questions than the Greeks. They lacked the philosophic training of the Greeks. They did not sharply distinguish the psychological aspect of anger. The ideal of perfect soul harmony and self-control made less appeal to them. They were more concerned with the outer than the inner man. They believed in and practiced ruling their subjects by fear rather than by love. They transferred this attitude of stern punitive justice to the Kingdom of God and pictured ^{God} as a righteous and avenging Judge rather than a loving Father. (1)

These typical Roman traits were stronger in some individuals than others. Some Roman writers were much more familiar with Greek thought and much more influenced by it. Tertullian, for example, shows this to a marked degree. Pohlenz states that the inner insecurity of Tertullian may have been due to the conflict of his Roman nature with Greek idealism. (2) His views have already been discussed in the chapter on Marcion and his opponents.

NOVATIAN.

Novatian shows very clearly the influence of Tertullian. He meets the problem of reconciling Greek thought and Hebrew teaching concerning emotion in God with some of Tertullian's arguments. There is one important difference. Novatian does not transfer all emotions to the Logos as Tertullian did. His chief effort at solving the problem was to find an ethical basis upon which the concept of anger would not be inconsistent with Deity. He distinguishes human anger from that of God. He claims

(1) Pohlenz: Op. cit., p. 41

(2) Ibid., p. 42

that anger in God is not accompanied by corruption as it is in men. He also points to its disciplinary value. Because the purpose behind God's anger is our correction, and because it springs from His love, Novatian claims that it is free from the corruption which is found in men's anger. These arguments are found in the one passage which he devotes to this subject. Selections from it illustrate his point of view:

"Moreover, if we read of His wrath, and consider certain descriptions of His indignation, and learn that hatred is ascribed of Him, yet we are not to understand these to be ascribed of Him in the sense in which they are human vices..... For such passions as these will rightly be said to be in men, and will not rightly be judged to be in God. For man may be corrupted by these things, because he can be corrupted; God may not be corrupted by them, because He cannot be corrupted... For that God is angry arises from no vice in Him. But He is for our advantage; for He is merciful even when He threatens, because by these threats men are recalled to rectitude..... And thus all those, either angers of God or hatreds, or hatreds, or whatever they are of this kind, being displayed for our medicine; as the case teaches, - have arisen of wisdom, not from vice, nor do they originate from frailty; wherefore also they cannot avail for the corruption of God. For the diversity in us of the materials of which we consist, is accustomed to arouse the discord of anger which corrupts us; but this, whether of nature or of defect, cannot subsist in God, seeing that He is known to be constructed assuredly of no associations of bodily parts." (1)

CYPRIAN.

Of quite a different spirit than his contemporaries, Tertullian and Novatian, is Cyprian. He is the furthest removed in spirit and thought from Origen and represents the opposite pole. He is more typically Roman than Tertullian or Novatian. His chief interest lay in practical subjects like church government. He appears to be completely unaware of the philosophical problems connected with the concept of anger in God. He makes no attempt to explain or to justify the use of the concept. The idea is one of which he makes large use. Temperamentally he seems akin to the sternest Puritan and most rigid Calvinist.

(1) De Trinitate, Ch. 5 (AF, v.5, p. 615)

An indication of the large use which Cyprian made of this concept is given by the frequency with which he refers to Biblical passages containing the idea. The following table shows this:

REFERENCE	QUOTED BY CYPRIAN	
Isa.57:6	Epistle liv, 12	(AF, v. 5, p. 343)
Rev.14:10	" lv, 7	(" " p. 349)
Ps.2:5	" lxi, 1	(" " p. 357)
Isa.57:6	" lxiii, 1	(" " p. 364)
Rev.14:10	" lxiii, 1	(" " p. 364)
Eph.5:6	" lxiii, 5	(" " p. 365)
II Ki.17:10	" lxxv, 6	(" " p. 399)
Ps.2:12	Treatise ii, 1	(" " p. 430)
Isa.42:25	" iv, 25	(" " p. 454)
Jer.25:6	" v, 6	(" " p. 459)
Isa.13:9	" v, 22	(" " p. 464)
Rom.2:5	" ix, 4	(" " p. 485)
Isa.57:6	" xi, 3	(" " p. 498)
Rev.14:10	" xi, 3	(" " p. 498)
Dt.13:17	" xi, 5	(" " p. 499)
Jer.25:6,7	" xii, Bk. 1, #2	(" " p. 508)
Isa.1:2-4	" " " 1, #3	(" " p. 509)
Hos.11:9	" " " 2, #6	(" " p. 518)
Rev.19:15	" " " 2, #30	(" " p. 528)
Jer.31:31-41	" " " 3, #20	(" " p. 540)
Nah.1:6	" " " 3, #20	(" " p. 540)
Rev.11:17	" " " 3, #20	(" " p. 540)
Rom.2:5	" " " 3, #35	(" " p. 544)
Rev.14:10	" " " 3, #59	(" " p. 550)
Ps.2:12	" " " 3, #66	(" " p. 551)
Ecclesiasticus 5:7	" " " 3, #97	(" " p. 554)
Zeph.3:8	" " " 3, #106	(" " p. 555)
Ex.22:24	" " " 3, #113	(" " p. 556)

Although Cyprian's view of God's wrath is not wholly eschatological, he often refers to future judgment. His view is little developed along the ethical side; it has much in common with the most primitive Old Testament pictures. He refers to incidents where God's anger is depicted in its most terrifying and destructive aspects, e.g. the rebellion of Korah which was followed by his destruction with two hundred and fifty of his companions. (1) Another illustration is a reference to the allaying of a plague when Phineas murdered an Israelite and a Midianite woman. (2)

(1) Epistle lxxii, 10 (AF, v. 5, p. 381)

(2) Epistle lxxv, 6 (AF, v. 5, p. 399)

The nearest Cyprian comes to an ethical justification of this concept is the assertion that God's anger is always deserved. He states,

"Let each one consider not what another has suffered, but what he himself deserves to suffer; nor think that he has escaped if his punishment delay for a time, since he ought to fear it the more that the wrath of God the judge has reserved it for Himself." (1)

He comes to this point again in his argument in reply to the accusation of the heathen, that plagues and disasters had come because of Christians. He turns the argument upon the heathen and claims these calamities occur not because Christians fail to worship heathen gods but because the heathen fail to worship the God of the Christians. In this argument he states,

"..... certainly when those things occur which show the anger of an offended God, they happen not on account of us by whom God is worshipped, but they are called down by your sins and deservings by whom God is neither in any way sought nor feared..." (2)

Later in this same discussion he again emphasizes the fact that God's anger is deserved. He states,

"You are indignant that God is angry, as if by an evil life you were deserving any good, as if all things of that kind which happen were not infinitely less and of smaller account than your sins." (3)

In justification he also states that God's anger comes upon the unjust (4) and upon those who sin against God. (5)

Cyprian's spirit, the thoroughness with which he believed in the darkest and gloomiest pictures of God's wrath, is seen from another quotation from this same discussion of the accusation of the heathen. He says,

"And therefore with reason in these plagues that occur, there are not wanting God's stripes and scourges; and since they are of no avail in this matter, and do not convert individuals to God by such terror of destructions, there remains after all the eternal dungeon, and the continual fire, and the everlasting

(1) Treatise iii, #26 (AF, v. 5, p. 444)

(2) Treatise v, #5 (AF, v. 5, p. 459)

(3) Treatise v, #5 (AF, v. 5, p. 460)

(4) Ibid., #21 (AF, v. 5, p. 464)

(5) Treatise xi, #3 (AF, v. 5, p. 498)

"punishment; nor shall the groaning of suppliants be heard there, because here the terror of the angry God was not heard....." (1)

In this discussion Cyprian reveals an inconsistency; anger which he so readily attributes to God he feels is a sin in men. That anger in men is in his eyes no mere peccadillo but a neinous offense is apparent from the sins with which he groups it. He states,

"God says He is wrathful and angry, because there is no acknowledgment of God in the earth, and God is neither known nor feared. The sins of lying, of lust, of fraud, of cruelty, of anger, God rebukes and finds fault with, and no one is converted to innocency." (2)

Later in this discussion another sentence shows this same attitude toward anger,

"For either you are swollen with pride, or greedy with avarice, or cruel with anger, or prodigal with gambling, or flushed with intemperance, or envious with jealousy, or unchaste with lust, or violent with cruelty; and do you wonder that God's anger increases in punishing the human race, when the sin that is punished is daily increasing." (3)

In his reply to the heathen accusations that plagues and other disasters were due to Christians, Cyprian, as we have seen, did not deny that the anger of God was the cause of these catastrophies. He did claim that they were not caused by means of the Christians, but were caused for their sakes in the sense that they were retribution for the persecutions which the Christians suffered. (4) He also holds that these misfortunes were a judgment of God to bring about His acknowledgment, an acknowledgment which His benefits had failed to secure. (5)

The only bright spot in this gloomy picture of God's wrath is that Cyprian speaks of the possibility of His anger being averted and appeased. (6) He does not give this aspect as much emphasis as the darker side. He

(1) Treatise v, #9 (AF, v. 5, p. 460)

(3) Ibid., #10 (p. 460)

(5) Ibid., #23 (p. 464)

(2) Ibid., (p. 460)

(4) Ibid., #16 (p. 463)

(6) Treatise iii, #22, 29, 36
(AF, v. 5, pp. 443, 445, 447)

seems steeped in the gloomiest sections of the Old Testament, but perhaps a part of his dark picture may be attributed to the psychological effect upon him of the persecution of Christians. He lived in dark and gloomy days.

COMMODIAN.

In Commodian one sees a contemporary of Cyprian who shows some points of resemblance to him. Like Cyprian he was interested in church government and practical matters rather than philosophy. Pohlenz states that he, like Cyprian, was unaware of the philosophical problem involved in the conflict of Greek thought and Hebrew theology. (1) Commodian does, however, ridicule Greek mythology on philosophical grounds. He pokes fun at the representations of Greek gods as being born, dying, and having other human traits. He objects to the stories of their cruelties and immoralities, but he does not expressly include anger in this condemnation.

That Commodian's failure to include anger was caused by a failure to recognize it as inappropriate for a deity may be argued from the fact that he does not hesitate to speak of the Christian God as angry. The following shows this use,

"In the law, the Lord of heaven and earth, and sea has commanded, saying, Worship not vain gods made by your own hands out of wood or gold, lest my wrath destroy you for such things." (2)

Commodian does not use the expression often, but his acceptance of the idea seems evident from his failure to disown or to explain it. His lack of any apology for its use seems to support Pohlenz' view that he was unconscious of the philosophical problems connected with it. The objections which he raises to the gods of Greek mythology do not imply any great acquaintance with the controversies occasioned by the clash of

(1) Op. cit., p. 44

(2) Instructions ii (AF, v. 5, p. 203)

later Greek thought with more primitive conceptions in their own and in Hebrew literature. His treatment of the subject is elementary and cursory. It is possible that he had a superficial knowledge of the writings which came from the struggle with Marcion, but he does not show dependence upon them. His remarks concerning Greek mythology may be an independent recognition of some of the grosser absurdities of these myths, if they are taken literally.

Commodian makes no contribution toward an ethical explanation of God's wrath, because he did not feel its need. His only point, as in the case of Cyprian, being that God's anger is against the wicked alone. The following quotation is somewhat in the spirit of Cyprian, although Commodian on the whole is less gloomy and has less of the note of doom,

"Certainly God lives, who makes the dead to live, that He may give worthy rewards to the innocent and to the good; but to the fierce and impious, cruel hell." (1)

One difference between Cyprian and Commodian noted by Pohlenz is that the latter thinks of God's wrath in terms of world history and world judgment in the future, while Cyprian sees it in the calamities of the present such as plagues and earthquakes. (2)

ARNOBIUS.

A man of quite a different spirit than Cyprian or Commodian was Arnobius. He is much closer to the Greek spirit in his thought. He stands squarely upon the position of the Greeks that anger is incompatible with Deity, although he sometimes ironically insists that the heathen gods are enraged at his opponents.

Arnobius, like Cyprian and Commodian, defends the Christians from the charge that they have caused calamities through arousing the anger of the heathen gods by their failure to offer sacrifices and worship them.

(1) Instructions ii (AF, v. 5, p. 208)

(2) Op. cit., p. 44

In his first objection to ascribing anger to God Arnobius shows a loathing and contempt for it which is entirely in accord with Stoic feeling. This is illustrated by the following sentences,

".... do you not see what base feelings, what unseemly frenzies, you attribute to your deities? For, to be angry, what else is it than to be insane, to rave, to be urged to the lust of vengeance, and to revel in the troubles of another's grief, through the madness of a savage disposition? Your great gods, then, know, are subject to and feel that which wild beasts, which monstrous brutes experience, which the deadly plant natrix contains in its poisoned roots." (1)

He follows this argument with the explicit statement that if it is proved the gods boil with rage, they are not to be reckoned as at all partaking of divinity. (2) He continues to point out the low ethical view of the gods held by his pagan opponents. He charges they represent the gods as possessing not even a moderate amount of fairness. He asks what is a greater wrong than to injure harmless corn crops and to inflict losses upon Christians. (3) He also questions the fairness of wreaking wrath upon the pagans in order to rouse them to vengeance upon the Christians. (4) He reiterates his belief that those worthy of the name of gods do not become angry, nor hold grudges. (5)

Arnobius fought with a two-edged sword. On the one hand, he replies to their charge with a categorical denial of anger on the part of God; on the other, he charges that it is the pagans rather than the Christians who have aroused the wrath of the gods, if they can be considered capable of anger. This wrath, if it is admitted that it exists, would be aroused by their unworthy representations of the gods. These to Arnobius are absolutely blasphemous. He can think of no greater sin than to picture God in terms of human weakness. It would be aroused by their presumption in attributing sex to the gods (6), by atheism (7), but especially by the

(1) Against the Heathen, Bk. i, 17
(AF, v. 6, p. 417)
(4) Ibid., Bk. 1, 20 (p. 418)
(6) Ibid., Bk. 3, 11 (AF, v.6, p.467)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 1, 18 (p. 418)
(3) Ibid., Bk. 1, 19 (p. 418)
(5) Ibid., Bk. 1, 23 (p. 418)
(7) Ibid., Bk. 3, 36 (AF, v.6, p.473)

stories attributing to them human failings and unethical conduct. (1)

This is illustrated by the following,

"But if it is proved by the very insults that it is so, it must, as a consequence, be understood that it is you who rouse the gods to fierce and terrible rage, because you either listen to, or believe, or yourselves invent about them stories so degrading." (2)

Arnobius does not tire of reiterating his contention that it is the pagans who have aroused the anger of the gods, if the concept is at all admissible. (3)

Arnobius does not attack the concept of anger in the gods from the ethical standpoint alone. He also takes account of the metaphysical objections. His argument from this aspect is that if they are harrassed by any kind of disturbance, this implies that they are weak and capable of suffering, qualities which belong to mortals alone and not to immortal gods. (4) He unites the ethical and metaphysical objections in a statement that emotions are alien to the gods because they suit savage beings and those who die as mortals. (5)

Arnobius devotes part of his discussion to a withering blast at the idea that sacrifices appease the wrath of the gods. He states that if one must offer sacrifices while they are not angry in order to forestall their rage, these are not gods, but wild beasts to whom one tosses food. The view that they appease wrath, after they have become angry, is to him equally untenable. (6) The fine scorn and ridicule which he heaps upon this idea is worth quoting,

"This one thing I ask, above all, what reason is there if I kill a pig, that a god changes his state of mind and lays aside his angry feelings and frenzy;.... Or of what service is a goose, a goat, or a peacock, that from its blood relief is brought to the angry god? Do the gods, then, make insulting them a matter of payment? And as little boys, to induce them to give up their fits of passion and desist from their

- (1) Ibid., Bk. 3, 16 (p. 468)
 (3) Ibid., Bk. 4, 37; Bk. 5, 15, 32
 (pp. 488-9, 495, 502)
 (6) Ibid., Bk. 7, 6 (p. 520)

- (2) Ibid., Bk. 4, 30 (p. 486)
 (4) Ibid., Bk. 7, 5 (pp. 519-520)
 (5) Ibid., Bk. 7, 36 (AF, v.6, p.533)

"wailings, get little sparrows, dolls, ponies, puppets, with which they may be able to divert themselves, do the immortal gods in such wise receive these gifts from you, that for them they may lay aside their resentment, and be reconciled to those who offended them? And yet I thought that the gods - if only it is right to believe that they are really moved by anger and resentment, and forgive the sins of the guilty, without any reward. For this belongs especially to deities, to be generous in forgiving, and seek no return for their gifts." (1)

The whole argument is concluded with the assertion that it is vain to offer sacrifices to appease the wrath of the gods, since reason has shown that they are not angry at any time. (2) This is only one of the numerous explicit statements denying the possibility of anger on the part of gods. Another explicit denial is found in the following statement,

".... we think that they - if only they are true gods, should be free from all agitating and disturbing passions; should not burn with anger, should not be excited by desires; should send misfortune to none, should not find a cruel pleasure in the ills of men....." (3)

According to Pohlenz (4) Arnobius shows no acquaintance with Marcion, although he approaches his reasoning in his efforts to show the incongruity of associating the idea of anger with God. Arnobius himself tells of his dependence upon one pagan philosopher; he says that he was influenced by Varro. His chief difference from Stoic philosophers is in his extremely low estimate of human worth. This evaluation is at the basis of his denial of anger on the part of the gods. How could anything which puny man does, ✓ a mere worm crawling in the dust, affect the gods? How can anything man does either please or insult beings so far removed and superior to him?

Since Arnobius devotes himself to refuting the charge of the opponents of Christianity, he confines himself to the errors of pagan assertions of anger in the gods. How he would explain the Old Testament references which clearly conflicted with his philosophy is not clear.

LACTANTIUS.

Lactantius was a pupil of Arnobius, but very unlike him in spirit.

(1) Ibid., Bk. 7, 8 (p. 520)
(3) Ibid., Bk. 6, 2 (pp. 506-7)

(2) Ibid., Bk. 7, 9 (p. 520)
(4) Op. cit., p. 48

In fact his whole point of view is the exact opposite to that of his teacher. He was much more Roman in his thought and feeling. Pohlenz says of him,

"Lactanz hat lange Zeit in einem Zentrum griechischer Bildung gelebt, ist aber Römer geblieben in Denken und Fühlen. Von griechischen Philosophen oder Theologen hat er herzlich wenig gelesen. Was er an philosophischen Kenntnissen vorträgt, schöpft er hauptsächlich aus Cicero Seneca und Lucrez." (1)

Lactantius especially attacks the views of Arnobius concerning the wrath of God. He defends the validity of the concept of God's anger. He produced the only treatise upon the subject which has come down to us from antiquity. His work has been quoted down to the present day by those who defend the idea of an angry God. Since this is true, a brief sketch of this work "De Ira Dei" is presented in order to show the strength and weaknesses of his arguments.

At the beginning of the dissertation Lactantius states four possible alternatives: God has anger but not love, God has love but not anger, God has neither love nor anger, or God has both love and anger. Since the first of these alternatives is held by no one Lactantius dismisses it with the comment that no one holds it. The third view, which he says is that of the Epicureans he discusses at some length. He charges Epicurus with atheism and deceit. He contends that Epicurus really did not believe in any gods, but concealed his real views for the sake of expediency, since if he had voiced them they would have gained him only opposition and would have deterred people from following him. For the sake of controverting the Stoic point of view later he admits that there is something to be said for the belief of Epicurus that it is inconsistent to take away one emotion from the Deity and retain the others. He, however, contends that in taking away all emotion from God, you can no longer have a belief in

(1) Op. cit., p. 50

any kind of deity; you have no god left. His statement of Epicurus' views and his reaction to them are given in the following quotation,

"For when Epicurus thought that it was inconsistent with God to injure and to inflict harm, which for the most part arises from the affection of anger, he took away from Him beneficence also, since he saw that if God has anger, He must also have kindness. Therefore, lest he should concede to Him a vice, he deprived Him also of virtue..... Therefore He is not God, if He is neither moved, which is peculiar to a living being, nor does anything impossible for man, which is peculiar to God, if He has no will at all, no action, in short no administration, which is worthy of God." (1)

He next turns to a discussion of the Stoic view that God is moved by kindness but not by anger. In chapter five he argues that if God is not angry with the impious, He does not love the pious and righteous. He says no master would show equal kindness to good and bad servants, but would reward the good and punish the bad. In the next chapter he argues that the fact that God is moved by kindness is proof that he is also moved by anger. He also states,

".... no honour can be due to God, if he affords nothing to his worshippers; no fear, if He is not angry with him who does not worship Him." (2)

In chapter seven he turns to the contrast between man and beast, pointing out that man alone worships and has knowledge of God. Here we see his divergence from Arnobius. In contrast to the latter, Lactantius has an exalted view of man. Arnobius emphasized man's kinship with the animals, Lactantius his elevation above them and difference from them.

In chapter eight he turns again to the thought expressed in the above quotation from chapter six. He reiterates that it is useless to worship God if it gains no favor. He illustrates his point with a quotation from Cicero,

"Farewell to God' says Cicero, 'if He is such as to be influenced by no favour, and by no affection of men.'" (3)

(1) De Ira Dei, ch. 4 (AF, v. 7, p. 260) (2) Ibid., ch. 6 (p. 262)
(3) Ibid., ch. 8, (p. 264)

Lactantius feels that the whole basis of both morality and religion is endangered by the view that God cannot be angry. The following quotation shows this,

"But if God takes no trouble, nor occasions trouble to another, why then should we not commit crimes as often as it shall be in our power to escape the notice of men, and to cheat the public laws? Whether, therefore, you take away from God kindness, or anger, or both, religion must be taken away, without which the life of man is full of folly, wickedness and enormity." (1)

In chapter nine he turns to the question of the providence of God, a doctrine denied by the Epicureans, and quotes various opinions concerning it. In the next chapter he discusses theories of creation. He asserts that God must have made the world and discounts an atomic theory of creation. He also contends that God governs as well as creates. For this reason most philosophers agree to the idea of providence.

Chapter eleven deals with the question of monotheism. He quotes different philosophers upon this point. He states that the philosophers acknowledge one God but do not inquire into His worship.

Chapter twelve returns to Lactantius' main thesis: that there is no religion or morality without fear. Fear is taken away if men are convinced God is without anger.

Chapter thirteen deals with the Stoic doctrine that God made the world for men. They held that even dangerous or evil things have their uses. Lactantius modifies their doctrine slightly. He says that a better statement is that these evil things are necessary for wisdom.

Chapter fourteen is devoted to the theme that man is made for worship. Chapter fifteen deals with the problem of the origin of evil. Lactantius states that God permitted evil, because good could not exist without it. He turns then to the Epicurean doctrine that God must be

(1) Ibid., ch. 8, (p. 264)

subject to fear and other weak human emotions if he favors with joy those who worship, and grows angry at those who do not. His next argument is somewhat stronger, that there is no occasion for fear in God. This is also true of envy, grief, avarice, etc.

In the next four chapters he returns to his chief argument, that of moral necessity. He begins by stating that God ought to be grateful to his worshippers, favour the good, and be angry with the evil. He states that there are some affections to which God is not liable, as desire, fear, avarice, grief, and envy. He holds that the Epicureans are wrong in excluding all emotions from God. He holds that the above-mentioned emotions are excluded, because they are evil,

"but as to those which belong to virtue, - that is, anger towards the wicked, regards towards the good, pity towards the afflicted, - inasmuch as they are worthy of the divine power, He has affections of His own, both just and true." (1)

The argument from moral necessity is continued in chapter seventeen by an attempt to justify anger and to distinguish between just and unjust anger. He begins by asking if slaves destroy property, if the master would be angry. In his effort to distinguish righteous from unrighteous anger he cites several definitions of anger: Seneca's that anger is the desire of avenging an injury, Posidonius' that it is the desire to punish any one by whom you think you have been unfairly injured, Aristotle's that it is the desire of requiting pain, and one whose source is not given that it is an incitement of the mind to injure him who either has committed an injury or who has wished to do so. Lactantius says that all these are definitions of unjust anger and apply only to it. His definition of anger is that it is an emotion of the mind arousing itself for the restraining of faults. He continues by admitting that rage ought not to exist in man,

(1) Ibid., ch. 16 (p. 273)

but contending that anger relating to the correction of vices should exist in both man and God. Anger is necessary for the proper discipline and punishment of slaves and children.

In chapter eighteen he argues that to be unmoved at sin is to approve it. The too easy pardon of sin fosters sin. If God were not angry, He would be like the too indulgent parent who spoils a child by failing to punish it and correct its faults. He states that the restraining of anger in the case of sins is faulty. This section concludes with the thought that God has made man like Himself.

Chapter nineteen introduces the argument that since God has a most holy law, and wishes all men to be innocent and beneficent, it is impossible for Him not to be angry when His law is despised, virtue rejected, and pleasure made the aim of life. It also concludes with the idea of the possibility of pardon from God.

Next, in chapter twenty, he attempts to answer the question of why the evil prosper. Lactantius answers this objection to his theory by the statement that if punishment followed every offense, we would all perish. For this reason God is most patient and restrains His anger. This chapter weakens, if it does not wholly destroy, his carefully built argument of moral necessity.

Chapter twenty-one answers another objection which might be raised: that God has forbidden men to be angry. Lactantius in this section again weakens his case by being inconsistent with his former position. He now freely admits man's anger ought to be curbed. He says that this is due to the fact that it is so often unjust. God's anger, on the other hand, is always just; in contrast to the temporal anger of man, His anger is eternal. He states that God would be a critic of His own workmanship if He prohibited anger entirely, for He inserted anger from the beginning in

man's liver. He says that God merely prohibits us from persevering in anger. He quotes Eph. 4:26 as evidence that God commands us to be angry rather than prohibiting it. He says God's anger is eternal, but controlled. It is appeased not by sacrifices, but only by reform.

Chapters twenty-two and three quote from the Sibyls to support the view that God is capable of anger. In chapter twenty-two the Erythraean Sibyl is quoted twice. The next chapter quotes other sibyls, eight quotations being cited. These are used as authoritative proof-texts. The concluding thought is as follows,

"Therefore, where there shall be no anger, there will be no authority. But God has authority; therefore also He must have anger, in which authority consists." (1)

Lactantius' whole polemic against those who do not admit God capable of anger is grounded in his belief that such a denial was a very dangerous step leading to atheism. His whole argument for the necessity of anger rests on the supposition that punishment is never given without it. (2) The admission of the possibility of dispassionate judgment and punishment of sin breaks down the whole fabric of his argument. Seneca recognized the distinction between anger and dispassionate judgment and punishment, and also recognized the quality of anger as an inner psychological emotion. Lactantius makes no clear distinction between the ethical and psychological aspects of anger. He considers only the effect of anger upon its object, and neglects the effect upon the one who is angry. (3) It is in this latter aspect that the chief objection to anger rests. It was here that Marcion's chief attack lay. Lactantius mentions Marcion among the heretics, but he does not seem to recognize the connection of the problem of anger and Marcion's criticism of the Old Testament. (4) His chief attack was

(1) Ibid., ch. 23, (p. 279)
(3) Ibid., p. 54

(2) Pohlenz: op. cit., p. 55
(4) Ibid., p. 58

upon pagan philosophies. His chief argument against the Stoic view is that anger is a necessary complement of love. This he puts forth as a dogmatic assertion with very little logic or other argument to support it. The weakness of this argument and of the argument from moral necessity made Lactantius' work of little influence among his contemporaries and immediate successors.

In conclusion, it may be added that among the Romans there was not unanimity of thought and feeling concerning this question of impassibility. Some were more influenced by Greek thought than others. Novation and Arnobius stand closer to the Greek view than the other Roman writers of this period. The typical Roman view, however, was not so hostile to the idea of anger in God as the Greek view. Cyprian took anger in God for granted. Lactantius attempted to defend the concept from a philosophic point of view. The views of Origen and his school, however, were much more influential, and the debate shifted. In the fourth century it was generally assumed that anger was precluded from the Father, and the question changed to the possibility of anger in the Son.

CHAPTER IX.

THE FOURTH CENTURY

Theological interest in the fourth century was centered in Christology. One phase of the Christological controversy concerned the impassibility of Christ. This question arose earlier in connection with Gnostic docetism. It also arose as the logical conclusion of the doctrine of the impassibility of God. If Christ is divine, then he too must share the attribute of impassibility. Since Origen had pointed the way to the solution of the intellectual problems concerning the impassibility of the Father, the theologians of the fourth century turned their attention to the intellectual problems connected with the impassibility of the Son. The latter doctrine presented some problems because of the passages in the New Testament which picture Jesus as subject to such human weaknesses as hunger, thirst, weariness, and grief.

The Christological controversy before the fourth century was a conflict between the Adoptionist Christology of the so-called Dynamic Monarchians, the Logos Christology, and that of the Modalistic Monarchians. The latter insisted upon the unity of the Godhead and were nick-named Patripassians. They held Father, Son, and Spirit were all one and the same. Noetus and Sabellius were the leaders of this school.

In the Logos Christology, especially in the writings of Clement, it has already been seen that there was a tendency to minimize the emotions of Christ. The divine Logos was impassible. At the same time in that school was the counter-tendency to clearly recognize the humanity of Christ. This was based partly on the thought that God had to become man in order to save man; their doctrine of salvation involved strong emphasis on Jesus' suffering and death. Their recognition of Jesus' passibility was undoubtedly influenced by the human traits of Jesus recorded

in the gospels. Such a strong supporter of the Logos Christology as Hippolytus, 170-236 A.D., calls attention to these. He states,

"In order, however, that He might not be supposed to be different from us, He even underwent toil, and was willing to endure hunger and did not refuse to feel thirst, and sunk into the quietude of slumber." (1)

He expresses this same point of view in a commentary on Psalm 2. (2)

He held this point of view in spite of the fact that he shows the influence of the Greek ideal of impassibility. This is shown by the following passage,

"And thou shalt be a co-heir with Christ, no longer enslaved by lusts or passions and never again wasted by disease. For thou hast become God: for whatever sufferings thou didst undergo whilst being a man, these He gave to thee because thou wast of mortal mould, but whatever is consistent with God to impart, these God has promised to bestow upon thee, because thou hast become deified and begotten unto immortality." (3)

The connection of the doctrine of impassibility with that of deification indicates that the mystery religions as well as Greek philosophy had an influence. Methodius, 260-312 A.D., held a similar view of the impassibility of men. In speaking of Paul's doctrine of a spiritual and corruptible resurrection body he states,

"The transformation, he (Paul) says, is the restoration into an impassible and glorious state. For now the body is a body of desire and humiliation, and therefore Daniel was called 'a man of desires'. But then it will be transfigured into an impassible body not by the change of the arrangement of the members, but by its not desiring carnal pleasures." (4)

Thus the Christological problem can be seen to be not merely a controversy between opposing views. Within the Logos school of Christology itself were inconsistencies which cried out for solution. Some explanation must be given to the conflict between the idea of a divine impassible Logos and a human passible Christ. Origen attempted a solution of this problem as well as that of the anthropopathisms of the Old Testament. He held firmly to the idea that the Logos must be free from emotions.

(1) Against all Heresies, x, 29 (AF, v.5, p.152) (2) On Psalm 2
 (3) Against all Heresies, x, 30 (AF, v.5, pp.152-3 (AF, v.5, p.170)
 (4) III, 12 (AF, v. 6, p. 375)

On the other hand, he held that during Jesus' earthly life, when the Logos was united with a human soul (using this in the Greek sense), that with this soul went human emotions as the gospel record clearly demonstrated. He gave clear recognition to the emotions of Jesus, but insisted these appertained only to the human soul, that the divine spirit or pneuma of the Logos remained altogether free from these human weaknesses. Pohlenz calls attention to one essential difference which Origen noted between the emotions of Jesus and those of men. He states,

"Indem er nämlich Matt 26:37 bei den Worten 'er fing an zu zittern und zagen' des alles Gewicht auf das 'er fing an' legt, liest er in Ahnnehmung an eine Lehre der späteren Stoa heraus, dass Jesus wohl die Vorstadien der Affekte durchgemacht habe, nicht aber diese selbst." (1)

Origen's distinction between the passible soul and the impassible spirit shows some relation to the teaching of Valentinus, but he differs from the latter in his emphasis on the unity of the personality of Christ.

ATHANASIUS.

The fourth century Christological controversy centered in the bitter and prolonged conflict between the views of Athanasius and Arius. The question of the impassibility of Christ was only one of the points at issue in this conflict. Concerning this point the view of Arius is stated by Harnack in the following sentence,

"The attributes which the historical Christ manifested, show that the Logos to which they belonged is a being capable of suffering and is not perfect." (2)

Athanasius, on the contrary held that all creature qualities which the Scriptures ascribe to Jesus have reference merely to his human nature. Athanasius' position can be made clear by reference to his own writings. He states,

".... He who did the works is the same as He who shewed that

(1) Op. cit., p. 64

(2) History of Dogma, p. 217

"His body is passible by His permitting it to weep and hunger, and to shew other properties of a body. For while by means of such He made it known that, though God impassible, He had taken a passible flesh;" (1)

Athanasius maintains that the human weaknesses and emotions of Christ refer only to the flesh or human nature of Christ.

"Wherefore of necessity when He was in a body suffering, and weeping, and toiling, these things are proper to the flesh, are ascribed to him together with the body..... it was not the Word, considered as the Word, who wept and was troubled, but it was proper to the flesh..... it was not the Godhead that was in terror, but this affection too was proper to the manhood.... (though He suffered nothing, for the Word was impassible)....." (2)

The same point of view is expressed in another passage in which he states that, in putting on human flesh, the Lord put on human emotions, though they did not touch Him in the Godhead. (3) Thus, in this aspect of the controversy Athanasius is nearer to the position of Origen than Arius is. In the Christological controversy as a whole, however, neither side could be said to represent Origen exactly. Each represented extremes of Origen's position and could find material in his writings to support their views.

Pohlenz points out two interesting facts in connection with this controversy. First, he shows that the methods of Arius resembled those of Marcion. (4) Just as Marcion hunted out all the Old Testament passages containing anthropopathic representations of God, Arius sought out all the New Testament passages attributing human weakness to Jesus. He used Jn. 11:18, Mk. 5:30; 6:38, and Matt. 16:13, for example, to show that Christ lacked omniscience and had only humanly weak knowledge. He insisted these and similar human traits belonged to the Logos.

Pohlenz next comments upon the lack of a psychological viewpoint

(1) Against the Arians, iii, 55 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 4, p. 423)

(2) Ibid., iii, 56 (p. 424)

(3) Ibid., iii, 32 (p. 411)

(4) Op. cit., pp. 71-4

in Athanasius. (1) He points out that Arius' whole contention was based upon the thesis that the Logos had taken only $\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\xi}$ and not a human soul, therefore all psychological traits were attributed to the Logos. The reply of Athanasius was that it was to the flesh and not the Logos that these human traits should be attributed. He uses $\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\xi}$, however, in a sense different from that of his opponent. He scarcely touches upon the question whether Christ had a human soul or not. Pohlenz thinks that this overlooking of the psychological viewpoint is probably intentional, since this question is in the foreground in Origen, Hippolytus, Lucian, and Arius. (2)

From the above discussion of the impassibility of the Son it is already evident that Athanasius held the orthodox view of the impassibility of the Father. It is so much taken for granted that he does not discuss it. It is not to be expected then that he would often use Scripture references attributing wrath to God. He does show a meticulous avoidance of them for the most part. Of approximately two thousand references only two containing the idea are found. He quotes Ps. 88:7, applying it to the sufferings of Christ. (3) He also refers to the storing up of wrath of Rom. 2:5 (4). These few instances do not alter Athanasius' position. He would undoubtedly explain and interpret them by Origen's methods. His avoidance of the use of the term is further evidenced by the fact that when he quotes John 3:36 he omits the last clause which refers to the coming wrath. (5)

THE APOLLINARIAN CONTROVERSY.

The psychological factor, ignored by Athanasius, led to the next phase of the Christological controversy. This phase, the Apollinarian

(1) Ibid., pp. 74-5

(2) Ibid., p. 75

(3) On Lk. 10:22, #2 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 4, p. 88)

(5) Against Arians, iv.

(4) Councils of Ariminum & Seleucia, Part 1, #2

(v.4, p. 411)

(v.4, p.451)

struggle, is a link between the Arian controversy and the fifth century Nestorian and Monophysite controversies. Before discussing Apollinaris and his opponents mention should be made of the work of Eustathius of Antioch, a contemporary of Athanasius and one of his followers. He took up the polemic against Arius from the psychological point of view. He insisted that the human weaknesses which Arius noted grew out of the fact that Jesus had a human body and soul, therefore it was not necessary to refer them to the divine impassible Logos. He held that Jesus must have had an essentially human soul, since a body without a soul cannot be truly human.

Apollinaris, like Eustathius, originally was a strict follower of Athanasius. He did not feel that all the Christological problems were settled. He felt the orthodox doctrine, limiting the sufferings of Jesus to His humanity, detracted from the atonement, since the death of a man could not destroy death. He also felt a difficulty in holding that the Logos and man, two complete personalities with intellects and wills, could be united. He said this resulted in an impossible mixture, comparing it to some of the old mythological creatures, e.g. the goat-stag. He solved this problem for himself by holding that Christ had a human body and soul, but not a human spirit. This solution was unsatisfactory because it limited the humanity of Jesus. It was apparently somewhat influenced by neo-Platonic ideas; one of their doctrines being that the common man himself was a union of an incorporeal, impassible soul with a passible body. At first Apollinaris seems to have contested that Jesus had a human soul. In later writings, in which he adopts the three-fold division of body, σῶμα, soul, ψυχὴ, and spirit, πνεῦμα, he admits that Jesus had a human soul, but denies that he had a human spirit. With this view he has something in common with Origen, but differs from the latter in holding that the soul

is not pre-existent. Nemesis upon his use of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ makes him a follower of Plotinus, but Fohlenz points out that the agreement is verbal rather than real since they use the word in different senses. (1)

Apollinaris did not waver from the position that the $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ in Christ always remained $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\varsigma$. In his objection, however, to the limitation of the sufferings of Christ to the human, he was accused of making the Deity suffer and die. Thus his view was unacceptable because of its seeming conflict with the dogma of the impassibility of God as well as its denial of full humanity to Christ. That he did adhere to the doctrine of the impassibility of God is stated by Schaff in the following,

"He made, however, a distinction between two sides of the Logos, the one allied to man and capable of suffering, the other allied to God and exalted above suffering." (2)

THE CAPPADOCIANS.

Among the chief opponents of Apollinaris were the three Christian leaders of Cappadocia: Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus. The theology of the three is similar; they were united in their rejection of Apollinarianism. They all attacked its docetism.

The Cappadocians were pulled in two directions. In the conflict with Apollinaris they were compelled to emphasize the humanity of Christ. At the same time impassibility as an ethical ideal had a strong influence and appeal, making it necessary to maintain the doctrine of Christ's impassibility. It is evident that the impassibility of the divine in Christ would be unquestioned. Gregory of Nyssa states this unequivocally,

".....as God, the Son is certainly impassible and incapable of corruption." (3)

He apparently would limit Christ's impassibility to the divine according to the following,

(1) Op. cit., p. 82

(2) Schaff: History of the Christian Church, v. 3, p. 712

(3) Against Eunomius, Bk. 6, 1 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 5, p. 183)

"For if he finds fault with those who refer the passion to the Human Nature, his intention is certainly to subject to the Passion the Godhead Itself." (1)

Pohlenz, however, points out statements which indicate that Gregory would have liked to save the impassibility of the human, at least in name. (2) He says that Christ as ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ἀπαθείας is to be our moral ideal. He urges imitation of the impassibility and incorruptibility of the mediator. To maintain this he forsakes the customary meaning of impassibility and makes it mean merely sinlessness, as the following citation by Pohlenz shows,

οὐδὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν πάθος ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ, εἰς ἀμαρτίαν φέρει....μόνον γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἐναντίου τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπαθείᾳ νοούμενον κυρίως προσαγορεύομεν πάθος (3)

The other Cappadocians, Pohlenz adds, did not go so far; they were satisfied to state that the manner in which human emotions appeared in Jesus precluded sinfulness.

In spite of this Gregory does not hold consistently to impassibility as an ideal for human conduct. He defends anger as legitimate and praiseworthy under certain circumstances. One illustration of this is a reference to the anger of Phineas, which he says was pleasing to God. He comments that anger is good or bad depending on its use. (4) Another passage which indicates how Gregory justified anger is the following,

"If anger is to be extinguished, what arms shall we possess against the adversary?" (5)

A passage which further explains his method of giving an ethical view of anger is the following,

"Then indignation, and anger, and hatred must be as watchdogs to be roused only against attacking sins....." (6)

He gives, nevertheless, a definition of anger difficult to defend on

(1) Ibid., Bk. 6, 1 (p. 182)

(2) Op. cit., p. 87

(3) Ibid., p. 87

(4) On the Soul and Resurrection

(5) Ibid., (p. 443)

(N & PF, ser. 2, v. 5, p. 441)

(6) On Virginity (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 5, p. 363)

ethical grounds. It is stated in the following,

"As for anger, most think it a fermenting of the blood round the heart; others an eagerness to inflict pain in return for a previous pain; we would take it to be the impulse to hurt one who has provoked us." (1)

Gregory also has something to say in justification of the anthropopathic references of the Old Testament. He employs Origen's suggestions towards the solution of this problem. This is shown by the following passage, which is preceded by the citation of Ps. 106:40, I Sam. 15:35, and Ps. 68:65,

"....it makes mention of His sitting and standing, and moving, and the like, which are not as a fact connected with God, but are not without their use as an accommodation to those who are under teaching. For in the case of the too unbridled, a show of anger restrains them by fear." (2)

In a passage preceding the above he gives this same argument more fully. He states that God,

"....like a tender mother who joins in the inarticulate utterances of her babe, gives to our human nature what it is capable of receiving; and thus in the various manifestations of God to man and speaks in human language, and assumes wrath, and pity, and such-like emotions, so that through feelings corresponding to our own infantile life might be led as by hand, and lay hold of the Divine nature by means of the words which His foresight has given. For that it is irreverent to imagine that God is subject to any passion such as we see in respect to pleasure, or pity, or anger, no one will deny who has thought at all about the truth of things. And yet the Lord is said to take pleasure in His servants, and to be angry with the backsliding people....the word teaching us in each of these expressions that God's providence helps our infirmity by using our own idioms of speech." (3)

It is in the light of such explanations that the casual references to God's wrath in Gregory's preaching should be understood. In a similar fashion he would explain the quotation of Scripture referring to God's wrath which he uses, such as Ps. 7:11 (LXX). (4) Such references are not numerous.

Basil, Gregory's younger brother, shows a similar attitude. He also

- (1) On the Soul and Resurrection (p. 440)
- (2) Answer to Eunomius, Second Book (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 5, p. 293)
- (3) Ibid., (p. 292)
- (4) Great Catechism, xl (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 5, p. 508)

uses in his sermons occasional references to God's anger and Bible quotations containing the idea, e.g. Ps.79:6 (1) and Ps.106:32 (2). Basil, like his brother, cannot accept a literal interpretation of such passages. This is shown in the following passage,

"As then, when we hear of God being angry and asleep and flying and of other such expressions which in their obvious sense furnish unbecoming assertions, we neither expunge the expressions of the Spirit nor take what is said in a corporeal sense..." (3)

Like Gregory, Basil shows the influence of the ethical ideal in warning men against anger. Homily X is devoted to this subject. It contains a vivid description of anger, noting some of its physiological and psychological effects. Basil points out the dire consequences of anger in the following,

"Rage rouses strife; strife begets abuse; abuse, blows; blows, wounds; and from wounds often comes death." (4)

In Homily II on fasting he again condemns anger, calling it the intoxication of the soul, making it out of its wits like wine. (5)

Basil, nevertheless, is like his brother in his concession that some anger is righteous and justified. He described this and defends it in the following words,

"Anger, stirred at the proper time and in the proper manner, is an efficient cause of manliness, patience, and endurance..... Anger is to be used as a weapon. So Moses, meekest of men, armed the hands of the Levites for the slaughter of their brethren, to punish idolatry. The wrath of Phineas was justifiable. So was the wrath of Samuel against Agag. Thus, anger very often is made the minister of good deeds." (6)

In Homily IX on "God is Not the Author of Evil" he attempts to justify God's anger in a similar fashion, holding that evils and catastrophes are just punishments for sins. (7) Homily VIII on "Famine and Drought" contains a similar argument. It has reference to a wide-spread and very

(1) Letter cccxxv, #3 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 8, p. 275)

(3) Select Works of S. Ephrem the Syrian, tran. by J.E.Morris, p. 246n

(2) On Spirit, ch. xix (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 8, p. 31)

(4) N & PF, ser.2, v.8, p.lxiv

(5) Ibid., p. lxi

(6) Ibid., xiv

(7) Ibid., lvii-lviii

severe famine of 368 A.D. This calamity is traced by Basil to national sin, especially the neglect of the poor. (1)

The third Cappadocian, Gregory of Nazianzus, holds views similar to those of the other two. Like Basil, some of his teaching concerning the anger of God comes in connection with a calamity. In 373 A.D. the people of Nazianzus were visited by a series of disasters: a cattle plague, drought, and a rain and hail storm which ruined just ripened crops. Gregory's father was so overcome by these that he asked his son to take his place in the pulpit. Gregory used the occasion to warn the congregation of the far greater misery awaiting them in the judgment unless they repent. His words have something of the sound of Cyprian's admonitions, but there is more emphasis upon the possibility of averting wrath. The mixture of emphasis upon wrath and grace is seen in the following,

"But more terrible still are those which the treasures of God's wrath contain, of which God forbid that you should make trial; nor will you, if you fly for refuge to the mercies of God, and win over by your tears Him who will have mercy and avert by your conversion what remains of His wrath. As yet, this is gentleness and lovingkindness and gentle reproof, and the first elements of a scourge to train our tender years: as yet the smoke of His anger, the prelude of His torments; not yet has fallen the flaming fire, the climax of His being moved; not yet the kindled coals, the final scourge." (2)

The above mention of the pedagogic use of anger indicates that Gregory could not entirely escape the influence of the teachings of Origen. In the next section, even in a vivid figure descriptive of the wrath of God, he gives at least lip-service to the doctrine of impassibility. He says,

"I know Him, who, though free from passion, meets us like a bear robbed of her whelps, like a leopard in the way of the Assyrians, not only those of that day, but if anyone now is an Assyrian in wickedness: nor is it possible to escape the might and speed of His wrath when He watches our impieties..." (3)

(1) *Ibid.*, lxiii

(2) *On His Father's Silence*, #6 (N & PP, ser. 2, v. 7, p. 249)

(3) *Ibid.*, #7 (p. 249)

A very similar passage in a poem on anger expressly denies that God is subject to real passion even in such passages. (1) Gregory also attempts to justify the disasters which he interprets as evidence of God's wrath by attributing them to the sin of the people. (2) He states that if God's anger could be propitiated by whole burnt offerings or sacrifices, he would not spare them. He exhorts them to amend their way of life as the only means of staying God's anger. (3) This oration naturally contains citations from Scripture of passages mentioning God's wrath. Even among these there is an emphasis upon the possibility of forgiveness: Jer.10: 24 (4), Ps.95:2 (5), and Joel 2:14 (6). Two emphasize the fact that it is the wicked and disobedient that are punished: Nahum 1:1, 2 (7) and Eph.5:6 (8). Homage is paid to the doctrine of impassibility in the statement that anger is unnatural to God and mercy is natural. (9)

One passage from another oration seems inconsistent with Gregory's acceptance of the doctrine of impassibility. It states,

"We both believe in and hear of the dregs of the anger of God the residuum of His dealings with those who deserve it: For the Lord is a God of vengeance..... Yet my father kept no grudge against those who provoked him, indeed he was absolutely uninfluenced by anger....." (10)

In contrast to this is a passage from one of his theological orations, an oration concerning the Holy Spirit. It shows the influence of Origen upon Gregory as upon the other Cappadocians. The passage is as follows,

"According to the Scripture God sleeps and is awake, is angry, walks, has the Cherubim for His Throne. And yet when

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| (1) Pohlenz: <u>Op. cit.</u> , p. 108n | (2) <u>On His Father's Silence</u> , #12 (p.251) |
| (3) <u>Ibid.</u> , #13 (p. 251) | (4) <u>Ibid.</u> , #12 (p. 251) |
| (5) <u>Ibid.</u> , #14 (p. 252) | (6) <u>Ibid.</u> , #14 (p. 252) |
| (7) <u>Ibid.</u> , #16 (p. 252) | (8) <u>Ibid.</u> , #18 (p. 253) |
| (9) <u>Ibid.</u> , #14 (p. 252) | (10) <u>On the Death of His Father</u> ,
#25 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 7,
p. 262) |

"did he become liable to passion, and have you ever heard that God has a body? This ther is, though not really fact, a figure of speech. For we have given names according to our own comprehension from our own attributes to those of God... When He punishes, we say He is angry; for so it is with us, punishment is the result of anger." (1)

If further evidence were necessary to show that Gregory held to the doctrine of the impassibility of God, the following short statement is conclusive,

"....envy is far from the Divine Nature, which is passionless." (2)

Pohlenz states that at one point Gregory went beyond Origen. (3) The latter held that it was the Logos who spoke in the Bible of the anger of God for pedagogic purposes. Gregory, however, holds the use of these terms is not due to the Logos but the humanly limited capacity of the authors of Scripture. This very modern view, Pohlenz believes, may have been motivated by the desire to remove from the Logos the unethical attribute of deceit.

CHRYSOSTOM.

The views of Chrysostom do not show any important difference from those of the Cappadocians. Like them he does not wholly avoid attributing anger to God. One such passage occurs in a reference to Jer. 15:1. It states,

"Nevertheless, those whom Moses and Samuel were not able to snatch away from God's wrath, this precept when observed was able to snatch away." (4)

It is followed by an exhortation to refrain from anger. Another reference states that the unedible fruit of the Dead Sea region is a monument to the wrath of God. It calls all unproductive and unfruitful things images of the wrath that has gone before and proofs of that which is to come. (5) The sermon containing this reference is full of references to Old Testament references to God's punishment for sin. An eschatological element is

(1) On the Holy Spirit, #22 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 7, p. 324)

(2) Second Theological Oration, #11 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 7, p. 292)

(3) Op. cit., p. 111

(4) Concerning Statutes, Hom. xx, #6 (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 9, p. 473)

(5) Hom. viii (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 13, p. 357)

present in the above reference. It is also in the following explanation of God's delay in punishing the Jews,

"And if the delay is a grievance, let it be a consolation that they will never lift up their heads again; or rather he hath cut short the time by saying 'THE wrath', showing that it was long ago due, and predetermined, and predicted." (1)

One further reference gives additional evidence concerning Chrysostom's use of the idea of the anger of God. He says,

"This again belongs to the Sovereignty, to Equal Dignity, to Honor and not weakness, that the Father should be angry for the things done to the Son." (2)

Chrysostom, however, no more than the Cappadocians holds to a literal interpretation of passages attributing anger to God. He uses the term figuratively. He explains,

"For words spoken in reference to God have not the same force as when spoken in reference to ourselves: for instance we say God is jealous, God is wroth, God repents, God hates. These words are human but they have a meaning which becomes the nature of God.... God is jealous, for He loves, God is wroth, not as yielding to passion, but for the purpose of chastising and punishing." (3)

Chrysostom also gives an explicit statement of the impassibility of God in the following,

"For God also is said to be jealous, not that any should suppose passion, (for the Godhead is impassible,) but that all may know that he doeth all things from no other regard than their sakes over whom He is jealous..." (4)

Another statement of God's impassibility is made in combatting the idea that God could suffer. (5) Pohlenz gives additional evidence of his teaching that God is impassible. (6)

Concerning the impassibility as an ideal for men Chrysostom takes much the same stand as the Cappadocians. The warnings against anger are frequent. Chrysostom urges pity for those who are held in subjection by

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| (1) Hom. iii | (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 13, p. 334) |
| (2) Hom. iii | (" " v. 14, p. 376) |
| (3) Hom. 2, #7 | (" " v. 9, pp. 256-7) |
| (4) Hom. 23 | (" " v. 12, p. 383) |
| (5) Hom. 3, #3 | (" " v. 14, p. 12) |
| (6) Op. cit., p. 114 | |

the dreadful monster, rage, the grievous demon anger. (1) He asserts it is a cause of disease. (2) He thinks one may say of the angry man, as of the wicked of Ps.10:4, that he says there is no God. (3) He calls wrath a fierce flame, a disease which causes many evils. He says it steals our souls. (4) He continues,

"Wrath is a fierce fire, it devours all things, it harms the body, it destroys the soul, it makes a man deformed and ugly to look upon; and if it were possible for an angry person to be visible to himself at the time of anger, he would need no other admonition, for nothing is more displeasing than an angry countenance. Anger is a kind of drunkenness, and is more pitiable than (possession of) a demon." (5)

In the above passage one seems to hear the voice of the late Stoic speaking. There is the same disgust at anger and extravagant, one might say passionate, denunciation of it. An equally strong condemnation of anger is found in the following,

"For wrath is a wild beast, a wild beast keen and angry... for there is nothing uglier nor more shameful than a visage inflamed with anger... Anger differs nothing from madness, it is a temporary devil, or rather a thing worse than having a devil; for one that hath a devil may be excused, but the angry man deserves ten thousand punishments, voluntarily casting himself into the pit of destruction, and before the hell which is to come suffering punishment from this already." (6)

In spite of the violence of these denunciations Chrysostom agrees with the Cappadocians in admitting the possibility of righteous anger. He states that anger is given for the succor of the injured. (7) He justifies anger which is not motivated by selfish desire for revenge. He states,

"What then is the proper time for anger? When we are not avenging ourselves, but checking others in their lawless freaks, or forcing them to attend in their negligence.... Being angry then is not a transgression, but being so unseasonably." (8)

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| (1) <u>Hom.</u> 87, #4 | (N & PF, series 1, v. 10, p. 518) |
| (2) <u>Hom.</u> 6 | (" " v. 11, p. 43) |
| (3) <u>Hom.</u> 39 | (" " v. 11, p. 243) |
| (4) <u>Hom.</u> 4, #4 | (" " v. 14, p. 19) |
| (5) <u>Hom.</u> 26, #3 | (" " v. 14, p. 92) |
| (6) <u>Hom.</u> 48, #3 | (" " v. 14, p. 175) |
| (7) <u>Hom.</u> 23, #8 | (" " 1, v. 12, p. 389) |
| (8) <u>Hom.</u> 16, #9 | (" " v. 10, p. 110) |

Ps. 4:5 (LXX) and Eph. 4:26 are cited in support of this view. A similar justification of anger is found in the following passage, which also carries an explicit statement of God's freedom from wrath,

"The proper time for anger is never where we move in our own quarrel; but if it is our duty to correct others, then is the time to use it, that we may by force deliver others. So shall we be like unto God, always keeping a Spirit free from wrath, and shall attain unto the good things that are to come....." (1)

Concerning the Christological controversy Chrysostom's position may be summed up in the formula "passible in the flesh, but impassible in the divine nature." He rebuked Apollinaris for endangering the doctrine of the impassibility of the Godhead. He accepted the emotions in Christ as in some sense real, but anger is so objectionable to him that he cannot admit its genuineness in Christ. He interpreted the emotions of Christ as condescensions on his part for the sake of man, just as the so-called emotions of God in the Old Testament. The emotions in Christ are not an essential accompaniment of his human nature. Their main purpose was to furnish a means of defeating heresy. Another important purpose was to furnish men with a model, just as the footwashing did, e.g. the tears at the grave of Lazarus were to show men how much grief it was proper to display. (2) Thus there was in Chrysostom a tendency in the direction of docetism.

AMBROSE.

The view of Ambrose is also similar to that of the Cappadocians. Like them he does not scruple to use the idea of God as angry. He occasionally cites references from the Bible containing the idea, e.g. Ps. 6:1 (3). He occasionally uses the idea independently, but usually when there is no direct quotation of Scripture, Ambrose's use of the phrase can nevertheless be traced to the influence of some passage employing it. The following is

(1) Hom. 17 (N & PF, series 1, v.11, pp. 111-2)

(2) Pohlenz: op. cit., pp. 90-91

(3) On the Holy Spirit, Bk. 3, ch. 6 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 10, p. 140)

an illustration,

"The anger of the Lord burst forth, so that He would kill all, but at the prayer of Moses He softened His judgment....." (1)

One use of the term entirely independent of any Scripture reference is found in the following,

"Plainly indeed the reason of God's wrath has been already made manifest, so that the belief in the Roman Empire was first overthrown, where faith in God gave way." (2)

All such references, and there are not many, are not to be understood in a crude literal sense. Ambrose gives too much evidence of intellectual struggle with the problems of the doctrine of impassibility to be accused of anthropopathism. One reference which proves this is the following,

"Non enim deus passioni patet, ut irascatur, cum sit impassibilis, sed quia vindicat, videtur irasci. Nobis hoc videtur, quia ipsi cum commotione vindicare consuevimus." (3)

One interesting reference mentions the anger of God in a discussion of a metaphysical problem closely related to the doctrine of impassibility, the problem of reconciling God's changelessness and His forgiveness. He states that some question the possibility of forgiveness, since it makes God seem liable to change if he forgives those with whom He is angry. (4) Ambrose's reply to this is a resort to the proof text method. He cites Hos. 11:9 as evidence for the possibility of forgiveness.

The clearest evidence concerning Ambrose's adherence to the doctrine of God's impassibility is found in connection with the problem of the passibility of Jesus. In his discussion of that problem the impassibility of God is assumed. The Christological problem is central in his important work "De Fide". His viewpoint is briefly given in the following,

"As being man, therefore, He doubts; as man He is amazed.
Neither His power nor His Godhead is amazed, but His soul;

- (1) Duties of the Clergy, Bk. 3, ch. 8 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 10, p. 76)
- (2) De Fide, Bk. 2, ch. 16, #139 (" " " p. 241)
- (3) Pohlenz: Op. cit., p. 122
- (4) Concerning Repentance, Bk. 1, ch. 5(" " " p. 332)

"He is amazed by consequence of having taken human infirmity upon Him. Seeing, then, that He took upon Himself a soul He also took the affections of a soul, for God could not have been distressed or have died in respect of His being God." (1)

In another passage he states,

"He hath taken upon Him the substance of man, and therewith the affections.... Not as God, then, but as man, speaketh He, for could God be ignorant of the possibility or impossibility of aught?" (2)

His view may be summarized as a simple assertion that Christ possessed both natures, human and divine, and that he was passible in his humanity. (3)

He thus defends the orthodox position without contributing greatly towards the solution of the problems involved in it. He employs Scripture to defend his views, quoting I Pet. 4:1 as evidence that Christ's suffering belonged to His humanity. He comments on this verse,

"It was the flesh, therefore, that suffered; the Godhead above secure from death." (4)

Ambrose is not consistent. He consciously combatted docetism, but he is not free from a tendency in that direction himself. He argued that the manifestations of human weakness on the part of Jesus are for the purpose of refuting docetism. He states that Christ,

"... as being God inhabiting a body displays the weakness of the flesh that the wickedness of those who deny the mystery of the Incarnation might have no excuse. Thus, then, hath He spoken, yet the Manichaeans believed not; Valentinus denied, and Marcion judged Him to be a ghost." (5)

The inconsistency of this view and the docetic tendency is more clearly shown in the following.

"Nor yet did He hunger because He was overcome by the weakness of the body, but by His hunger He proved that He had verily taken upon Himself a body; that He might teach us that He had taken not only our body but also the weaknesses of that body..." (6)

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| (1) De Fide, Bk. 2, ch. 7, #56 | (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 10, p. 230) |
| (2) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 2, ch. 5, #42 | (" " " p. 228) |
| (3) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 2, ch. 7, #58 | (" " " p. 230) |
| (4) <u>Ibid.</u> , #57 (p. 230) | |
| (5) <u>Ibid.</u> , #44 (p. 229) | |
| (6) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 3, ch. 1, #6 (p. 243) | |

He does not go as far as Chrysostom towards docetism in his interpretation of Jesus' tears at the grave of Lazarus. He interprets this as a genuine emotion, stating that Christ was moved by a loving sister's tears, for they touched his human heart. (1)

One further reference concerning the possibility of Christ should be noted. He refers to Christ's anger and attempts to give an explanation of this. He uses an argument to satisfy ethical demands which had been applied by previous writers to God's anger. He asks,

"Is it not evident that the Lord Jesus is angry with us when we sin in order that He may convert us through fear of His indignation. His indignation, then, is not the carrying out of vengeance, but rather the working out of forgiveness...." (2)

Ambrose, like most writers of this period, found a place for human righteous indignation, although he also warns against anger in strong terms. In one admonition against anger he cites Ps. 4:4 and warns that anger or passions give the devil opportunity to ensnare those under their sway. (3) He devotes an entire chapter of this same treatise to the subject of anger. (4) He again quotes Ps. 4:4, interpreting it as a command to be angry at the faults against which one should be angry. For Ambrose righteous indignation is chiefly that directed against self. He advises that, if one is to be angry, one should be angry with one's self for being roused and thus avoid sin. He urges that anger be overcome by reason. He advises that wrath be resisted if possible, but if not to give way since it is written to give place to wrath.

JEROME.

Pohlenz states that Jerome's position concerning the impossibility of Christ is similar to that of Ambrose. (5) He adds that Jerome emphasizes

(1) Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. 7, #55 (p. 230)

(2) On Repentance, Bk. 1, ch. 5 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 10, p. 333)

(3) Duties of the Clergy, Bk. 1, ch. 3 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 10, p. 3)

(4) Ibid., Bk. 1, ch. 21 (pp. 16-7)

(5) Op. cit., p. 101

the genuineness of Christ's suffering in a commentary on Isa.53:5ff., but follows Hilary in his interpretation of Gethsemane in maintaining that the anguish and fear do not arise from human need or weakness.

Jerome cites Scripture references containing the idea of an angry God more frequently than Ambrose, e.g. Lev. 10:6 (1), Ps. 85:4 (2), Hosea 11:8,9 (3), Rom.2:4, 5 (4) and Col.3:6 (5). He also uses the idea independently, interpreting the attacks of the barbarians as evidence of God's anger. (6) He also uses the expression eschatologically, employing the Pauline phrases vessels of wrath (7) and children of wrath (8). He occasionally uses the idea of God's wrath with a note of stern warning.

One such reference states,

"The pontiff Aaron, we read, faced the raging flames, and by putting fire in his censer checked the wrath of God.... Who think you is there now under heaven able to stay God's wrath...." (9)

There is also recognition of the possibility of averting God's wrath and obtaining forgiveness. Jerome refers to the story of Jonah as evidence for this. (10)

In one reference an indication is given of the method by which he found an ethical justification for the use of the idea of God's wrath. His method is no new one; it is the familiar doctrine of the Alexandrian school. He states,

- (1) Letter 39, #4 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 6, p. 52)
- (2) " 112, #1 (" " " , p. 226)
- (3) " 122, #2 (" " " , p. 227)
- (4) Vs. Pelagians, 3(" " " , p. 475)
- (5) Letter 14, (" " " , p. 15)
- (6) " 60
- (7) Dial. vs. Luciferians (" " , p. 331)
- (8) Vs. Jovinianus, Bk. 1 (" " , p. 376)
- (9) Letter 128 (N & PF, " , p. 260)
- (10) Vs. Jovinianus, Bk. 2, 15" " , p. 400)

"The ten plagues were sent upon Pharaoh not as by an angry God but as by a warning father...." (1)

He cites Rom. 2:4, 5 in this discussion.

One of the most interesting of his references to God's wrath is found in a letter to Castrutius, a friend afflicted by blindness. Jerome assures his friend that his blindness is not an evidence of God's anger. He combats the old idea that such afflictions were punishments for certain sins. In this letter he states,

"God's hottest anger against sinners is when he shows no anger." (2)

Ezek. 16:42 and Heb. 12:6 are cited in this connection. From the latter passage the meaning of the above quotation may be made clear. The worst sinners are punished by the awful fate of God being indifferent to them.

Concerning human impassibility Jerome is frankly sceptical. He doubts the possibility of man attaining impassibility, as the Stoics urge, on the grounds that it would mean equality with God. He points out that the Stoic view was combatted by the Peripatetics and Academics. (3) In another passage he adds that the position of the Peripatetics on this point has the constant support of all Scripture. (4)

AUGUSTINE.

Concerning human impassibility Jerome's views had strong support from that great leader of the fourth century, Augustine. He held that impassibility was not attainable in this life and that emotions were not to be condemned in man. (5) In defense of this view he argues that Jesus, who was sinless, was subject to emotions when he became man. Pohlenz points out that Augustine gave full recognition to the real

- (1) Letter 147 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 6, p. 289)
- (2) " 68 (" " " p. 141)
- (3) " 133 (" " " p. 272)
- (4) Vs. Pelagians(" " " p. 467)
- (5) City of God, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 2, p. 269)

humanity of Jesus, rejecting Apollinarianism. (1) He shared the viewpoint of the Cappadocians. Concerning human passibility the only further comment necessary is that Augustine did not fail to give the usual condemnation of anger. He warned against it because it leads to hate, is hard to expel, and increases rapidly. (2) This warning was given against even just anger. Also in a comment upon Ps. 6:7 (LXX) he stated that David ought not to have been angry. (3)

Augustine does not wholly avoid quoting Bible passages referring to God's wrath, e.g. Ps. 79:5, 8 (4), Ps. 77:9 (5), and Ps. 89:46, 47 (6). Rom. 2:5 is cited without being quoted exactly. (7) Augustine uses the expression independently also. In his Confessions the idea is not infrequent. (8) In one of these references we see one point in Augustine's rationale of the anger of God; it drives one to reform:

"But Thou wert always by me, mercifully angry, and dashing with the bitterest vexations all my elicit pleasures, in order that I might seek pleasures free from vexation." (9)

In this same work he states another point in this rationale, that emotions attributed to God are distinct from human emotions:

"Thou lovest and burnest not; art jealous, yet free from care; repentest, and hast no sorrow; art angry, yet serene." (10)

In another important work, The City of God, in two passages Augustine denies that God's anger is psychological. In the first he states it means punishment for sin and is used in condescension to the weakness of human understanding. (11) In this passage he also denies that God can

(1) Op. cit., p. 102

(2) Letter 38

(3) To Consentius

(4) Confessions

(5) City of God, Bk. 21, ch. 24

(6) Ibid., Bk. 17, ch. 11

(7) Confessions, Bk. 9, ch. 4

(8) Ibid., Bk. 1, ch. 5, Bk. 2, ch. 2, Bk. 4, ch. 9 (pp. 46, 55, 72)

(9) Ibid., Bk. 2, ch. 2 (p. 55)

(10) Ibid., Bk. 1, ch. 4 (p. 46)

(11) City of God, Bk. 15, ch. 25 (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 2, p. 306)

(N & PF, ser. 1, v. 1, p. 271)

(" " " 3, p. 490)

(" " " 1, p. 127)

(" " " 2, p. 470)

(" " " 2, p. 350)

(" " " 1, p. 132)

be said to repent as man. The second passage denies that God's wrath is an emotion and states that it merely refers to punishment. (1) In this passage he states no right thinking person could object to anger which seeks the amendment of the wrong-doer. He adds the angels when they punish feel no anger.

A typical statement of Augustine's position concerning God's wrath is found in the following,

"Nor is He enraged with a passion similar to human anger, but is angry, not in the sense of desiring vengeance, but in the peculiar sense of giving full effect to the sentence of a righteous retribution." (2)

A similar statement is found with reference to Job 14:1 (3). In a comparison of Rom.2:5 and Ps.6:1 he defines anger as an emotion of the soul urging to the infliction of punishment, adding that this emotion must not be ascribed to God who judges with tranquility. (4) Other denials of the psychological element in God's anger are found in connection with references to Ps. 90:9 and Jn.3:36 (5), Ps.79:5 (6), and Ps.83:15 (7). In the latter God is said to be angry only as the law might be said to be angry when its ministers punish. In one reference the problem of God's anger is linked to that of His changelessness. Augustine solves this readily,

"And consequently, when God is said to change His will, as when, e.g., He becomes angry with those to whom He was gentle, it is rather they than He who are changed....." (8).

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| (1) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 9, ch. 5 | (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 2, p. 169) |
| (2) <u>Reply to Faustus</u> , Bk. 22, ch. 21 | (" " " 4, p. 279) |
| (3) <u>Gospel of John</u> , Tractate 124, #5 | (" " " 7, p. 449) |
| (4) <u>On Psalms</u> , Ps. 6, #3 | (" " " 8, p. 16) |
| (5) <u>Enchiridion</u> , ch. 33 | (" " " 3, p. 249) |
| (6) <u>On Psalms</u> , Ps. 79, #8 | (" " " 8, p. 383) |
| (7) <u>Ibid.</u> , Ps. 83, #10 | (" " " 8, p. 399) |
| (8) <u>City of God</u> , Bk. 22, 5 | (" " " 2, p. 480) |

As a final conclusive proof of Augustine's adherence to the doctrine of divine impassibility it is possible to cite a passage in which the term impassibility is used. (1) In this passage it is stated that God is impassible yet not impatient. His patience is as jealousy and wrath not akin to human perturbations.

It is evident that Augustine's position does not differ markedly from that of Origen. Weber calls attention to one important difference,

"Bei Origenes ist Gute und Gerechtigkeit eins, daher keine ewigen Strafen; Augustin aber nimmt eine Erwählung an, daher als Corellat der ewigen Seligkeit eine ewige Verdammnis." (2)

From Augustine's own writings it can be shown that Weber has not misrepresented Augustine's position. The following passage can be used to illustrate this,

"For when the power of human wrath hath killed the body, it hath nothing more to do, but God hath the power to punish here, and after the death of the body to send into Hell...." (3)

Another reference states that God destroys sinners not only in anger, but in compassion. (4)

JOHN CASSIAN.

Equally emphatic as Augustine's is John Cassian's rejection of crude anthropopathisms. His views are given in the following passage,

"So then also when we read of the anger or fury of the Lord, we should take it not ἀνθρωποπαθῶς i.e. according to an unworthy meaning of human passion, but in a sense worthy of God who is free from all passion; so that by this we should understand that He is the judge and avenger of all the unjust things which are done in this world....." (5)

He continues by pointing out that an impartial judge is not swayed by passion, yet to those punished it seems that he is ruled by the most savage

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| (1) <u>On Patience</u> , ch. 1 | (N & PF, ser. 1, v. 3, p. 527) |
| (2) <u>Weber: Vom Zorne Gottes</u> , pp. 45-6 | |
| (3) <u>On Psalms</u> , Ps. 90, #11 | (" " " 8, p. 443) |
| (4) <u>City of God</u> , Bk. 21, 24 | (" " " 2, p. 470) |
| (5) <u>Institutes</u> , Bk. 8, ch. 4 | (" " " 11, pp. 258-9) |

wrath and vehement anger. In this same discussion he states that the passion of wrath and anger cannot be attributed to the unchangeable nature of God without fearful blasphemy.

Although he states that to take such terms literally is horrible profanity, he does not cavil at quoting Scripture containing such terms: e.g. II Chron.24:18 (1), Prov.24:18 (2), Isa.48:9 (3), Jer.10:24 (4), Isa.12:1 (5), Ezek.16:42 (6), and Rom.2:5 (7).

An important development during this period was that human freedom from emotion became the accepted ideal of monasticism. John Cassian makes a statement typical of the monastic spirit of this period in the following,

"And so a monk aiming at perfection, and desiring to strive lawfully in his spiritual combat, should be free from all sin of anger and wrath." (8)

He adds that anger is only useful when it is directed against the sinful emotions of one's own heart. In another passage he gives the following estimate of anger,

"As then nothing should be put before love, so on the other hand nothing should be put below rage and anger." (9)

HILARY OF POITIERS.

Hilary of Poitiers was more strongly influenced by the doctrine of impassibility than the writers so far discussed in this chapter. It resulted in a stronger tendency towards docetism than that already noted in both Ambrose and Chrysostom. The impassibility of God the Father was taken for granted by Hilary, and it followed that the divine Logos must likewise be impassible. Here Hilary was a staunch defender of the Athanasian posi-

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| (1) <u>Ibid.</u> , Bk. 12, ch. 21 | (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 11, p. 286) |
| (2) <u>Conf. of Ab. Serapion</u> , 15 | (" " " " p. 346) |
| (3) <u>Ibid.</u> , #12 | (" " " " p. 345) |
| (4) <u>Conf. of Ab. Theodore</u> , xi | (" " " " p. 358) |
| (5) <u>Ibid.</u> , xi | (" " " " p. 358) |
| (6) <u>Ibid.</u> , xi | (" " " " p. 358) |
| (7) <u>Conf. of Ab. Serenus</u> , xxx | (" " " " p. 373) |
| (8) <u>Institutes</u> , Bk. 8, ch. 5 | (" " " " p. 259) |
| (9) <u>First Conf. of Ab. Joseph</u> , 7 | (" " " " pp. 452-3) |

tion, differing from the Eastern Athanasians, however, in emphasizing the unity of Christ. He held that only the body of Christ was purely human; the soul, coming from the Logos, could not have emotions of a human sort. One passage in which Hilary discusses the subject shows that in trying to reconcile inconsistent view he was forced to resort to paradoxes,

"For He was able to suffer, and yet the Word was not passible. Passibility denotes a nature that is weak; but suffering in itself is the endurance of pains inflicted, and since the God head is immutable and yet the Word was made Flesh, such pains found in Him a material which they could affect though the Person of the Word had no infirmity or passibility. And so when He suffered His nature remained immutable, because like His Father, His Person is of an impassible essence, though it is born." (1)

Hilary devoted a great deal of his chief work, De Trinitate, to the problem of the impassibility of Christ. In this work he attacked the Sabellians because the majority of them did not hold that Christ has the impassible nature of God. He characterized as impious their assertions that Christ trembled with fear at human suffering and groaned before the violence of bodily pain. (2) Hilary attempted to explain his paradoxical position by the argument that Christ felt the force of suffering without its pain. He compared it to a dart passing through water, flame, or air. These are affected by the dart, but do not suffer from it. He continues the argument with statements which add to the paradox rather than clearing it up,

"So our Lord Jesus Christ suffered blows, hanging, crucifixion and death: but the suffering which attacked the body of the Lord without ceasing to be suffering, had not the natural effect of suffering." (3)

How far Hilary went in his docetism is shown by the following.

"He ate and drank, it was a concession not to His own neces-

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| (1) <u>De Synodis</u> , #49 | (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 9, p. 18) |
| (2) <u>De Trin.</u> , X, 9 | (" " " p. 184) |
| (3) <u>Ibid.</u> , X, 23 | (" " " pp. 187-8) |

"sities, but to our habits." (1)

To maintain this position he held that Christ's body was unique.

Hilary's docetism was motivated by a desire to defend the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. This is shown when he asks,

"What phantom hope are you chasing when you deny that Christ is God, and attribute to Him fear of suffering?" (2)

The doctrine of the suffering of Christ was felt to be an indispensable element of the doctrine of the atonement. The difficulty raised by this Hilary attempted to solve by stating that the penal requirements were satisfied when Christ went through the form of suffering the penalty, although it did not actually cause him to suffer. (3)

With Hilary's strong belief in divine impassibility leading him to a docetic view of Christ, it is surprising to find that he used even casually the expression the wrath of God. He speaks of God's wrath in connection with a reference to Deut.32:21 (4).

MARIUS VICTORINUS.

Marius Victorinus, the Neo-Platonist, also dealt with the question of impassibility. He held that God is impassible, the Son both passible and impassible. The Son, since he shares in the divine nature, is impassible in this side of His nature; since He shares in men's human nature by becoming flesh, is passible in His flesh and human soul. The Logos suffered only in appearance, not in His essential Being.

Pohlenz points out a passage from Victorinus which he compares to the view of Lactantius. It attributes wrath to God, and, like Lactantius, holds that this wrath is for the purpose of correcting and never for avenging. The passage in question occurs as a comment upon Eph.4:26,

"Si deus irascitur - sicuti dictum 'revelatur enim ira dei,

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| (1) <u>Ibid.</u> , X, 23 | (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 9, p. 188) |
| (2) <u>Ibid.</u> , X, 27 | (" " " p. 189) |
| (3) <u>On Ps.</u> 63, #12 | (" " " p. 247) |
| (4) <u>De Trin.</u> , V, 31 | (" " " p. 94) |

"ira de coelo in omnem impietatem' et item in multis locis - recte ergo et homini datur ira, id est ut irascatur; sed peccat in ira, qui non ut corrigat irascitur sed ut puniat." (1)

In the comment upon Eph.4:31 a little later, however, he defines wrath as a motion of the soul with desire of revenging and punishing. Victorinus, as a Neo-Platonist, can hardly have taken these passages ascribing anger to God as referring to real anger. They must be considered in the light of other passages definitely adhering to the dogma of divine impassibility.

RUFINUS.

An instructive comment concerning the creedal status of the doctrine of impassibility at the end of the fourth century is made by Rufinus. He was a friend, later an enemy of Jerome, finally being reconciled to him. His Commentary on the Apostles' Creed is thought to have been written at Aquileia early in the fifth century. (2) In it he discusses the addition of the phrase invisible and impassible in the creed to the statement of belief in God the Father Almighty. He states that these words are not in the creed of the Roman Church, but were added by his church because of the Sabellian heresy. He gives his own view by adding,

"For it is evident that the Son, not the Father, became incarnate and was born in the flesh, and that from that nativity in the flesh, the Son became 'visible and passible'. Yet so far as regards that immortal substance of the Godhead which He possesses, and which is one and the same with that of the Father, we must believe that neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost is 'visible or passible'." (3)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA.

One controversy of the fourth century was concerned with the impassibility of God the Father. Unlike the Christological controversies it was not a dispute between Christians of differing views, but a dispute between a Christian and a pagan. This was the attack of the apostate emperor

(1) Pohlenz: Op. cit., p. 119

(2) The date given in N & PF, ser.2, v.3, p.541 seems to be in error by one hundred years. It should be 407-409 A.D.

(3) A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed (N & PF, ser.2, v.3, p. 545)

Julian upon Christianity and Cyril of Alexandria's defense in reply.

One of Julian's objections to Christianity was based on the Old Testament picture of God as subject to primitive emotions, including anger. His attack is like a recrudescence of the attack of Celsus. Julian's objection to the unethical and anthropopathic representations of God is illustrated by the following passage in which pagan religious thought is contrasted with the Old Testament,

"Nowhere is God shown as angry, or resentful, or wroth, or taking an oath, or inclining first to this side, then suddenly to that, or as turned from his purpose as Moses tells us happened in the case of Phineas." (1)

The passage continues discussing Num.23:11. Julian asks what could be more trivial than the reason assigned for falsely representing God as angry. He points out the ethical difficulty in six thousand destroyed for the sin of a few. Another objection of Julian is found in the following,

"For, if the anger of even one hero or unimportant demon is hard to bear for whole countries and cities, who could have endured the wrath of so mighty a God, whether it were directed against demons or angels or mankind?" (2)

In still another quotation it is evident that Julian was influenced by Greek philosophy in his views, especially by the Stoic ideal of human impassibility. He states,

"The philosophers bid us imitate the gods so far as we can, and they teach us that this imitation consists in the contemplation of realities. And that this sort of study is remote from passion and indeed is based on freedom from passion, is, I suppose, evident, even without my saying it. In proportion then as we, having been assigned to the contemplation of realities, attain freedom from passion, in so far do we become like God. But what sort of imitation of God is praised among the Hebrews? Anger and wrath and fierce jealousy." (3)

(1) Julian: Against the Galileans 160D

(2) Ibid., 168B

(3) Ibid., 171E

In controverting this part of Julian's attack, Cyril used much the same arguments that Origen employed against Celsus. (1)

Cyril was also involved in the Christological controversy. He was a bitter opponent of Nestorius. This development of the Christological struggle was at its height in the fourth decade of the fifth century. Cyril's theology tended towards Apollinarianism. He emphasized the divine in Christ and failed to recognize more than an impersonal humanity. Especially objectionable to Nestorius was the designation of Mary, the mother of Jesus, by the term *Θεοτόκος*, a term used also by Athanasius, Apollinarius, and Gregory of Nazianzus. (2) Cyril's position concerning the possibility of emotion in Christ is given in the twelfth and last of his anathemas directed against Nestorius. It states,

"If any one confesses not that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh, and tasted death in the flesh, and was made firstborn of the dead, in so far as He is life and giver of life, as God; let him be anathema." (3)

Theodoret, a friend of Nestorius, undertook to combat Cyril. He accused Cyril of heresy. He misunderstood both Cyril and Nestorius; his friendship with the latter led him to interpret Nestorius as saying what he himself believed and to see only the extremes in Cyril's views. In his reply to the anathema of Cyril he makes the following statement concerning the twelfth one, quoted above,

"Passion is proper to the passible; the impassible is above passions. It was then the form of the servant that suffered, the form of God of course dwelling with it, and permitting it to suffer on account of the salvation brought forth of the sufferings, and making the sufferings its own on account of the union. Therefore it was not the Christ who suffered, but the man assumed of us by God." (4)

- (1) The Works of the Emperor Julian, trans. by W. C. Wright, v.3, p. 315
- (2) Walker: A History of the Christian Church, p. 146
- (3) N & FF, ser. 2, v. 3, p. 25.
- (4) Ibid., p. 31

Further evidence of Cyril's view of the passibility of Christ is found in the following quotation, which occurs as a commentary upon John 12:27,

"You will find each and every human experience duly represented in Christ, and that the affections of the flesh were called out into energy, not that, as in us, they might gain the upper hand, but that by the might of the Word dwelling in the flesh, they might be tamed and kept within bounds and our nature transformed into a better state." (1)

THE SYRIANS.

Before concluding the discussion of the fourth century, mention should be made of the Syrians. Aphraat used the concept of an angry God without question, also attributing repentance to Him. One illustration of this use occurs in connection with a quotation of Isa.54:9. Aphraat's use of the term here emphasized the attribute of mercy rather than wrath, but his comment did not give a philosophical denial of wrath on the part of God. He said,

"Of a truth He will not again be wroth with her nor will He reprove her forever; for that which is in desolation He will not reprove, nor will she provoke to wrath." (2)

An instance of a quotation of Scripture referring to the sterner aspect of God's wrath is a citation of Lk.21:23. (3) from the philosophical viewpoint. He arrived at the position of Origen, explaining anthropopathic passages as accommodations to human limitations. His point of view is concisely given in the following quotation,

"And as there is not in His Essence wrath or repenting, He put on the names of them for our weakness sake.... so spake He with us childish creatures." (4)

Another passage illustrating his point of view states,

"When it was known that His Nature, as unchangeable, was far from passions, He feared not to put on repentance; hence He

(1) N & PF, ser. 2, v. 10, p. 230n

(2) Dem. 21, #6 (N & PF, ser. 2, v. 13, p. 395)

(3) " " #17 (" " " p. 399)

(4) Rhythm the Thirty First Upon the Faith Against the Disputers.

"did not hesitate to sleep and slumber, yea, and did ask for sacrifice." (1)

One editor of his work states that such passages show how often Ephraem thought it worth while to insist that such expressions were accommodations to human weakness and were not to be taken literally. (2)

Ephraem was led to this position through conflict with Marcionites in Syria. In a treatise against Marcion, he says,

"(See) also, O Marcion, that (these) two Gods, namely the Maker and the Stranger, are both of them angry at the same thing, and take pleasure in the same thing and are gratified by the same thing. For the Maker is angry at hateful things, and the Good (God) also is angry at hateful things - if it be right to admit that the Good (God) is angry with those who have committed no offence whatever against Him.... it is evident that they are both angry at adultery and theft and other hateful things." (3)

Thus it is seen that in the East, as in the West, in Syria, as in Rome, the literal acceptance of anthropopathic passages were rejected. Throughout the Christian world the Greek doctrine of the impassibility of God was generally accepted in the fourth century.

- (1) Select Works of St. Ephraem the Syrian, trans. by J. B. Morris, p. 245n
- (2) Ibid., p. 246n
- (3) Mitchell: St. Ephraim's Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion, and Bardaisan, v.1, p. xxxiv

CONCLUSION.

In the first chapter the Hebrew concept of the wrath of God as found in the Old Testament is discussed. The idea is shown to be of frequent occurrence and common to all parts of the Old Testament. The derivation of Hebrew expressions for anger is used as evidence of the primitive, anthropopathic, and non-ethical character of the concept. Two non-psychological types of reference are pointed out: those showing a tendency towards hypostatization, and those clearly eschatological. Development away from the cruder, more primitive anthropopathisms is shown to be due to ethical and not metaphysical reasons. Three factors are mentioned as playing a part in the origin of the idea of an angry God: the need for reconciling favorable oracles followed by calamity, the numinous awe emphasized by Otto, the ethical demand for justice and punishment of sin. The Hebrew emphasis of the concept of an angry God, it is suggested, is due to Yahweh's earlier character as a storm-god, the capricious climate of Palestine, its position as a buffer state, and racial temperament. Stratton's theory that the concept of Yahweh as jealous and angry influenced the development of Hebrew monotheism is discussed as an illustration of the important part this idea played in the development of religious thought.

The second chapter gives the background of the Greek attitude towards the idea of angry gods. Although early Greek mythology contains very crude and gross anthropomorphisms and anthropopathisms, protest against them by Greek philosophers can be traced as far back as the sixth century B.C. Out of such protests a doctrine of divine impassibility was developed. This idea is found in Platonists, Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans. They are agreed that divinity must be superior to and incapable of emotions.

and suffering. The need of reconciling primitive traditions and teaching was a factor in the development of a belief in demons among Platonists. In the Stoic school the doctrine of divine impassibility gave rise to the teaching of human impassibility as a goal or ideal. The doctrines of Greek philosophy influenced Roman thinkers. The section devoted to Roman philosophers gives evidence of the prevalence of the Greek doctrine of impassibility at the period when Christianity was pushing into the Graeco-Roman world.

In the third chapter the writings of the Hellenistic Jews are discussed. Evidence is given that the influence of the Greek doctrine caused the translators of the Septuagint to soften the text of some of the anthropopathic passages. The evidence is clearest in those references ascribing repentance to God, but it is also found to a lesser extent in the passages ascribing wrath to God. The Apocrypha are found, for the most part, to have a concept of the wrath of God similar to that in the later canonical books. Little evidence of the influence of the Greek attitude is found. Among the Pseudepigrapha the Greek attitude is clearly seen in two writings: The Letter of Aristaeus and IV Maccabees. There is slight, but inconclusive, evidence of this also in The Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs. Three works contain no mention of the wrath of God. Philo shows very clearly the influence of Greek thought; he was conscious of the need of harmonizing this with the Old Testament. He seems to be the first to attempt a solution of the problem. His contribution towards this was to insist that these anthropopathic passages are figurative and not literal. He also suggested that the references to the wrath of God have a pedagogic purpose.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the New Testament. The idea of the wrath of God does not play such a large part as in the Old Testament.

The references are found chiefly in Romans and Revelation. They are largely eschatological in emphasis and do not have the primitive anthropopathisms of the earlier references in the Old Testament. In Paul there is a further development of the tendency towards hypostatization. For the most part the references are like those of the later Old Testament books. Little evidence is available concerning the attitude of Jesus. He did not use the term, but probably did not question the Jewish teaching upon the subject. It does not seem to have been important to him, and he probably did not consider it from a philosophic point of view. There is no proof of Greek influence.

The fifth chapter deals with the Apostolic Fathers and the early Apologists. In this period three writers give unmistakable evidence of the influence of the Greek philosophic concept of God: Aristides, the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, Athenagoras. Tatian also was conscious of the ethical problems in an unworthy representation of God. Justin Martyr and Hermes are inconsistent. Justin Martyr quoted the Old Testament passages concerning the wrath of God, and occasionally used the expression, but he also used the Greek concept without attempting any reconciliation of these conflicting views. Of the writers of this period Ignatius and Clement of Rome give least evidence of Greek influence, but this may be due to paucity of data. On the whole they seem to hold a New Testament concept of the wrath of God. This is also true of Theophilus, but he took the first step in justifying the concept of God's anger. He did this by limiting God's anger to those who are wicked. He was the only writer of this period who gives evidence that he was conscious of the ethical problem.

Celsus' attacks on Christianity and the Gnostic heretics played a large part in bringing the conflict of Greek and Hebrew concepts to

an open issue and a conscious problem. Marcion was especially important in this respect. He solved the conflict by arguing that the God of the Old Testament was not the Supreme God of the New Testament, but a Demiurge. This solution was unsatisfactory because it depreciated the Old Testament and was not strictly monotheistic. Marcion's chief opponents were Irenaeus, the author of the Clementine Writings, and Tertullian. Irenaeus replied to Marcion by insisting on monotheism and by pointing out that the idea of the wrath of God is found in the New Testament as well as the Old. He shows the influence of Greek thought, but did not solve the conflict. The Clementine Writings replied to Marcion by attempting to justify "righteous" anger. The Homilies, however, found a different solution in the hypothesis that the objectionable passages are the result of extensive interpolation. Tertullian shows that he accepted the doctrines of Greek philosophy, but passages may be quoted which indicate an acceptance of the Old Testament idea. He seems never to have fully reconciled these conflicting views. He did suggest that God's anger is not like human anger; it is always justified, always for chastisement. He answered Marcion by showing that there can only be One God, who must be both just and good. He pointed to evidence of wrath in the New Testament and grace in the Old. Finally, he solved the problem by delegating all objectionable passages to the Logos, saving the Old Testament at the expense of the Logos.

In chapter seven the solution of the Alexandrians is given. Clement occasionally used references to the wrath of God, but shows unmistakable Stoic sympathy. He justified the Old Testament use of the idea of God's wrath with three propositions: first, not to be angry with evil is to condone it; second, the references are figurative; third, men need chastening. Origen developed a more complete rationale. He said the

references are not to be understood literally. Second, they are accommodations to human weakness. Third, they have disciplinary value. Fourth, he insisted on their non-emotional character. Fifth, they are punishments for sin. Sixth, they are associated with love. These solutions of Origen were influential, and the most satisfactory of any ancient writer.

In the eighth chapter the Ante-Nicene Romans are studied. Novatian had much the same attitude as Tertullian, but did not shift to the logos the primitive and unethical representations of God. Cyprian made large use of the concept of God's wrath. He was seemingly not conscious of the philosophical problems involved, but did say that God's wrath is always deserved. Commodian, like Cyprian, appears not to have been conscious of the philosophical problems involved. Arnobius is a decided contrast. He was whole-hearted in his adherence to the Greek view and made good use of it in his defense of Christianity. He was fully cognizant of the metaphysical as well as ethical objections to the concept of God as passible. Lactantius represents a reaction from the views of Arnobius. He attempted a philosophic defense of the idea of an angry God. His chief argument is that both ethics and religion are based on fear of divine anger, that the moral government of the world demands it. He failed to recognize that dispassionate punishment of evil is possible without the psychological disturbance of anger. He is also somewhat inconsistent in his views.

During the fourth century the impassibility of God the Father was generally accepted; Origen's views being influential, Lactantius having little influence. The problem shifted to Christology. One important factor in the Arian controversy concerned the passibility of Christ,

Arius maintaining the Logos was passible. It was also involved in the Apollinarian controversy. Apollinaris objected to limiting the passibility of Christ to the human, because the atonement could not be accomplished by the suffering and death of a man. His opponents, the Cappadocians, attacked his views on the ground that he taught that God is passible. The Cappadocians, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine held views that are much alike. They all adhered to the doctrine of the impassibility of the Father, denied the doctrine of human impassibility, and asserted that Christ was passible in his humanity, impassible in his divinity. The emphasis upon the latter led to docetic tendencies in Chrysostom, Ambrose, and Jerome. This tendency was pronounced in Hilary of Poitiers. John Cassian gave evidence that human impassibility had become a monastic ideal. Marius Victorinus touched upon the subject from the point of view of Neo-Platonic philosophy. Rufinus gave evidence that the words invisible and impassible were added to the statement concerning God the Father in the church of Aquileia early in the fifth century. Cyril of Alexandria combatted the attack on Christianity by the apostate Emperor Julian, an attack similar to that of Celsus. One of Julian's criticisms was the anthropopathic and unethical representations of God in the Old Testament. Cyril was involved also in a controversy with Nestorius. One of the points at issue was the question of the passibility of Christ, Cyril tending towards Apollinarianism. The question of impassibility was also a problem for the Syrian Christians. Aphraat did not seem to be conscious of the problem, nor does he show the influence of Greek thought. Ephraem, however, did consider the problem from the philosophic point of view. He combatted Marcionites in Syria. He arrived at a solution of the problem similar to that of Origen.

After the fourth century the question of impassibility was not in the foreground. The Greek view of the impassibility of God was generally accepted. Origen's solution of the problem provided a practical answer to the question of reconciling the Greek doctrine with the Old Testament. During the fourth century the issue shifted to the question of the passibility of Christ. This problem of the doctrine of impassibility had entered into all the major theological controversies from the time of Marcion to the end of the fourth century. It played an important part in the Christological controversies of the fourth century. After that period theological interest shifted to other issues than that of impassibility.

REFERENCES TO THE WRATH OF GOD

Gen.18:30	יחַר	αὐτὸν
Gen.18:32	יחַר	μὴ τι
Ex.4:14	יחַר אַף	θυμωθεὶς ὀργῇ
Ex.15:7	הָרוּן	ὀργῇν
Ex.22:24	הָרָה אַף	ὀργισθήσεται θυμῷ
Ex.32:10	יחַר אַף	θυμωθεὶς ὀργῇ
Ex.32:11	יחַר אַף	θυμοῖ ὀργῇ
Ex.32:12	הָרוּן אַף	τῆς ὀργῆς τοῦ θυμοῦ
Ex.34:6	אַרְךָ אַף	μακρόθυμος
Lev.10:6	יִקְצֵה	θυμός
Num.1:53	קִצֵּה	ἀμάρτημα
Num.11:1	יחַר אַף	ἐθυμώθη ὀργῇ
Num.11:10	יחַר אַף	ἐθυμώθη ὀργῇ
Num.11:33	הָרָה אַף	ἐθυνώθη ὀργῇ
Num.12:9	יחַר אַף	ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Num.16:22	הִקְצֵה	ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Num.16:46	קִצֵּה	ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Num.18:5	קִצֵּה	θυμός
Num.22:22	יחַר אַף	ὀργισθῇ θυμῷ
Num.25:3	יחַר אַף	ὀργισθῇ θυμῷ
Num.25:4	הָרוּן אַף	ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Num.25:11	חַמָּה	θυμὸν
Num.32:10	יחַר אַף	ὀργισθῇ θυμῷ
Num.32:13	יחַר אַף	ὀργισθῇ θυμῷ
Num.32:14	הָרוּן אַף	θυμὸν τῆς ὀργῆς
Deut.1:34	יִקְצֵה	παροξυνθεὶς ὤμοσεν
Deut.1:37	הִתְאַנָּה	ἐθυμώθη
Deut.3:26	יִתְעַבֵּר	ὑπερεῖδε
Deut.4:21	הִתְאַנָּה	ἐθυμώθη
Deut.4:25	הִכְעִיב	παροργίσει
Deut.6:15	יִחַרְהָ אַף	ὀργισθεὶς θυμῷ
Deut.7:4	הָרָה אַף	ὀργισθήσεται θυμῷ
Deut.9:7	הִקְצֵה	παρώξυνας
Deut.9:8	הִקְצַחְתָּם	παρωξύνετε
Deut.9:18	הִכְעִיב	παροξύνει
Deut.9:19	קִצֵּה	θυμὸν ὀργῇν
Deut.9:20	הִתְאַנָּה	ἐθυμώθη
Deut.9:22	מִקְצָפִים	παρπαξύναντες

Deut.11:17	חרה אף	θυμωθεὶς ὀργῇ
Deut.13:17	חרון אף	θυμῶ τῆς ὀργῆς
Deut.29:20	יעשן אף	ὀργῇ
Deut.29:23	חמה אף	θυμῷ ὀργῇ
Deut.29:24	חרי האף	θυμῶς τῆς ὀργῆς
Deut.29:27	יחר אף	ὠργίσθη θυμῷ
Deut.29:28	חמה אף	θυμῷ ὀργῇ
Deut.31:17	חרה אף	ὀργισθήσεται θυμῷ
Deut.31:29	הכעיו	παρόργισαι
Deut.32:16	יכעיהו	παρώξυναν
Deut.32:21	כעסוני	παρώξυναν
Deut.32:22	אף	θυμῶ
Josh.7:1	יחר אף	ἐθυμώθη ὀργῇ
Josh.7:26	חרון אף	θυμῶ ὀργῆς
Josh.9:20	קצף	ὀργῇ
Josh.22:20	קצף	ὀργῇ
Josh.23:16	חרה אף	part of verse missing
Jud.2:12	יכעסו	παρόργισαν
Jud.2:14	יחר אף	ὠργίσθη θυμῷ
Jud.2:20	יחר אף	ὠργίσθη θυμῷ
Jud.3:8	יחר אף	ὠργίσθη θυμῷ
Jud.6:39	יחר אף	ὀργισθήτω ὁ θυμός
Jud.10:7	יחר אף	ὠργίσθη θυμῷ
I Sam.28:18	חרון אף	θυμὸν ὀργῆς
II Sam.6:7	יחר אף	ἐθυμώθη ὀργῇ
II Sam.22:8	חרה	ἐθυμώθη ὀργῇ
II Sam.22:9	עשן באפו	ὀργῇ
II Sam.24:1	אף חרות	ὀργῇ
I Ki.11:9	יחאנה	ὠργίσθη
I Ki.14:9	הכעיסני	20 verses missing
I Ki.14:15	ככעיסים	20 verses missing
I Ki.15:30	כעס	παρόργισω παρώργισε
I Ki.16:2	הכעיסני	παρόργισαι
I Ki.16:7	הכעיסו	παρόργισαι
I Ki.16:13	הכעיס	παρόργισαι
I Ki.16:33	הכעיס	παροργισματα παρόργισαι
I Ki.21:22	הכעסת	παροργισματα, τῶν παρώργισας
I Ki.22:53	יכעס	παρώργισε
II Ki.17:11	הכעיס	παρόργισαι
II Ki.17:17	הכעיס	παρόργισαι
II Ki.17:18	יחאנה	ἐθυμώθη

II Ki.21:15	מכעיסים	παροργιζοντές
II Ki.22:13	חמה	ὀργή
II Ki.22:17	הכעסני	παροργισωσι
II Ki.23:19	הכעים	παροργιζειν
II Ki.23:26	חרון אף	θυμοῦ τῆς ὀργῆς
II Ki.24:20	אף	θυμὸν
I Chron.27:24	קצף	ὀργή
II Chron.12:7	חמה	θυμός
II Chron.12:12	אף	ὀργή
II Chron.15:2	קצף	ὀργή
II Chron.19:10	קצף	ὀργή
II Chron 24:18	קצף	ὀργή
II Chron.25:15	יחר אף	ὀργή
II Chron 28:11	חרון אף	ὀργή θυμοῦ
II Chron.28:13	חרון אף	ὀργή θυμοῦ
II Chron.28:25	יכעם	παρωργισαν
II Chron.29:8	קצף	ἠργισθη ἠργή
II Chron.29:10	חרון אף	ὀργήν
II Chron.30:8	חרון אף	θυμὸν ὀργῆς
II Chron.32:25	קצף	ὀργή
II Chron.32:26	קצף	ὀργή
II Chron.33:6	הכעים	παροργίσαι
II Chron.34:21	חמה	θυμός
II Chron.34:25	הכעים	θυμός
II Chron.36:16	חמה	θυμός
Ezra 5:12	רגז	παρώργισαν
Ezra 7:23	קצף	ὀργή
Ezra 8:22	אף	θυμός
Ezra 9:14	חאנה	παροξυνθῆς
Ezra 10:14	חרון אף	ὀργήν θυμοῦ
Neh.4:5	הכעיסו	over a verse
Neh.9:17	ארך אפים	μακροθυμός ^{missing}
Neh.13:18	חרון	ὀργήν
Job 4:9	אף	ὀργῆς
Job 9:5	אף	ὀργῇ
Job 9:13	אף	ὀργήν
Job 14:13	אף	ὀργή
Job 16:9	אף	ὀργή
Job 19:11	אף	ὀργή
Job 19:29	חמה	θυμός
Job 20:23	חרון אף	θυμὸν ὀργῆς

Job 20:28	אא	θυσμόν ὀργῆς
Job 21:17	אא	θυσμόν ὀργῆς
Job 21:20	חמה	altered
Job 21:30	אברוה	ὀργῆς
Job 35:15	אא	ὀργήν
Job 36:18	חמה	θυσμός
Job 42:7	אא	altered
Ps. 2:5	אא	ὀργή
Ps. 2:12	אנא	ὀργίσθη
Ps. 6:1	אא	θυσμῶ
Ps. 7:6	אא	ὀργή
Ps. 7:11	זעם	ὀργήν
Ps. 18:7	חרה	ὀργίσθη
Ps. 18:8	אא	ὀργή
Ps. 21:9	פנים	ὀργή
Ps. 27:9	אא	ὀργῇ
Ps. 30:5	אא	ὀργή θυσμῶ
Ps. 38:1	קצף	ὀργῇ
Ps. 38:3	זעף	ὀργῆς
Ps. 56:7	אא	ὀργῇ
Ps. 58:9	חרון	ὀργῇ
Ps. 59:13	חמה	ὀργῇ
Ps. 60:1	אנא	ὀργίσθης
Ps. 69:24	אא	ὀργήν
Ps. 74:1	אא	θυσμός
Ps. 76:7	אא	ὀργῆς
Ps. 76:10	חמה	ἐν θυσμῶν
Ps. 77:9	אא	ὀργῇ
Ps. 78:21	אא	ὀργή
Ps. 78:31	אא	ὀργή
Ps. 78:38	אא חמה	θυσμόν ὀργήν ὀργήν
Ps. 78:49	אא עברה	ὀργήν θυσμῶ
Ps. 78:50	אא	ὀργή
Ps. 78:58	כעס	παρώργισαν
Ps. 78:59	עבר	ὑπερεῖδε
Ps. 78:62	עבר	ὑπερεῖδε
Ps. 79:5	אנא	ὀργισθήσθη
Ps. 79:6	חמה	ὀργήν
Ps. 80:4	עשן	ὀργιλῇ
Ps. 85:3	אא עברה	ὀργήν ὀργῆς
Ps. 85:4	כעס	θυσμόν
Ps. 85:5	אא אנא	ὀργισθής ὀργήν

Ps. 86:15	אָא	μακροθυμος
Ps. 88:7	חמָה	θυμός
Ps. 88:16	וּרְוֹן	ὀργαί
Ps. 89:46	חמָה	ὀργή
Ps. 90:7	אָא חמָה	ὀργῇ θυμῷ
Ps. 90:9	עֲבָרָה	ὀργῇ
Ps. 90:11	אָא עֲבָרָה	ὀργῆς θυμοῦ
Ps. 95:11	אָא	ὀργῇ
Ps. 102:10	אָא קֶצֶף	ὀργῆς
Ps. 103:8	אָא	μακροθυμος
Ps. 103:9	נִמְרָה	ὀργισθήσεται
Ps. 106:23	חמָה	θυμοῦ
Ps. 106:29	כַּעַס	παρώξυναν
Ps. 106:32	אָא קֶצֶף	παρωργισαν
Ps. 106:40	אָא	ὀργισθη
Ps. 110:5	אָא	ὀργῆς
Ps. 145:8	אָא	μακροθύμος
Prov. 11:4	עֲבָרָה	verse 4 missing, 3 altered
Prov. 11:23	עֲבָרָה	altered
Prov. 24:18	אָא	θυμὸν
Ecc1. 5:6	אָא קֶצֶף	ὀργισθη
Isa. 5:25	אָא חֲרָה	ἐθυμῶθη ὀργῇ
Isa. 9:12	אָא	θυμός
Isa. 9:17	אָא	θυμός
Isa. 9:19	עֲבָרָה	θυμὸν ὀργῆς
Isa. 9:21	אָא	θυμός
Isa. 10:4	אָא	ὀργῇ
Isa. 10:5	אָא	θυμοῦ ὀργῇ
Isa. 10:6	עֲבָרָה	ὀργῇ
Isa. 10:25	אָא	ὀργῇ
Isa. 12:1	אָא	ὀργισθης
Isa. 13:3	אָא	θυμόν
Isa. 13:9	עֲבָרָה	θυμοῦ
Isa. 13:13	אָא	θυμὸν ὀργῆς
Isa. 14:6	עֲבָרָה	θυμῷ
Isa. 30:27	אָא	ὀργῆς
Isa. 30:30	אָא	θυμὸν
Isa. 42:25	אָא	ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Isa. 48:9	אָא	θυμόν
Isa. 54:8	אָא קֶצֶף	θυμῷ
Isa. 60:10	אָא קֶצֶף	ὀργῇ
Isa. 63:3	אָא	θυμῷ

Isa. 63:5	חמה	θυμός
Isa. 63:6	אף	ὀργή
Isa. 66:15	חמה	θυμῷ
Jer. 2:35	אף	θυμός
Jer. 3:12	אמור	μηνιῶ
Jer. 4:8	חרון אף	θυμός
Jer. 4:26	חרון אף	ὀργῆς θυμοῦ
Jer. 7:20	חמה אף	ὀργή θυμός
Jer. 8:19	הכעסוני	παρώργισάν
Jer. 10:10	קצף	missing
Jer. 11:17	הכעסוני	παροργίσαι
Jer. 12:13	חרון אף	ὀνειδισμοῦ
Jer. 17:4	אף	missing
Jer. 18:20	חמה	θυμόν
Jer. 18:23	אף	θυμοῦ
Jer. 21:5	חמה אף	θυμοῦ ὀργῆς
Jer. 25:6	הכעיסו	παροργίζετε
Jer. 25:7	הכעסוני	missing
Jer. 25:15	חמה	οἴνου τοῦ ἀκράτου
Jer. 25:38	חרון אף	missing
Jer. 30:24	חרון אף	ὀργή θυμοῦ
Jer. 32:29	הכעסוני	παραπικράναι
Jer. 32:30	מכעכים	missing
Jer. 32:31	חמה אף	ὀργην θυμόν
Jer. 32:32	הכעסוני	πικράναι
Jer. 32:37	קצף חמה אף	ὀργῇ θυμῷ
Jer. 33:5	אף	ὀργῇ θυμῷ
Jer. 36:7	חמה אף	θυμός ὀργῇ
Jer. 42:18	חמה אף	θυμός θυμός
Jer. 44:3	חמה	παραπικράναι
Jer. 44:6	אף	ὀργῇ θυμός
Jer. 44:8	הכעסוני	παραπικράναι
Jer. 49:37	חרון אף	ὀργὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ
Jer. 50:13	קצף	ὀργῆς
Jer. 51:45	חרון אף	missing
Jer. 52:3	אף	missing
Lam. 1:12	חרון אף	ὀργῆς θυμοῦ
Lam. 2:1	אף	ὀργῇ
Lam. 2:2	עברה	missing
Lam. 2:3	אף	ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Lam. 2:6	אף	ἐμβληματι ὀργῆς
Lam. 2:21	אף	ὀργῆς

Lam.2:22	אף	ὀργῆς
Lam.3:1	עברה	θυμοῦ
Lam.3:43	אף	θυμῷ
Lam.3:66	אף	ὀργῇ
Lam.4:11	אף חרון	θυμὸν ὀργῆς
Lam.4:16	פני	προσωπον
Ezek.5:13	אף חמה	θυμός ὀργή
Ezek.5:15	אף חמה	θυμοῦ
Ezek.7:3	אף	missing
Ezek.7:8	אף	θυμόν
Ezek.7:12	חרון	missing
Ezek.7:14	חרון	missing
Ezek.7:19	עברה	altered
Ezek.8:17	הכעיסני	altered
Ezek.8:18	חמה	θυμοῦ
Ezek.13:13	חמה	ὀργῇ θυμῷ
Ezek.13:15	חמה	θυμόν
Ezek.16:26	הכעיסני	παροργισαί
Ezek.16:42	אכעס	θυμόν
Ezek.21:31	עברה	ὀργήν ὀργῆς
Ezek.22:20	אף חמה	ὀργῇ
Ezek.22:21	עברה	ὀργῆς
Ezek.22:31	עברה	θυμόν ὀργῆς
Ezek.25:14	אף חמה	ὀργήν θυμόν
Ezek.38:19	עברה	θυμός
Ezek.43:8	אף	θυμῷ
Dan.9:16	אף חמה	θυμός
Hos.8:5	חרה אף	θυμός (παρωξυνθη)
Hos.11:9	אף חרון	ὀργήν τοῦ θυμοῦ
Hos.12:14	הכעיס	(ἐθυμωσεν Ἐφραϊμ)
Hos.13:11	אף	ὀργῇ θυμῷ
Hos.14:4	אף	ὀργήν
Joel 2:13	ארך אפים	μακρόθυμος
Jonah 3:9	אף חמה	ὀργῆς θυμοῦ
Jonah 4:2	ארך אפים	μακρόθυμος
Micah 5:15	אף חמה	ὀργῇ θυμῷ
Micah 7:18	אף	ὀργήν
Nahum 1:2	חמה	θυμοῦ
Nahum 1:3	ארך אפים	μακρόθυμος
Nahum 1:6	אף חרון חמה	ὀργῆς ὀργῇ θυμοῦ
Hab.3:2	רגז	θυμὸς
Hab.3:8	אף עברה	ὀργίσθης θυμός

Hab.3:12	אָה	θυμῶ
Zeph.2:2	אָה חרון	ὀργὴν θυμοῦ
Zeph.2:3	אָה	ὀργῆς
Zeph.3:8	אָה חרון	ὀργὴν θυμοῦ
Zech.7:12	קצף	ὀργή
Zech.8:14	הקציף	παροργίσει
Zech.10:3	אָה חרה	θυμός

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Matt.3:7
 Luke 3:7
 Luke 21:23
 John 3:36
 Rom.1:18
 Rom.2:5
 Rom.2:8
 Rom.4:15
 Rom.5:9
 Rom.9:22
 Rom.12:19
 Rom.13:4
 Rom.13:5
 Eph.2:3
 Eph.5:6
 Col.3:6
 I Thess.1:10
 I Thess.2:16
 I Thess.5:9
 Heb.3:11
 Heb.4:3
 Rev.6:16
 Rev.6:17
 Rev.11:18
 Rev.14:10
 Rev.14:19
 Rev.15:1
 Rev.15:7
 Rev.16:1
 Rev.16:19
 Rev.19:15

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